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Cities have often been likened to symphonies and poems,
and the comparison seems to-me a perfectly natural one:
they are, in fact, objects of the same kind, The city
may even be rather higher, since it stands at the point
where Nature and artifice meet. A city is a congregation
of animals whose biological history is enclosed within
its boundaries; and yet every conscious and rational act
on the part of these creatures helps to shape the city's
eventual character. By its form, as by the manner of
its birth, the city has at once biological procreation,
organic evolution, and aesthetic creation. It is both
natural object and a thing to be cultivated; individual
and group; something lived and something dreamed; it is
the human invention par excellence.
Claude Levi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques

ABSTRACT
Environmentalism: Philosophical Sources of 19th Century Urban Thought
by Hong-Bin Kang
Submitted to the Department of Architecture on August 12, 1980 in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
The emergence of modern urbanism as a separate discipline is an
event in intellectual history; it was brought in part by the
epistemological shifts that allowed the city to arise as an object
of self-conscious empirical knowledge.
The rise of the city as an object of empirical knowledge is a
corollary of the emergence of environmentalism. A broad intellectual
mode that operates across disciplinary boundaries, environmentalism
is characterized by its cognitive schema of viewing given objects
or phenomena in terms of their interactions with their spatial
contexts. Environmentalism considers "place" to be causally effective,
granting it an epistemological and ontological status.
The visibility of environment rests on the acceptance of certain
cognitive prerequisites: the topological conception of space, the
acceptance of change and development as the order of things, the
axiom of the mutability of things, and the reality of holistic
formations such as society, culture, region, and city.
Environmentalism emerged at the end of the eighteenth century as
a pervasive theoretical orientation. It could not florish under the
Renaissance and the mechanist world views, as their universalistic,
unitary, static and geometric bias was incompatible with its
epistemology. The possibility of environmentalism was opened with
Newtonian dynamics and particularly with the emergent idea of field.
It emerged with the rise of the idea of life as an autonomous process
and the concomitant categorical distinction between mechanism and
organism.
The adoption of environmentalism in the consideration of the human
condition entailed the rejection of the traditional deterministic or
humanistic conception of man in favor of the idea of the "malleability"
of man. Even when human malleability was accepted, the category of
environment was initially applied only to the natural realm, leaving
man-made artifacts to be viewed solely in terms of a creator-created
relationship. Human artifacts came to be seen as parts of man's
environment only when the rising sense of alienation and a holistic
orientation undermined the convention of the nature and culture on the
one hand and the precept of the one-to-one correspondence between
human intentions and products.
Artifactual environmentalism invited social activism; it brought
about the view that the improvement of the environment leads to the
improvement of man and his cociety. Bentham's Panopticon scheme is
vii
an inversed example of this view, where environmental
deprevation was purposefully employed as a means to reform
the delinquent. Owen's communitarian experiments constituted
a positive example, where new environments were created as a
means to bring about a total reconstitution of society. In
Chadwick's sanitary reform movement, the city attained a new
status as a causal factor of public health. Chadwick's movement
was correlated with the rise of environmentalist medical theories
of disease and public health. Geddes united all previous strands
of environmentalism in his theory of the new science of "civics"
and produced the first ecological, evolutionary theory of the
city and city planning. His global interpretation of environment
and environmentalism led Geddes to view the city as a central
factor in human evolution and urbanism as a new field of paramount
moral and practical importance.
Environmentalism had corollaries of far-reaching implication.
Metaphysically, environmentalism constituted an attempt to
reconcile several dichotomies: free-will versus determinism;
mentalism versus materialism; and individualism versus holism.
Ideologically, it attempted to maintain the ideal of human
equality and unity together with its diversity and variation;
it also offered an alternative program of social reform to
laissez-faire liberalism and collectivist socialism. Episte-
mologically, environmentalism brought a new set of facts and
relations into focus, providing both new forms and subjects of
scientific enquiry. Modern urbanism is a combined product of
these corollaries. Environmentalism led to a reconstitution of
the role and the object of planning: it made the anonymous popu-
lation the axis of planning rather than the designers; invited
a life-centered approach to the city rather than geometric
concerns; and encouraged functional, process-oriented method
rather than solely morphological, product-oriented emphasis.
Thesis Supervisor: Stanford Anderson
Title: Professor of Architecture and History
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INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
The city today is a well-established subject of theo-
retical enquiry. While a unified "science" of urbanism
has yet to emerge, many academic disciplines and sub-
disciplines have it as their central task to observe,
describe, compare, and explain various aspects of the
city and the life lived within it. In terms of practical
planning which now constitutes an important function of
city government, theoretical knowledge of how the city is
formed and works is also considered an important prere-
quisite for realizing both accurate diagnoses and
effective solutions to its problems.
This conception of the city as something to be empi-
rically investigated and as something "to be known" is
of only recent origin. Despite the fact that the history
of urban settlement is as old as the history of human
civilization itself (in fact, the word "civilization"
derives from the Latin civitas, city-state or the
organization of citizens), and that man's planned inter-
ventions in his habitat abound in urban history, only
during the latter half of the last century has the city
come to be seen as a legitimate field for systematic
investigation. For the eighteenth century theorist, as
Tafuri noted, the city belonged to the same category as
painting, a realm of human creativity considered as lying
outside the domain of scientific law and discourse. 1
Various terms describing all forms of city planning --
urbanization, urbanism, town-planning, Stadtebau -- are
scarcely a century old,2 and the various academic
disciplines specialized in the study of the city are of
even more recent origin.3 Only in a "retrospective
regrouping" can we speak of urban planning or urbanism
in general during historical periods.
Hence, the question arises: how did the city become
accessible to scientific investigation? What transform-
ations in the field of collective thinking warranted a
new way of looking at the city, leading eventually to
the formation of new areas of research?
Commonly, the birth of modern urbanism is viewed as
a consequence of two factors at work in the cities of
the nineteenth century. The first factor is the sheer
physical state of the cities which created conditions
rife with problems -- the growth of over-population,
the lack of sanitation and public amenities, and a
general state of disorder caused by the imposition on
the urban environment of rapid transformations in the
society's techno-economic structure. A second factor
often cited is the state of public consciousness towards
such problem-situations; the new reform-oriented ideology,
particularly the ideas of the "utopian" socialists, is
seen as having heightened public sensitivity to the
problems of the living environment, making people consider
the city's prevailing conditions as not only unacceptable
but remediable through corrective action.
While it cannot be disputed that nineteenth century
cities were beset with acute environmental problems and
that the pioneering practical and theoretical works on
the city represented attempts to ameliorate such problems,
the objective existence of a problem situation alone does
not quite explain why the city came to be viewed as
something that could be studied in similar ways as natural
systems. Developing a positive science is neither an
automatic nor a compulsive way of responding to what is
perceived as a problem situation. It would be absurd to
explain the emergence of the science of modern preventive
medicine in the last century in terms of that century's
poor state of public health. In death tolls, the nine-
teenth century was certainly no worse than preceeding ones
2
and fares definitely better than the plague-ridden four-
teenth century. Furthermore, the very idea of "public
health" is itself a product of nineteenth century medical
thought; the emergence of the science of preventive
medicine owes as much to the formation of this idea as
to the actual health conditions of the general public.4
Having recourse to the influence of nineteenth century
reformist ideology as well as the general scientific
inquisitiveness of the time does not fully answer the
question either. Even in our century we do not feel
compelled to develop a "scientific" discipline to study
every conceivable category of thing in the world; we do
choose problems, and find it perfectly acceptable to
admit that some things are either not worthy of such
effort or are simply outside of, to use Franyois Jacob's
expression, "the realm in which reason can maneuver."5
Furthermore, reformist ideology is not necessarily
congenial to the formation of fields engaged in the study
of urban problems. Despite his well-known condemnation
of the miserable housing conditions in English industrial
towns, Engels remained a vehement opponent to movements
aimed at ameliorating these conditions. For him such
problems were, though acute, symptoms of larger structural
failures in society, warranting no separate treatment. 6
What is remarkable, then, from a historical point of
view, and yet remains inadequately explained, is the
very fact of the city emerging as an object of self-
conscious reflection and scientific knowledge.
The birth of modern urbanism is, after all, an event
in "collective epistemology" as it is an incidence of
the convention of techno-political praxis. It is as much
a result of broad transformations in the ways of viewing
the external world as it is a consequence of objective
changes in the condition of the city proper. The world
that directly impinges on people and elicits their varied
3
responses is not one that is objectively "given" to them;
rather, such an "operational" world, to adopt the
expression of the American anthropologist Marston Bates,7
is one that is "constructed" through the cognitive frame-
work people consciously or unconsciously bring in ordering
their experiences of a given reality. It is the shared
cognitive framework that broadly defines the terms and
categories with which the external world is perceived,
conceptualized, and evaluated. And it is such a cognitive
framework that largely structures the choice of problems
attended, the types of concepts and theories developed,
and the fields of research established. Underlying the
emergence of modern urbanism, then, are certain shifts
in the received cognitive framework, shifts which not only
made the city accessible to systematic enquiry, but also
gave both epistemological legitimacy and moral urgency
to the pursuit of such an enquiry.
This dissertation is an attempt to determine some of
the philosophical sources of modern urbanism. Pursuing
the theme that the rise of modern urbanism was an integral
part of broad and far-reaching transformations in the
received modes of viewing the world, the dissertation
focuses at the time when the field of modern urbanism
was beginning to emerge, and attempts to lay bare the
nature of the epistemological and metaphysical shifts
which made the systematic study of the city possible,
desirable, and valid. The central thesis is that the
rise of modern urbanism was profoundly predicated on
the emergence of the concept of environment and of the
ideas connected with it.
Canguilhem, the French philosopher and historian of
science, recently noted that the notion of environment
has come to occupy a central place in modern man's
experience and knowledge of the world.8 While Canguilhem
was referring mainly to the notion of environment in
4
biological sciences, we may say the same thing with
respect to the field of urbanism. Since it defines
both the subject and object of enquiry, the concept of
environment is as fundamental to urbanism as the concept
of life is in biology or matter in physics. Indeed, the
concept is so basic to discourse about the city, whether
merely descriptive or explanatory, it only rarely emerges
at the level of conscious reflection or of explicit
theoretical formulation; it has become one of the "stock
notions" about the city which we simply take for granted.
The pervasiveness and familiarity of the term environ-
ment is deceptive. The concept of environment is highly
impregnated with theoretical presuppositions, and its
introduction to the field of discourse, whether generally
or specifically about the city, is only a recent pheno-
menon.
Environment is neither a natural category nor a neutral
concept devoid of philosophical coloration. While appli-
cable to a wide range of things, it presupposes a con-
stellation of determinate ideas, attitudes, and values.
Thus, the adoption of the concept of environment entails
an acceptance of a certain philosophical orientation --
environmentalism -- with far-reaching methodological and
practical consequences. Essential to the concept of
environment is the general consciousness that we are not,
nor can we be, completely free; that we are surrounded
and conditioned by a world of artifacts of our own making;
and that the shaping of our environment and the making of
ourselves are two sides of one and the same process. When
directed towards the city, the environmentalist orientation
constructs its research program on the premise that the
city is above all an ecological reality, impinging on
every aspect of its inhabitants' lives. This orientation
does not deny that the city is an artificial world created
through human activity; it does hold, however, that the
city exists and functions mainly as an "unintended
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consequence" of human actions, as a semi-autonomous
reality separate from the men who created it. Under
this orientation, therefore, the central question to
pursue becomes not one of how the city is made, but one
of how the city, once made, affects its inhabitants.
Only at the end of the eighteenth century did envi-
ronmentalism begin to emerge as an influential mode of
thinking. In the beginning, environmentalism appeared
mainly in the context of naturalistic discourse with
the category of environment being applied primarily to
natural formations impinging on life such as climatic
conditions, topographical settings or other geographical
features of a region. This, however, soon changed.
From the second decade of the nineteenth century, the
category of environment began to be applied to the world
of man-made objects and systems, giving rise to humanistic
environmentalism. With this diffusion of the environmen-
talist mode of thinking, it became possible to view the
man-made world not solely as a world of designed products,
as it had been hitherto regarded, but as autonomous reality
independent from men and, therefore, capable of condition-
ing their lives.
The theme I shall pursue in this study is that the
birth of modern urbanism was a product of the new view
of the man-made world sketched above, a view ushered
in by the emergent environmentalist mode of thinking in
general and by its application to the world of human
artifacts in particular. As an exploration of this theme
requires two differing levels of analysis, one epistemo-
logical and the other historical, I shall accordingly
proceed in two steps in this study.
In Part One, I consider environmentalism as a general
mode of thinking. The purpose of this part is to
determine the nature of epistemological and philosophical
shifts which gave rise to environmentalism and, thus,
6
ultimately to modern urbanism. In Part Two, I examine
how environmentalism, defined and analyzed in Part One,
rendered possible and gave structure to the early modern
conception of human habitat and the city. This part
consists of a series of historical case studies -- the
proposals and theories of Jeremy Bentham, Robert Owen,
Edwin Chadwick, and Patrick Geddes, who are commonly
regarded as pioneers in modern urbanism. The purpose of
these analyses is to show that, behind the diverse con-
cerns and approaches represented by the selected cases,
there was a common source of the environmentalist
premises, and that the development of urbanistic theories
was concomitant with the growing sophistication of
environmental theories.
7

PART ONE
ENVIRONMENTALISM AS A MODE OF THINKING
9i

I. ENVIRONMENT AS A CATEGORY OF THOUGHT
To begin our investigation of the origin and early
development of the environmentalist mode of thinking,
let us first consider the characteristics of the seman-
tic formation by which the concept of environment is
prescribed and, by extension, the mode of environmental
discourse is circumscribed.
What constitutes 'environment'? Evidently the general
meaning of environment cannot be induced from properties
internal to various things and systems to which we apply
the term. The term has anexceptionally diverse and
diffuse usage, its particular denotations varying greatly
in kind and scale. There is no common substance shared
by everything that is called 'environment,' and, there-
fore, no substantive, inductive definition is possible
for the term.
How are we, then, to characterize the concept of
environment? The answer lies in the fact that environ-
ment is fundamentally a relational category. Its seman-
tic identity derives not from the substance of its
denotations but from the particular ways in which those
substances are viewed, structured, and ordered into an
intelligible pattern. In other words, its significance
rests on the cognitive schema it presupposes. In order
to "define" the concept of environment and therefore
discern the semantic unity underlying various forms of
environmental discourse, we need to determine the nature
of cognitive operations prescribed by the schema.
Broadly speaking, the following four cognitive pre-
suppositions circumscribe the semantic structure on which
the concept of environment is supported.
II
First of all, 'environment' predicates a binary
separation of all things of interest in a given context.
Being a relational category, 'environment' presupposes
the existence of that which it environs ('environed'
hereafter); without implicating its correlate, 'environ-
ment'is both unthinkable and indeterminate. Furthermore,
the two correlated categories exhaustively map the field
of a given semantic universe. In it, any given thing
belongs either to the category of 'environment' or to
that of 'environed'; there is no place for categories
other than these two or for gradations in between them.
While self-evident, this presupposition of binary
separation nonetheless sets environmental cognition
apart from many other modes of viewing things in the
world. Environmental cognition stands in contrast to,
for example, taxonomy, which involves more than two
categories that are not necessarily mutually-implicating;
or to analogy, where the focus of the mental operation
is not to separate between things but to overcome
phenomenal differences. We shall see the implication
of this point in the next chapter.
Secondly, the concept of environment presupposes that
things brought into an environmental relationship are
spatially contiguous or juxtaposed and temporally coin-
cidental. Differently put, 'environment' and 'environed'
meet each other at a common spatial boundary. Fundamental
to the concept of environment is that the relationship
it establishes is one between co-existent things. Things
that are separated in time cannot be environmentally
related, even if they occupy the same place in succession.
Not all co-existent things can be environmentally related,
however. The environmental relationship can exist only
between things that are spatially contiguous or juxta-
posed; that is to say, only between things that meet each
other at a common spatial boundary. Thus, as Stea and
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Downs aptly put it, 1 there is a quality of "whereness"
inherent in the concept of environment. The parameters
circumscribing an environmental relationship are such
topological ones as exclusion and inclusion as well as
continuity and limit. In common discourse, such loca-
tional prepositions as 'near', 'in', and 'at' describe
an environmental relationship. Other non-locational
spatial parameters, such as formal resemblance, congruence,
and the homology of proportion are completely irrelevant
in constructing an environmental relationship, making
Euclidean or perspective space incommensurate with the
space presupposed by the concept of environment.
Thirdly, there is a relationship of logical asymmetry
between 'environment' and 'environed'.2 If 'A' ix an
environment of 'B', 'B' cannot be at the same time an
environment of 'A'. Thus, while we speak of a home as
the environment of a family, we do not consider family
an environment of home, even if we grant that the two
affect each other. This asymmetry indicates that the
space structuring an environmental relationship is
inherently 'centered' and relativistic. 'Environment'
and 'environed' are not co-equal components whose
relative locations are reversible within a unified and
uniform spatial framework. Rather, one contains the
other. Thus, 'environment,' as the place or situation,
enwraps the 'environed' positioned within it, while the
converse does not hold. As such, 'environment' is
cognized as an undivided and indivisible whole, and
often without determinate outer limits. In this sense
it is like background in visual perception. On the
other hand, the 'environed' are always bounded, determi-
nate, separable entities or systems. Like figures in
visual perception, 'environed' presupposes an unambiguous
demarcation.
Lastly, the concept of environment posits a web of
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functional interdependence between things brought into
an environmental relationship. While binary separation,
spatial contiguity, and asymmetrical relationship are
all necessary prerequisites of an environmental rela-
tionship, they are not sufficient. In addition to these,
the presence of dynamic interaction is required. This
requirement implies two things that are connected but
not quite the same. The first implication is that
'environment', whatever the denotation, is not an effect-
less, inert, and blank background, but rather an agent,
something with causal power and the quality of a resource.
In addition, the 'environed' are not completely self-
contained in their existence, behaviour, and development,
but dependent on factors originating from outside them-
selves. Or, to put it differently, the boundary
separating 'environment' and 'environed' is not absolute
but permeable.
The above four relational modes -- binary separation,
spatial contiguity or juxtaposition, asymmetrical
ordering, and functional integration -- constitute the
essential attributes of the concept of environment and,
as such, underlie all forms of environmental discourse,
whether or not one is conscious of it. None of these
four is necessarily unique to the concept of environ-
ment, and none alone is sufficient to form the basis
of environmental discourse; all four are required as
necessary conditions. Consequently, the rise and
general acceptance of environmental discourse depends
on the compatibility of the prevailing convention of
thought with these four modes of ordering things and
knowledge.
But where does the primary intellectual force of the
environmental mode of thinking lie? What conceptual
interests does an adoption of this mode of thinking
fulfill?
14
Although the concept of environment seems obvious and
easy, it has certain inherent ambiguities and difficulties.
For one thing, it is always difficult to determine where
'environed' ends and where 'environment' begins. Is
clothing an extension of the body's external limit or is
it a part of the environment? Is a parasite inside an
organism a part of the organism or that of its environment?
This problem of demarcation is even further confounded
when man and man-made artifacts are considered in envi-
ronmental terms. Is culture an attribute of environment
or is it an extension of human attributes? The difficulty
of finding clear closures of 'environment' and 'environed'
creates serious problems when environment is used as an
explanatory concept. It engenders tautology.
These difficulties derive from the very nature of the
cognitive operation presupposed by the concept of envi-
ronment. The viability of environmental cognition rests
on balancing between two 'clean-cut' ways of conceptual-
izing two given sets of data: one which sees them as two
completely separate and mutually independent wholes, and
the other which views them as forming a single, fully
integrated whole. Environmental cognition forsakes both;
it relates the two sets as being semi-autonomous and
semi-integrated, while still positing that they make up
a semantic universe. For this reason, it is inherently
arbitrary to divide this universe into two sets --
'environment' and 'environed'; it depends ultimately on
the intentions of the person studying any particular
set of objects as to which other set should be related
environmentally.
The foregoing discussion may be illustrated by an
analogy. In a way, environmental cognition contrasts
with what is called in perceptual psychology "object
perception." As extensively investigated by Gestalt
psychologists, we tend, in visual perception, to see
15
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1. M.C. Escher, "Day and Night"
objects rather than backgrounds or spaces between them;3
only by deliberately ignoring the sensory data of the
background can we distinguish objects, make out what
they are, identify them, and compare them with other
objects in the same visual field. We can observe the
'background' only with effort, and only by shifting
our normal focus of vision to what we ordinarily see
but not consciously. Even more difficult, if not
impossible, is to view both the object and the background
simultaneously. To do so, as Escher's ingenious etching
so effectively demonstrates, is to attempt what is
highly unnatural to the workings of visual perception.
Without denying that cognition and visual perception
are not the same thing, we may still say that environ-
mental cognition involves similar difficulties; it
requires mental efforts that do not easily lend them-
selves to simple,clear-cut logic.
In this "unnaturalness" lies, however, the very source
of the epistemological potency of environment as a
category of thought. This quality, and the arbitrary
nature of demarcation between 'environment' and 'environed',
make it possible to attend intellectually to what does
not readily present itself to positive thinking. By
virtue of this category, the aggregate of things that
would otherwise remain an amorphous, indeterminate,
and impotent 'background' in the field of knowledge,
gains configuration, effect, and even ontological status,
thereby inviting intellectual and practical attention.
The history of the emergence of environmental thinking
is, then, a history of the reconstitution of the form of
knowledge and the picture of the world; it is a process
of invisible things becoming visible and, figuratively
speaking, the background becoming the foreground. This
process is neither unilinear nor followed consciously
or consistently. In retrospect, however, there is a
17
certain discernible pattern in this process, which makes
a rational reconstruction possible.
On the whole, the history of environmental thinking is
one in which 'environment' evolves from what is initially
an implied, undifferentiated, and generalized idea to a
highly differentiated, positivistic, and even reified
concept. To adopt Foucault's expression, it is a history
of the gradual surfacing of the idea from the unconscious,4
"archaeological" level to the level of scientific con-
sciousness. From the perspective of the perceiving man,
this history represents an increasing "externalization"
of the world. Since environmental thinking subdivides
a given semantic universe in order to reconstitute it,
its development concurs with the progressively more
differentiated and refined subdivisions by which the
cognized world is reordered into a series of binary
pairs. Thus, the idea of environment first arises with
the collapse of the unitary view of the world and the
concomitant division between the living and non-living
worlds; becomes applicable as a correlate of the human
world with the separation of nature and culture; and
finally comes to encompass the world of man-made objects
as artifacts which are seen as a separate and externalized
reality, independent from man whose activities create it.
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II. MACROCOSM, MECHANISM, AND THE ABSENCE OF ENVIRONMENT
Earlier, we compared the problems of environmental
cognition with those of perceiving an object and its
background simultaneously -- of paying equal attention
to both parts. This comparison suggests a minimal
condition without which environmental thinking is
inconceivable: both the possibility and the incentive
of distinguishing an object and its background. We
can think of two cases where this condition is absent.
The first case is one where the background is a mirror
image of the foreground. Escher's etching of the black
and white birds is a classic illustration of such a
case. Because one is exactly like the other, there is
no way of establishing a visual hierarchy between the
two sets of images, and this being so, there is no
inducement for employing environmental terms. The second
case discourages environmental thinking for the opposite
reason. In this case the mind pays attention only to
objects and the various relations between them; the
background is completely powerless, without effect, and
void of content, as in the case of a printed page: its
sole effect is to act as a "gap" between objects and,
consequently, it rarely enters into the field of
conscious thought.
By analogy, the Renaissance doctrine of microcosm
and the underlying idea of similitude correspond to
the first of the above cases: they discourage the forma-
tion of environmental thinking through their predilection
to draw things together into family resemblances despite
spatial incongruities. The second case is exemplified
by mechanistic philosophy, a model of knowledge and a
world picture preeminent in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. Mechanistic philosophy did not produce
environmental thinking because, as we shall soon see, its
assumption of the absolute reality of rigid, impenetrable
bodies was fundamentally incompatible with an environ-
mental mode of perceiving the world.
* * *
In the literature on the general topic of human habita-
tion, one broad approach may be distinguished by its
reliance on some cosmological, metaphysical schema of the
native people in interpreting both the form and origin
of their habitation. Joseph Rykwert's treatise, The Idea
of the City, typifies such an approach. In this work,
Rykwert seeks the origin of orthogonal planning in the
cosmological beliefs of ancient civilizations. For Rykwert,
the founding of a town is more than a pragmatic, practical
activity; it is, and thus should be explained as, a
primarily symbolic gesture. In the minds of the actors,
the founding is equivalent to the creation of the world,
motivated by the desire to "consecrate" the place and
make it "fit" for human habitation. A place is sanctified
by establishing an order in it, and the order is created
by arranging the structure of the habitation to mirror
the principles that are thought to govern the universe.
The town thus created is "micro-cosm," an "imago-mundi,"
an earthly reflection of the cosmological order. It is
in this light that Rykwert considers the axial planning
of the Roman mundus, its cardo and decumanus.
This "microcosm" approach has been influential in the
received interpretation of settlement forms, particularly
those of ancient civilization and contemporary primitives.
We find a similar approach in Paul Wheatley's analysis of
medieval cities (in which he suggests that they are
modelled after medieval cosmogeography), in Nelson Wu's
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study of Chinese and Indian architecture and town
planning,2 and in Tzonis' analysis of an African village.
In a more generalized form, similar ideas are found in
the scholar of comparative religion, Mircea Eliade, 4
whose works were sources of inspiration for many similarly
spirited investigations of settlement pattern, including
the above-mentioned work of Rykwert.
"Microcosm" is at once a category of thought and a
general world model; it is a schema through which one looks
at the world as well as the conceptual image of the world
constructed on the basis of this schema. A pervasive
theme in human thought, the history of the idea of micro-
cosm is both long and varied. According to Conger,5 the
origin of microcosmic ideas lies in the pre-Socratic
natural thought (Conger ascribes the origin to Anaximander)
which recognizes a similarity of process and structure
in the universe and in man. Plato's cosmology contains
microcosmic interpretations, and similar ideas strongly
influenced the Stoicism and Neo-platonism of Plotinus
(the resemblance is such that the cosmos may be called
an image itself, always moulding itself; the parts of
the universe may be regarded even as wholes); the idea
of microcosm remained in medieval theology as a conve-
nient method of reconciling religion with natural sciences.
It is, however, in Renaissance thought that microcosmic
ideas attained their highest influence. According to
Foucault, the idea of microcosm was "one of the most
frequently mentioned terms" at the time of the Renais-
sance.6 Even after the Renaissance, it continued to
affect Western thought, most notably in the metaphysical
systems of Leibniz and Spinoza, and later even in the
idealist philosophy of Herder and Schelling. In early
modern thought, the idea is said to have influenced the
psychological theory of Jung and, according to Donald
Levy,8 Freud as well.
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The essential ingredients of the microcosmic idea
are the belief that the universe and its parts (usually
man) are constructed according to the same harmonic
principles so that each part is sympathetically attuned
to the others and the belief that there is a relation
of similitude between the whole (macrocosm) and each
of its parts (microcosms). Thus under the microcosmic
idea it becomes possible that:
The stars are the matrix of all the plants and every
star in the sky is only the spiritual prefiguration
of a plant, such that it represents that plant, and
just as each herb or plant is a terrestrial star
looking up at the sky, so also each star is a celes-
tial plant in spiritual form, which differs from the
terrestrial plants in matter alone . . . , the
celestial plants and herbs are turned downwards
the earth and look directly down upon the plants
they have procreated, imbuing them with some
particular virtue. (9)
Foucault distinguishes four principal ways in which
things and beings in the universe are linked to one
another in the web of similitude: a resemblance of
the place or "convenienta," which guarantees the resem-
blance between things that are spatially juxtaposed
or close to each other ("the body is altered and corrupted
by the passions of the soul"); "aemulatio," or emulation,
one reflecting the other in distance, "from one end of
the universe to the other" (the human face emulating
the sky, man's intellect reflecting God's wisdom);
"analogy," resemblance of relations (the vegetable is an
animal living head down, its mouth -- or roots -- buried
in the earth, and man's body the possible half of the
universal atlas); and, finally, "sympathies," the
principle of mobility, or the power to attract the like
to the like (what drives the root to water, what separates
fire from water). 10
The microcosmic interpretation of the world guarantees
the unity of the world, as, according to this interpre-
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tation, everything is a mirror image of everything else.
Yet, the infinite series of resemblances are not laid
bare to open eyes. They are hidden from man's probing
mind, yet not completely so. The material world is a
"signature" marking the hidden relationship of resem-
blances. It consists of "signs" God left, as "a man
who buried a hoard of treasure, marked the spot so that
he may find it again."11 The form of knowledge is, then,
the unearthing and deciphering of these hidden signatures,
the finding of similarities between things. As the
resemblances are universal, "everything resembles
everything else," knowledge of one naturally leads to
knowledge of all others, knowledge of parts to the
knowledge of wholes. Thus, Plato could maintain that
"all nature is akin, and the soul has learned everything,
so that when a man has a single piece of knowledge --
learned in ordinary language -- there is no reason why
he could not find out all the rest."1 2
The microcosm ideas and the attendant emphasis on
the principle of similitude are the foundations of
astrology, alchemy, and medicine in Renaissance thought.
An example is Paracelsus, whom Conger sees as the most
insistent and thoroughgoing of those who espouse the
doctrine of microcosm. Following the Hippocratean
notions, but interpreting them in more chemical, or
rather alchemic terms, he considered health as a har-
monious blending and balancing of the powers that make
up the universe -- moisture and dryness, cold and heat,
bitterness and sweetness. Supremacy of one of these
causes disease. Each place is endowed with the elements
of which the macrocosm is composed. Some places are
out of balance with one or more elements dominating the
others. People situated in such a place are affected
by virtue of the aforementioned "convenienta," by the
unbalanced state of the place, and become ill. Cure
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can be provided by re-establishing the balance. As
like is supposed to cure like, medicine can be derived
from astrology and alchemy. Man contains four elements:
his desire to eat because he is from the earth, to drink
because he is from the water, to breathe because he is
from the air, and to be warm because he is from the
fire. 1 3
Microcosmic theories look at the world in ways so
radically different from environmental thinking that
the dominance of these theories precludes the possibility
of environmental categories emerging in the field of
knowledge. Let us consider how the two systems of
thought differ.
First of all, the microcosmic theories are totally
indifferent to the criteria of spatial position, atten-
tion to which, as we have already discussed, is the
very foundation of the notion of environment. In
microcosmic theories, things are brought into relation-
ship not by virtue of their actually being in contact
in space, but by their resembling one another in
appearance or in character. In the web of resemblances,
the distance that separates things in space has no power;
all figures in the universe can be drawn together by the
interplay of duplicated resemblances, and this is so from
one end of the universe to the other. The star is the
paradigm of plants, and the movements in the heavens can
affect the state of human affairs on earth, because
resemblance and the power of sympathy operate on a plane
where the physical barrier of distance has no place.
Even in the case of "convenienta," spatial proximity
is dealt with only by turning it to the relationship
of resemblance. If the "humor" of the place is seen to
affect the state of health, it is so not because the
conditions of the place and the physiology of organism
are seen to be engaged in material interaction, but
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because the magical dictates of the like correspond to
the like, and because the logic of sympathy is supposed
to operate between things that happen to be situated
in the same location. Consequently, the topological
relation of "neighborhood," "boundary," "continuity"
are totally superfluous conceptions in the system of
similitude, and the size of things is irrelevant in
this world conceived in terms of similitude. The parts
can reflect the entire universe; there is no mechanism
in this thinking that separates things in terms of
parts and wholes, an operation most fundamental in
environmental thinking.
The relationship of similitude is incommensurate with
the idea of environment for another reason. As we have
described, the concept of environment presupposes a
binary distinction between things; continuity and sepa-
ration, inside and outside, bounded and unbounded are
the parameters by which things are grouped into two
mutually exclusive yet contiguous clusters, the environ-
ment and the environed. The relationship of similitude
does not lend itself to this kind of binary clustering;
resemblance is a kind of relation where there are
infinite possible gradations, where there is no firm,
logical threshold that separates the things compared
into two sets. The thrust of recognizing resemblance
is in fact to overcome the separation between entities
and to draw them together.
Furthermore, similitude relates things in symmetric
terms, contrary to the asymmetricity of the relationship
that environmental thinking requires for it to be
possible. If plants resemble stars, then stars resemble
plants; the relationship works both ways. In a world
composed of the infinite duplication of twins, it is
irrelevant to ask what is original and what are copies,
as the logic of resemblance precludes the relevance of
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such questions. This, of course, is not to say that
there are no postulates of hierarchy in the microcosmic
order of things: in astrology, as in alchemy, there
are assumptions giving ontological primacy to certain
elements of the world, such as four "humors," the
heavens, the original creation of God. So, in actual
cosmology, stars are more potent in their effect on
human affairs than plants, for which they provide models.
The point, however, is that this postulate of hierarchy
is something added to the logic of similitude, and is not
an integral part of it. This makes the system of thinking
based on similitude totally inconducive to the environ-
mental mode of structuring the experience of the world.
* * *
Let us now turn to a consideration of mechanistic
philosophy for its compatibility, or rather incompati-
bility, with the environmentalist mode of thinking.
First, a definition: by mechanical philosophy we mean
a research program which considered the natural world
as a machine, composed of inert bodies, and moved by
physical necessity. "Machine" here is used in a literal
sense, as an arrangement of bodily parts which are
designed, put together, and set going for a definite
purpose by an intelligent mind outside of itself.
Mechanistic philosophy was a product of the seven-
teenth century; it defined the framework of the century's
general intellectual orientation vis-a-vis the natural
world and is considered the catalyst of modern physical
science. As such, it represents a collective reaction
to the premises of Renaissance naturalism -- the tendency
to project the human psyche into the natural world, and
the refusal to separate body from mind and matter from
soul. In the seventeenth century, Renaissance naturalism
lost its former intellectual authority, which Descartes
26
scorned as being based on "illusions" produced by an
uncritical mind, and which Bacon assailed as "idolatry. ,14
As a collective research program, mechanical philo-
sophy drew from and, in return, shaped the contributions
of many scientists and philosophers. Galileo and Kepler
prepared the basis, Descartes provided the first rigorous
formulation, Gassendi, Hobbes, Gilbert, and Boyle
practiced it, and Newton expanded and redefined it.
Furthermore, as a picture of the world and as a form of
research, mechanical philosophy enjoyed an extremely
broad range of application, used for explaining every-
thing from atoms to animals and to the cosmos. Under
this program, as Descartes proclaimed, all nature was
a machine as machine was nature. Thus, for Harvey,
the heart and circulation system were hydraulic pumps
and conduits; 15 for Descartes men were engines endowed
with wills;l6 and for La Mettrie all animals were
automata. In this way, mechanical philosophy not only
provided a method of investigation but also determined
which aspects of the world were accessible to such
investigation.
As already indicated, at the core of mechanical
philosophy was the insistence on eliminating psychic
aspects from the picture of the material world. The
well-known Cartesian dualism formed the basis. To
Descartes, as to most of his followers, thinking and
the material realm were mutually irreducible: the substance
of thinking was spirit, while the substance of the
material realm was body. Between these two realms, only
the material world has extension, place, and motion.
In contrast to the Renaissance emphasis on visual
signs as the keys to true knowledge, mechanical philoso-
phy viewed physical reality as unlike what was immediately
received in visual perception. Physical reality contained
only body and motion, the "catholic principles" with which
one could trace all natural phenomena.18 As we shall see
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later, body and motion became interdependent in Newton's
redefinition of mechanics through the concept of force.
In the Cartesian system, however, the two remained final,
irreduceable qualities of things. Mechanical philosophy
considered motion as the most important primary quality,
since given the assumption of inert body, only motion
could account for the diversity and change in the world.
Hence the quest for the principles governing motion
became mechanism's central task.1 9
There were two contending traditions within mechanical
philosophy with differing views about the nature of matter
and the mechanism for motion. The atomist tradition, or
"pail of sand" theory as Bertrand Russell called it,
represented by Descartes' contemporary, Pierre Gassendi,
held that matter was not infinitely divisible and that
the world was composed of atoms which moved in a
surrounding void.20 The plenum theory (a bucket of
molasses) whose foremost proponent was Descartes, consi-
dered the physical world as one continuum and denied the
possibility of a void. For Descartes, the essence of body
was its extension, and all other sensible properties,
such as size, shape, density, and weight were derivatives
of extension. Void was impossible because "extension
of nothing is wholly contradictory."21 Ether, or the
"subtle matter," as Descartes called it, was posited to
fill the gap created by the evacuation of air or other
sensible matter by, for example, an air pump.22
Despite differences on particulars, however, the
proponents of both the atomic and plenum theories shared
the same fundamental conception of nature. The natural
world is composed of qualitatively neutral bodies whose
motion creates all natural phenomena. Furthermore, motion
is explained in similar terms of "impact." Since matter,
according to the mechanists, is by definition inert, it
cannot be the cause of its own motion. The common
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explanation was that the ultimate source of motion was
God while the immediate cause of motion was the impact
of bodies in contact. Only when a body is hit by another,
as with billiard balls, can motion be generated. And,
when bodies are separated in space otherwise void of
matter, an "ether" was posited that ensured the trans-
mission of "pressure" from one body to another.
With these main points in mind, we can now examine why
environmental thinking did not and could not develop
under this research program.
First of all, the spatial properties inherent in
environmental thinking are incommensurable with those of
mechanism. As Gillispie noted,23 Descartes housed
mechanical philosophy in a Euclidean conception of space.
Descartes geometrized the material world by equating
body with extension. Because everything is extension,
it follows that the constitution of the world is
exhaustively describable and explainable by the logic
of geometry. Not only body, but motion as well is
conceived in geometric terms, as displacement of a body
from a place and replacement by a new body. However
the world might appear to human perception, according
to the mechanists, it is nonetheless a geometric
world.
This geometric world can be described by means of
Descartes' invention, analytical geometry. Space that
can be pictured by means of this tool is Euclidean:
a world whose main parameters are "magnitude," the length,
width, and depth of bodies, and their configuration.
Bodies, in other words, are solid, self-contained and
permanent. The spatial properties which characterize
environmental relations on the other hand, are topolo-
gical: enclosure, the division of a field to the interior
and exterior, the relation of center to periphery, and
of penetration through spatial boundaries. The space
conceptualized by the mechanists is not accessible to
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environmental cognition since it does not involve the
above topological criteria as primary parameters.
Completely lacking the capacity for self-motion or any
autonomous process, bodies in mechanical philosophy
can be related to their surroundings only as carriers
of "impact." And because they are homogeneous "solids,"
their condition is unaffected by their surroundings
except through shift of position. No effect penetrates
into a body from the outside, and no force emanates
from within the body to the outside across its boundary.
Boundary is a rigid barrier between things, while at the
same time not allowing for a distinction of inside and
outside.
In the mechanical world made up of bodies alone (.ether
was a form of "body," though declared to be "subtle"),
there is no possibility of conceiving of environment or
of place. All possible relations in the world are
symmetrical in the form of contact between bodies, and
place is simply a synonym of space, "the space of the
thing placed," merely "the extremity which is between
the surrounding body and that surrounded. ,24 It is,
thus, inconceivable that body has significant relations
with its place.
While Cartesian kinematics pictured the world in ways
wholly incompatible with environmental thinking, Newton's
reform of mechanism at the end of the seventeenth century
signalled the beginning of an epistemological shift which
would eventually usher in evironmental ideas at the end
of the following century. The early signs of the shift
are discernible in Newtonian dynamics and in its conco-
mitant reinterpretation of the nature of "body" and
"action at a distance," which first appear in detail in
Newton's classic Mathematical Principles of Natural
Philosophy. 25
In its basic aspiration, the work continues Descartes'
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quest for a "universal science" in mathematical form.
And the world it pictures is also a mechanical one,
according to which the natural world is a machine
consisting of bodies possessing extension, figure,
number, motion, and rest. However, in contrast to
the Cartesian equation of body with extension, Newton
considers mass to be the most essential attribute of a
body, ontologically prior to extension. Furthermore,
Newton rejects the Cartesian "contact theory" of
motion. While retaining it as a mode, he nonetheless
posits gravitational force as the universal and funda-
mental mode of action. The material world represented
in Newtonian dynamics, then, is one whose masses reci-
procally determine one another's motions or positions
rather than one consisting of colliding bodies.
Unlike Cartesian "contact," which grants only the
"push" force as a source of motion, gravitation operates
as both a "pull" and a "push" force. Furthermore, it
is a form of action between bodies that are spatially
separated, not as in Cartesian contact. Magnetism does
not attract particles through contact.
Of course, questions arose about the mechanism causing
gravitational force to be transmitted from one body to
another through space. Newton's attitude to these
questions was neither clear nor consistent. In the
Principia, he adopts an agnostic position and tries to
avoid the question by saying that the mutual attraction
and repulsion between bodies exists and can be expressed
in terms of quantifiable laws; for these reasons,
metaphysical discussions, concerning whether gravitation
is truly action at a distance or concerning what the
mechanism of propagation might be, are superfluous.
In Optics, however, he posits the existence of ether,
an intervening medium which transmits gravitational
force. Throughout his life, Newton never abandoned the
conviction that rather than merely mathematizing gravi-
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tational phenomena, some intervening medium was a
necessary supposition. In the hands of his followers,
the "ether" was later developed into the idea of "an
elastic fluid," which came to be a general explanatory
schema detailing such phenomena as solidity, magnetism,
and gas which classical mechanics had failed to under-
stand.26
In his La Connaissance de la Vie, Canguilhem credits
Newton as one of the very first people to introduce the
idea of environment (milieu) in scientific thinking,
and he cites Newton's postulation of "ether" or its
later version, "elastic fluid," as implying environ-
mental concepts.27 The idea of ether alone, however,
does not call for the environmental concept; environ-
ment is absent in Cartesianism, as we have seen, despite
the fact that Descartes too posited the existence of
ether. The vital impetus for the consideration of
environment comes, I suggest, from the inclusion of
the idea of "force" as the central feature of his system.
"Force" in the sense of Newtonian dynamics is simply
a faculty of action. It denotes the innate capacity
in bodies to overcome resistance and cause motion. Force
is a property of mass, and is ontologically prior to
extension, shape, density or any other spatial quality.
The notion of "force" thus gives body a capacity which
it did not have under Cartesian mechanics: the power of
"pull." In a system where movement is seen to be caused
only by impact, bodies are no more or less than either
carrier or recipient of impact-motion, or of "push"
energy. As "force" is the property of mass, mass is a
harbinger of such energy; it is the center of "pulling"
forces emanating from the center. Thus, even when
stationary, bodies can be seen as centers of a spatio-
temporal field.
This has two implications pertaining to the notion of
environment. First, because there is a center, it now
32
becomes possible to talk about peripheries, vicinities,
closeness, etc.; in other words, something close to
the topological constitution of space, as opposed to
Euclidean solid figures, becomes conceivable. The
space is "warped" with many centers of force located
in it. Bodies enter into real interrelations with their
surroundings.
Secondly, the introduction of force expressly
challenges the precept of the solidity of bodies, where
their boundaries are the precise limit of their existence
and effect. In the gravitational concept, bodies are
conceived as "mass-points" and the perceptible boundary
in the transmission of gravitational force is a
necessary step in preparing the emergence of environ-
mental concepts. Furthermore, to a degree far stronger
than in the Cartesian system, gravitational theory
implies a reciprocal relationship between bodies that
attract and repel each other, thus beginning to open
the possibility of a relational category of environ-
ment. Gravitation is unthinkable in a world consisting
of just one body.
While the notion of gravitation allows the permeation
through boundaries, this is still a far cry from the
proper conditions under which the notion of environment
is possible. And this is due to the fact that in the
Newtonian system, bodies are still looked at as "objects"
and though there is an implied "field of force," the
relational mode to which the "objects" are subjected is
symmetrical, that is, between bodies that are pulling
and pushing each other as bodies. The very nature of
interaction visible in this system is one of action
and reaction. When thought leaves this domain and
ponders the causal mechanism that propagates such action
and reaction, it falters because it is beyond the realm
where reason can operate; there is no relational cate-
gory that can deal with adaptive processes, that can
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deal with objects and the influential surroundings
which yet are not exactly objects. Lacking proper
categories, such relations do not emerge in conscious
thought, and when they do emerge, they create insoluble
problems, requiring the reinvention of the notion of
"ether." An epistemology allowing for such a category
was not to appear until the end of the eighteenth
century when the theory of field and the concept of
life emerged.
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III. LIFE, ORGANISM, AND ENVIRONMENT
Purely from the standpoint of logic, there can be no
limit as to the kinds of things to which the category
of environment may be applied: there is no logical
reason why we cannot speak of the "environment" of a
piece of rock or of a hammer. In practice, however,
we use the term environment mainly as a correlate of
organism. In our common discourse, environment is
taken to mean the sum total of forces working on orga-
nisms from the outside in contrast to the forces of
organisms emanating from the inside; in our received
thought, environment implies organism, as organism
presupposes environment.
Undoubtedly, this customary pairing of environment
and organism in our discourse reflects the actuality of
such a relationship. From our lay observations and
from the teaching of ecological sciences, we know that
in reality there exists a complex web of adaptive
relations which tie living beings with their surround-
ings. But what must be remembered is that this
knowledge of the pairing is as much a result of our
subjective seeing as it is a reflection of objective
reality. After all, it is through the concepts of life,
organism, and adaptation that we see the living world
around us and come to the cognizance of the interdepen-
dency between living beings and their surroundings.
In other words, we see environment and organism as inse-
parable partly because we view them with categories
that are mutually implicated.
The point is, then, that the customary pairing of
environment and organism is more than a casual result
of our habit of thinking; it indicates the existence
of a common conceptual foundation which profoundly
correlates the two concepts. Like mountains and
valleys formed by the same geological forces, they
are mutually implicative as co-representations of
common epistemological strata, sharing the same condi-
tion of possibility and the point of entry to the
surface of conscious thought.
Keeping the above point in mind, let us stay on the
side of organism a little further. As we regard them
today, mechanism and organism are things of opposite
nature: one is artificial, lifeless, and without
autonomy, and the other natural, living, and self-
regulating; the separation between the two is deemed to
be as sharp and irrevocable as one between life and
death. However, as so ably studied by such authors as
Canguilhem, Foucault, and Jacob,1 such a categorical
distinction is only a recent phenomenon in Western
thought, emerging first at the end of the eighteenth
century. The ideas of organism, and thus of life,did
not exist before then. Raymond Williams reports that,
in seventeenth century English, the words mechanism
and organism were interchangeable.2 And, given the
intellectual prestige of mechanistic philosophy in
that century, naturally it was organism that was
considered to be like mechanism rather than the other
way around.
The absence of the categorical distinction, obviously,
does not mean that people did not theorize about the
living world. Theories of the living world existed,
but they were founded on forms of knowledge much
different from the ones familiar to us. The rise of
the concept of organism as well as of environment
reflect shifts in the forms of knowledge or "epistemo-
logical strata." The origin of the concept of environ-
ment must be searched, therefore, in such shifts, the
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shifts which brought on the categorical distinction
between living and non-living.
To begin this search, let us first consider the
"strata" that supported "biological" knowledge in the
eighteenth century -- the complex of ideas Lovejoy
called the doctrine of the Great Chain of Being.
As Lovejoy shows in his classic study, eighteenth
century thought was infused with the idea of the Great
Chain of Being. There has been "no period in which
writers of all sorts -- men of science and philosophers,
poets and popular essayists, deists and orthodox
divines -- talked so much about the Chain of Being,
or accepted more implicitly the general scheme of
ideas connected with it, or more bodly drew from these
3
their latent implications, or apparent implications."
Indeed, the Great Chain of Being was the "sacred phrase
of the eighteenth century," secondary only to the word
"nature," "playing a part somewhat analogous to that of
the blessed word 'evolution' in the nineteenth." 4
According to Lovejoy, the doctrine of the Great
Chain of Being frames the research of natural history
by providing three principles which tell how the
universe is constituted.
The first principle is that of "plenitude," meaning
that the universe is a plenum fomarum, a place where
all conceivable diversity in living beings is exhaus-
tively exemplified, and where no genuine potentiality
of being can remain unfulfilled.5 The universe is,
thus, "perfect," as it is full and complete; as Buffon
expressed it, in this universe, "everything there can
be, is." 6
The second principle is that of continuity. This
principle views the universe in terms of a linear
scale, positing all things and beings in the world as
forming a continuous and linear scale. The motto
"nature does not leap" expresses this principle well.
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This principle means that the qualitative differences
in things allow them to be arranged into a long chain
and that furthermore no link in the chain remains empty.
In this spirit, Locke claims that there are "fishes
that have wings" as well as birds "that are inhabitants
of the water, land] whose blood is as cold as fishes,"
because there are no gaps between birds and water
animals.
The last principle of the three, that of gradation,
posits that things in the world conform to a certain
"ontological scale" according to their generic nature
or essence. Thus, the series made up of things in the
world is not a continuum with no directionality or
"privation" but one that is hierarchic. The gradation
runs from inert, inanimate matter to plants, which have
additionally the features of nourishment and reproduc-
tion, to animals, which are endowed with sensation,
motion, and all the degrees of mental functioning
except reason, and to man, the uniquely reasoning being.
Usually, man is seen as located at the middle of the
chain. The places "above" him are occupied by various
angels, and the "highest" part is of course taken up
by God.8
The doctrine of the Great Chain of Being thus
guarantees the orderliness of the universe; under this
doctrine, the universe is a perfectly designed system
authored by an all-perceiving, completely rational,
and inexhaustively fecund source. This guarantee, in
turn, structures both the object and method of natural
history. Because the truth of the Great Chain of Being
transcends man's limited capacity for knowledge, the
objective of natural history is to ascertain this truth
through empirical observation, to read the principles
of plenitude, continuity, and gradation in the visible
world. If empirical observations noticed "gaps" in the
visible world, such gaps were taken as indications
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of an insufficient state of knowledge rather than as
threats to the authority of the Great Chain of Being.
This desire to maintain the fullness of the world in
the face of many observed "gaps" led the century to its
curious fascination with the search for "missing links."9
Taxonomy constituted the primary method of ascertaining
the orderliness of the world. Accordingly, individual
objects and beings were scrutinized to decide their
identities, which in turn were determined by the table
of classification; the table of classification arranged
the "types" of things and beings making up the world
according to the principles of plenitude, gradation,
and continuity.
To return to the subject of environment: in natural
history, the concept of environment did not and could
not exist; it was incommensurate and incompatible with
the metaphysical and epistemological premises on which
natural history was founded. The reasons are not
difficult to identify.
Above all, the preoccupation of natural history
with the taxonomy of types precluded aspects of the
individual organism's habitat becoming a legitimate
area of attention. Under the doctrine of the Great
Chain of Being, the ultimate epistemological value of
beings lay in their susceptibility to arrangement in
the table of taxonomy; the identities of individuals
and their properties were recognizable and explainable
only in reference to their positions in the abstract
grid in this table. Where organisms lived, and how
the habitat influenced or was modified by organisms,
did not surface as legitimate or worthy questions,
since they did not directly concern or help the task
of drawing up the table of classification. In short,
the quality of 'whereness' did not enter into conscious
thought under the doctrine of the Great Chain of Being.
To be sure, opinions varied as to the "correct" way
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of establishing identities and taxonomy. "System" and
"method" were two representative contenders. System,
a model associated with the name of Linnaeus, selected
a relatively small group of characteristics and examined
individual entities in terms of variations and constancies
of the chosen criteria; method, on the other hand,
attempted total classification and complete enumeration
of differences by selecting only a few natural beings
whose mutual resemblances were great and concentrating
on them. Buffon was a major proponent of this approach.
Despite their differences, however, the two approaches
rested on the same epistemological base. They were
simply two alternative ways of establishing identities
by means of the general a-spatial, a-temporal grid of
similarities and differences, and the aspects brought
under comparative scrutiny were those internal to the
entities under observation, such as size, shape, propor-
tion, and relative position of organs. In no way were
aspects of locality included in the taxonomic variables.
The concept of environment was not possible also
because the world depicted by the doctrine of the Chain
of Being was immutable, timeless, and complete. Since
all potential beings are seen to be exhaustively mani-
fested, and the Chain of Being complete, the world under
the idea of the Chain of Being is a finished product
where no genuine change or chance is possible. Further-
more, because no new types are allowed, and also because
individual beings are knowable only as "specimens" of
the type they represent, the range of these individual
beings' variability (and changeability) is severely
limited. In other words, individual beings are what
they are only by virtue of their membership in one of
the fixed types. They are, therefore, immanent, being
immune to forces of "external circumstance." This being
so, there is neither the necessity nor the possibility
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of generating the category of environment.
That the admission of genuine change, in addition to
the attention to locational qualities, is a precondition
for the formation of environmental concepts is further
illustrated by the "cataclysmic" theory. Advanced by
such naturalists as Buffon, Diderot, Maupertuis, and
Charles Bonnet,10 the theory considered the earth's
history as a series of geological catastrophes,
explaining the observed gaps in the natural world as the
result of the elimination of species through past
catastrophes. In the sense of introducing time into the
living world, the theory stands in contrast to the
completely static view of the world described above
and, in fact, anticipates the evolutionism of the
nineteenth century.11
Even in this theory, however, no genuine change is
allowed for individual organisms. As Jacob observes,
"biological time and terrestrial time remain unconnec-
ted"in this theory.12 To the extent that catatrophes
involve the habitat, the theory invokes, in a very
limited sense, the notion of environment, although
habitat in this theory was conceived simply as a region
of earth that lends itself to certain forms of life
while rejecting others. Yet, it posits such a total
correlation between habitat and its life forms that,
like air for breathing, the efficacy of the former is
recognizable only through the absence of the latter.
The habitat in the cataclysmic theory, then, is not
an environment in any real sense, since it lacks the
vital notion of the adaptive relationship that connects
the two. It is like a vessel containing water: breaking
the vessel eliminates the water, but this does not mean
that the water's properties are affected in any way by
the condition of the vessel. In a different sense,
"environment" in the cataclysmic theory is like "ether"
in Cartesian mechanics; both are auxiliary hypotheses
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invented to preserve the authority of the respective
research programs' hard cores.
To recapitulate, biological thinking in the eighteenth
century was founded on a form of knowledge not structu-
rally conducive to an environmental mode of thinking.
It viewed the world through immutable, a-spatial, and
a-temporal categories, making no conceptual distinction
between the living and non-living, and attending to
beings not as unique, centered individuals but as spe-
cimens representing types. As such, it admitted neither
the epistemological relevance of locational parameters
nor the possibility of change, autonomous process, and
functional interaction -- all vital prerequisites for
environmental thinking. From the end of the eighteenth
century, however, major shifts began to take place in
the form of biological knowledge.
These shifts brought about a radical reconstitution
of the form of knowledge as well as the picture of the
world. Under the doctrine of the Great Chain of Being,
the concept of life did not exist and, therefore, there
was no categorical separation between the animate and
the inanimate; the natural world was divided into three
"kingdoms" -- animal, vegetable, and mineral -- with only
imperceptible boundaries posited to exist between them.
Now, a dual division took hold: organic and inorganic.
This dual division, whose initiators included Lamarck,
Vicq d'Azyr, and Goethe, posited unbridgeable gaps
between the two domains, shattering the previous assump-
tions of continuous gradation; organisms were now endowed
with life and thus came to be seen as capable of self-
control and adaptation in contrast to the completely
inert, immutable inorganic things.
Lamarck wrote:
One will first remark a large number of bodies com-
posed of raw, dead material which increases by the
juxtaposition of the substances forming it and not
because of any internal principles of development.
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Those beings are generally called inorganic or mineral
beings . . . . Other beings are provided with organs
appropriate for different functions and are blessed
with a very marked vital principle and the faculty of
reproducing their like. They are comprised in the
general denomination of organic beings, (13)
Intimately connected with the rise of the concept of
life is a reversal of the traditional relation between
type and individual. In the natural history of the
eighteenth century, it was type (or species) that was
both ontologically and epistemologically primary;
invidual beings were determined by and knowable through
types. The concept of life, on the other hand, meant
that individuals should be seen as primary since they,
rather than types, are the very locus of life and all
of its manifestations. Thus, type came to be regarded
as derivative and the individual as the primary reality.
This rediscovery of the individual invited environmental
thinking in several ways.
First, it introduced the conception of space (and
time) as a centered, differentiated field, a necessary
condition, as we have seen, for the concept of environ-
ment. Because the new world-picture made the individual
the locus of change, growth, and adaptations -- in
short, of all processes that constitute living -- and
because it recognized each individual as a unique entity,
not as a replica of a fixed mold, it could not sustain
the previous unitary, homogeneous, absolute conception
of space and time; space and time became relativized as
fields, differentiated, heterogeneous and conceiveable
only with specific individuals placed as central points
of reference.
Secondly, the shift of attention from abstract type
to concrete individual allowed new ways of conceiving
wholes, making such aggregates as population and commu-
nity accessible to systematic observation and conscious
reflection. This became possible only when collective
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thought freed itself from the previous habit of grouping
individual entities solely on the basis of their taxo-
nomic similarities and differences. As long as the
abstract grid of classification was seen as the primary
form of knowledge, neither the incentive nor the concepts
were available to direct systematic thinking toward
such aggregates; for the logic of forming such aggregates
is not class-similarity but the sharing of common habitat
and the actual interaction among their components. Once
population and community entered the field of conscious
thought, it was only a step to viewing them as influential
environments relative to the individual members.
Thirdly, the concept of life enabled environmental
thinking by reconstituting the space in which the
organism lives. When organisms are viewed as machines,
the idea of environment is superfluous; lacking the
capacity for self-control, development, and reproduction,
machines remain totally extrinsic to the space in which
they are placed, and no meaningful relations bind them
with the surrounding space as an "outside." With no
separation of inside and outside, and without real
interaction connecting the two realms, the concept of
environment could not emerge.
In contrast, the concept of life brought with it all
the conditions that were necessary to think in terms of
environment -- topological separation of space into
inside and outside, the acceptance of change allowing
the presence of adaptive interactions reuniting these
separate realms, and the asymmetricity of such adaptive
relations. The dichotomous opposition of inside and
outside was ingrained in the earliest conception of
life. For Goethe, for example, life was "the productive
force against Ithe] action of external elements" 14 and
"the reason for Ian organism's] existence within itself";
for Kant, life was "an internal principle of action."1 5
44
Furthermore, organism was given a property of "interior-
ity" as opposed to its surroundings, because it alone
was capable of an autonomy of process; hence the asymme-
try of relation. In addition, the inside and the outside
were linked not only in semantic terms but by the actual
interactions of an organism with its surroundings, The
boundary that separates the organism and its setting was
no longer an impenetrable barrier but a surface of active
interface. To quote Cuvier, "the sphere of organism
reaches beyond the limits of the living body itself."1 6
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IV. MAN, ARTIFACT, AND ENVIRONMENT
In the preceding sections we traced the emergence of
environmental thought in the context of post-Renaissance
naturalistic thought. As we have maintained, environmen-
tal thought arose as an integral part of broad and far-
reaching tranformations in the conventions of both the
form of knowledge and the picture of the world; its
introduction to scientific discourse was concomitant
with the processes that undermined the static, unitary
conception of the world and ushered in a dynamic, diver-
sified counterpart. It could not and did not exist under
the unitary and static views of the world, because such
views did not allow conceptualizing reality in terms of
functional interactions between two spatially contiguous
or juxtaposed groups. It became possible only at the
end of the eighteenth century when the emergence of the
idea of life rendered such conceptualization possible.
Having dealt with the rise of environmental thought
at its most abstract level, we are still left with the
question: how does the general idea of environment find
its way to the discourse on cities? What conditions of
possibility does an environmental consideration of the
city require?
Clearly, there is a great difference between treating
a beehive in terms of environment and speaking of the
city as an environment. As an often-repeated aphorism
has it, "the city is not a beehive,"1 and human environ-
ment is qualitatively different from animal environment.
The city can be considered in environmental terms only
when "human environment" is accepted as a legitimate
concept.
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As a special case of the general idea "environment,"
the concept of human environment predicates two things
which, while overlapping, are not quite the same. The
first is the notion that man is fundamentally a con-
strained and conditioned being. It posits that man's
behavior, his thoughts and feelings are not completely
accountable in terms of dispositions and propensities
seen to be intrinsic to him, but are explainable only
when certain extraneous factors are taken into consi-
deration. This presupposition of the circumscribed
nature of human existence forms the core of what Bury
and Mandelbaum called the "doctrine of human mallea-
bility. 2 The second notion inherent in the concept
of human environment is that specifically human artifacts
are also parts of the external environment conditioning
human existence. Under this notion, artifacts are seen
to constitute a semi-autonomous reality, separate from
human prerogatives; despite their human origins, they
affect man's existential condition and even his physio-
logical and psychological nature. To put it conversely,
the notion is that -man is related to his products not
really as a producer but as a passive subject,
The history of the concept of human environment is
one of the gradual acceptance in collective thought of
the above two notions -- the doctrine of human -mallea-
bility and the idea of the semi-autonomy of artifacts.
As we shall see in the following, this history is a
process leading to an increasingly relativistic and
diversified orientation to the human order, and one
moving toward a reconciliation of certain contraditions
inherent in Enlightenment thought out of which the
concept of environment sprang.
That the concept of human environment is a correla-
tive of the idea of human malleability requires no
elaborate analysis. An essential attribute of the
concept of human environment is that man, like plant or
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animal, is affected by factors originating outside of
himself. Similarly, the idea that man is a conditioned
and constrained being presupposes the existence of
factors, agents, or forces that condition and constrain
him. The question of how man is to be demarcated from
his environment is not a simple one: it will have
answers which vary depending on particular viewpoints
and problems involved. This does not, however, dispute
that the above two ideas are fundamentally correlated.
In positing the man-environment dichotomy, an implicit
assumption is adopted which posits that man is not a
completely free being, that his existence is profoundly
affected by the exigencies of the environment in which
he is placed.
Historically, the concept of human environment and
its correlate, the idea of human malleability, emerged
as a challenge to two broad conceptions of human nature
pervasive in Western thought: one that posited the
predetermination of human character and the fixity of
variations among men; the other that viewed man as a
a completely free, unconstrained being. Let us con-
sider examples bearing on these anti-environmental
views.
A position most antithetical to the idea of human
malleability and hence to the concept of human environ-
ment can be found in the eighteenth century doctrine
of "polygenesis."3 A biological doctrine shared by the
century's many leading figures including David Hume,
Samuel Norton, and George Cuvier and influential in
guiding investigation into aspects of human society
and history, it maintained that the races of men are
natural species, formed by independent creations,
Concomitant with this thesis is the contention that
individuals' character traits as well as their intellec-
tual and moral capacities are not acquired but are
determined by group-specific hereditary factors. Thus,
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according to the doctrine of polygenesis, Gypsies keep
on the move because they have "Wanderlust" in their
blood, and blacks succeed in jazz music because they
are born with rhythm.
It is not difficult to see that the polygenesis
doctrine has a close intellectual connection with the
idea of the Great Chain of Being, an idea whose incom-
patibility with the concept of environment we have
already discussed. Once the races are seen as natural
species, they can be arranged in the Chain of Being
according to the principles of continuity and gradation.
Conversely, the precept of unity in nature dictates
that the racial divergences be seen as manifestations
of the order in the "Chain of Being," that they conform
to the above principles. One idea reinforces the other.
With this arises the notion that there are "higher" and
"lower" races which are as naturally and immutably
separated as dog and cat, and even the claim that the
"lowest" races are "connecting" links between homo
sapiens and the anthropoids, filling the gap in their
physiological and psychological differences. 4
By insisting on the predetermination of human races
by hereditary factors, therefore, the doctrine of
polygenesis denies human malleability and, with it,
resists the idea of human environment. The idea of
human environment is superfluous when the human order
is seen to be completely subsumed to the natural --
heredity in the present example. The doctrine of poly-
genesis is not, of course, alone in assuming hereditary
determinism in the exclusion of the idea of human
malleability by the environment. Similar hereditary
determinism is manifested in Galton's "eugenics, "6
although in this case Galton was concerned with the
effects of heredity on the intellectual and moral
characteristics of individuals rather than on group-
specific qualities. Another example of theories founded
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on a similar assumption is the "phrenology" of Joseph
Gall, who attempted to correlate men's mental faculties
and character traits with the congenital features of
the cranium.
As we see it today, heredity and environment are
complementary rather than contradictory concepts; we
do not find it a logical necessity to choose between
them, adopting one at the expense of the other, This
does not, however, mean that they can be easily embraced
within a single explanatory theory; as discussed earlier,
there are some serious ambiguities inherent in these
concepts, which make it difficult to construct such a
unified theory. As Glacken points out, it is characte-
ristic of nineteenth century thought that these concepts
were posited mainly as polar opposites rather than as
complements, thus inviting controversies over their
relative merits. 8
If the concept of human environment is absent in the
hereditary explanations of human divergencies because
of the latter's assumption of man's complete subsumption
to nature, it is equally lacking in the idea of man as
geographical agent, because this idea posits man's total
supremacy over nature. The idea that man is related to
nature essentially as its "superintendent" or as "-master"
is deeply ingrained in the biblical view of the world
as well as in Enlightenment confidence in man's innate
9intelligence. Among all beings, it is noted, -man alone
possesses self-conscious intelligence, and he alone is
capable of reasoned choice and action. He is placed in
the world as a master. The earth and all lower creatures
are made specifically for his use and exploitation. To
the Creator he is "vassal," but to nature he is master.
He has both the power and the duty to modify nature and
bring order to it.
The primary concern of this orientation is well
expressed in the title of George Marsh's book, Man and
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Nature; or Physical Geography as Modified by Human
Action (18641. According to Marsh, what deserves inves-
tigation is how "nature comes from our hands" rather
than how nature affects us. The focus of attention
is thus to such human modifications of nature as the
domestication of plants and animals, the construction
of dams, the draining of-marshes, and the opening of
canals. That nature affects us as an environment may
not be completely denied by the proponents of the idea
of man as geographical agent. Nonetheless, it is con-
sidered either insignificant compared to what man can
do to nature or too trivial to require self-conscious
reflection. Buffon expresses this when he says:
Nature comes from our hands . . . the state in
which we see nature today is as much our work
as it is hers. We have learned to temper her,
modify her, to fit her to our needs and desires.
We have made, cultivated, fertilized the earth;
its appearance, as we see it today, is quite
different than it was in the time prior to the
invention of the arts. (10)
To recapitulate, the concept of human environment
is not possible unless the malleability of human nature
and character is granted, and the idea of human mallea-
bility gains no viability when man is seen as immutable
and completely predetermined or completely free and self-
contained; the conception of neither the oneness of the
human and natural orders nor their total separation is
consistent with the idea of human malleability and envi-
ronment. Such polarized views of man's relationship
with nature represent what Marvin Harris characterizes
as the "grand paradox" of Enlightenment thought, where
"[a uniform] law governed the universe, determining the
smallest motion of the least grain of sand, but men need
not necessarily believe this to be true, and even if
they do, they are free to ignore its consequences." 11
The rise of an environmental interpretation of the human
order represents an attempt to resolve this "paradox."
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Environmentalism as applied to human existence posits
that human nature or the human condition is subject to
the exigencies of external reality. This idea is mani-
fested in many different forms in nineteenth century
thought. It is sometimes expresssed as the idea that
natural resources are capable of constraining or cata-
lyzing human progress; or that geographical factors
influence both the physiological and psychological states
of the individual and hence the general condition of
society; or that circumstances condition or determine
the individual's moral and intellectual character.
While opinions vary as to the nature of specific envi-
ronmental causes and of the mechanism of environmental
influence, the basic thesis remains the same: human
malleability by external factors.
One of the first to expound on the effects of nature
as a limiting factor of the human condition is Malthus,
whose An Essay on Population (1798) is commonly consi-
dered a source of the modern environmentalist position.1 2
In An Essay as well as his later work, Principles of
Political Economy Considered with a View to their Prac-
tical Application (1820), Malthus' aim was to show that
the Enlightenment assumption of limitless progress is
untenable. He constructs his criticism on the basis
of two premises: the fecundity of living beings on the
one hand and the limitedness of the resources necessary
to sustain life. For Malthus, as for many of his
contemporaries, fecundity of an organism is Nature's
law; an organism has the natural tendency to procreate
and multiply infinitely. Man's fecundity is such,
Malthus maintained, that if unchecked, the population
descended from a "single pair since the Christian era
would have been sufficient not only to fill the earth
quite full of people, so that four should stand in
every square yard, but to fill all the planets of our
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solar system in the same way."1 3 The fact that the
earth is not so disastrously overpopulated is, for
Malthus, an indication of the existence of a mechanism
checking population's unlimited growth, a mechanism
the "benevolent Creator" provided for along with
fecundity. Malthus proposed that the check on over-
population is ultimately the very limitedness of the
earth and of its productivity. Good lands are not
available in abundance, and the quantity of available
food is thus limited. While technical improvements
and inventions can increase food production, their
effect is severely limited since the land itself is
finite. The earth is, then, like a "closed room," an
"island," or a "reservoir," Malthus writes:
Where there are few people, and a great quantity
of fertile land, the power of the earth to afford
a yearly increase of food may be compared to a
great reservoir of water supplied by a moderate
stream. The faster population increases, the more
help will be got to draw off the water, and conse-
quently an increasing quantity will be taken every
year. But the sooner, undoubtedly, will the reser-
voir be exhausted, and the streams only remain. C14)
The conclusion Malthus draws from the above premises
is highly pessimistic. Disease, famine, war, destitution,
and all other sources of human misery are in the final
analysis unremovable from society, since they are the
very means through which Nature maintains the balance
of population with available resources. The only way
to achieve a permanent improvement of the human condi-
tion is to lower the birth rate; the reform of human
institutions, economic systems, and customs is, while
morally laudable, at best ineffectual in bringing about
genuine progress, and at worst destructive, since it
hinders the mechanism of a natural check.
Whether Malthus was right in his mathematics regard-
ing the growth rates of population and food production,
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or whether his gloomy view of social reform was justi-
fied, is, while a legitimate question, irrelevant in the
context of the present discussion, What requires atten-
tion is that, in insisting on the circumscribed nature
of human existence, Malthus introduced a version of
environmental theory. To be sure, "environment" in
Malthus' population theory is not a full-fledged notion,
In fact, it is a negative concept, deriving its efficacy
from what it lacks rather than what it has, and working
as a limiting factor rather than as a causal agent; the
question of how qualitative aspects of the environment
affect cultural formations, for example, does not
interest Malthus. Nonetheless, there is an unmistakable
element of environmentalism in Malthus' theory. It
attributes to man's habitat a power to profoundly affect
the well-being of individuals and societies.
Malthus' "dismal science" was the target of his con-
temporaries' many-sided attacks. Most vocal of his
antagonists were those who believed in human perfectibi-
lity, the idea that man's intellectual and moral capacity
could be infinitely improved. Often, though not always,
the idea of human perfectibility was reinforced with a
psychological version of environmentalism. This made it
akin to the Malthusian theory despite its otherwise
contrary views regarding human nature and the possibility
of reform.
In short, psychological environmentalism is charac-
terized by its central thesis that man's character traits
and mental faculties are moulded by the conditions of
his environment and, therefore, are infinitely modifia-
ble.15 According to this orientation, an individual's
conduct depends on his acquired habits and opinions, not
on innate ideas and propensities. Psychological envi-
ronmentalism rejects the rationalist contention -- a
contention advocated by, among others, Descartes,
Spinoza, and Leibniz -- that certain basic ideas and
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and mental traits are given a priori to individuals,
Instead, it embraces an empiricist conception of mind,
positing that the mind is composed of mental images and
sensations derived from the external world, and that all
complex ideas and percepts, and hence thoughts and acts,
are formed through association of such images or sen-
sations. 'Under this program, then, the external envi-
ronment is the ultimate source of habits and opinions
determining the individual's behavior. By altering his
environment, it follows, he can be made to acquire new
habits and opinions, and thus, to act differently.
Psychological environmentalism began to flourish
at the end of the eighteenth century. It was shared
by, among others, Locke, Helvetius, Godwin, Turgot,
and Holbach. Turgot, in his Plan for Two Discourses
on Universal History (1750), tried to explain beha-
vioral differences among individuals through differences
in education -- education not only in the sense of the
acquisition of knowledge, but also in the sense of what
one acquires from the environment in which he is
situated. Indeed, for Turgot, "all the objects which
surround us contribute to that education; the instructions
of our parents and teachers are only a small part of
it."l6 Monboddo went so far as to claim that great apes
are really uncultured human beings, and that they are
uncultured because they have been subjected by an
environment retarding the development of their potential.1 7
Holbach expressed more moderate, yet essentially similar,
opinions:
True morality should be the same for all the inha-
bitants of the globe; the savage man, and the civi-
lized; the white man, the red man, the black man;
Indian and European, Chinaman and Frenchman, Negro
and Lapp have the same nature. The differences
between them are only modifications of the common
nature produced by climate, government, education,
opinions, and the various causes which operate on
them. Men differ only in the ideas they form
of happiness and the means which they have imagined
to obtain it. (18)
56
Another example of psychological environmentalism
may be found in the science of "ethology," which John
Stuart Mill hoped to found.1 9 "Ethology" was to be a
science of human character, investigating both the
factors for the formation of character and the ten-
dencies of action by men of differing types of charac-
ter. As was the case in the above examples, the main
ideas of "ethology" were derived from the associationist
psychology of Locke and Condillac, who had rejected the
innatist view of human character and maintained the
all-importance of environment in character formation.
We shall see later how a similar doctrine shaped the
communitarian experiments of Robert Owen.
"Environment" in the above cases is conceived in an
extremely inclusive and generalized manner. It covers
virtually all things which surround the individual and
affect his sensory as well as his mental experience.
There is no systematic discrimination between differing
dimensions of the environment, between the individual's
behavioral setting and the objective ecological variables,
or between man-made organizational structures and
natural formations. As a result, not only are clear
terminological and conceptual distinctions absent
between ecological effects of the external world and
effects of enculturation or socialization, but, for
some authors, the words environment, circumstance,
education, and external reality are almost interchange-
able. This lack of specificity nothwithstanding,
however, the basic ingredients of environmental thought
are present in the above theories of character forma-
tion: the conceptual separation of man from the world
surrounding him; the assumption of the malleability
of human character; and the causal efficacy of factors
external to man in moulding his character,
Conceived as a sum total of things that affect the
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individual's experience and development, the environment
in these theories has no particular reference to aspects
of human habitat per se. The idea of environment having
specifically the human habitat as its designatu derives
from different sources. One.of these sources is what is
commonly called geographical environmentalism (or simply
"environmentalism" in geographical literatureL Geogra-
phical environmentalism is a broad theoretical orienta-
tion whose central thesis is that the region is an orga-
nized set of ecological variables, that various
geographical features of a region -- including climate,
soil, relief, flora and fauna -- are causal factors
affecting the state and development of the people living
in it. In contrast to psychological environmentalism,
whose primary concern was with the process of human
ontogeny, geographical environmentalism arose mainly in
the context of the attempts to explain divergences
among peoples and societies, among their varied histories,
institutions, economic systems, manners, and customs.
In the beginning of the nineteenth century, geogra-
phical environmentalism came to attain a pre-eminence as
a theoretical orientation offering an explanatory model
to many-sided researches into human societies and their
histories.20 The nineteenth century environmental
theories were preceded by climatic theories, theories
which sought to explain the divergences in the human
condition by invoking the causal effect of climate and
the variations in the climatic conditions on the earth.
These climatic theories were not "geographical" theories
in the proper sense; while they speculated on the exis-
tence of a causal relation between a place and the
people living within it, they lacked the conception of
region as an organized, holistic reality and thus treated
place only indirectly through its climate.
A work representative of these climate theories is
Montesquieu's The Spirit of Laws (1748). An Enlightenment
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classic in political and social theory, this treatise
explained variations in the forms of government and
customs in terms of the differing character of peoples
thought to be caused by differing climates.
The basis of Montesquieu's climatic interpretation
is a physiological theory of fiber. Montesquieu ex-
pounded on this theory in his An Essay on Causes
Affecting Minds and Characters (1736-1743). According
to this theory, the body is composed of two basic
materials: the solid parts and the fluids those solids
contain. All the solids in the body are in turn thought
to be composed of various fibers. These fibers,
depending on their size, moisture, and flexibility,
determined the flow of fluids they contain, and the flow
of fluids in turn determines the individual's state of
mental alertness or sluggishness and of health or sick-
ness. Climates determine the condition of fibers and
are thus the ultimate determinants of the individual's
physiological as well as psychological state. People
are vigorous in cold climates, Montesquieu speculated,
because "here the action of the heart and the reaction
of the extremities of the fibers are better performed,
the temperature of the humours is greater, the blood
moves freer towards the heart, and reciprocally the heart
has more power."21 On the other hand, Montesquieu
continued, "the inhabitants of warm countries are, like
old men, timorous," because "a warm air relaxes and
lengthens the extremes of the fibers land thus] dimi-
nishes their force and elasticity." 22 For Montesquieu,
the fact that characters of mind are different in
different climates meant that customs, social institu-
tions, and political organizations also vary (and must
vary) according to climates, because it is "the nature
of things" that they conform to the characters of people
for whom they exist. It is for this reason, for example,
that Montesquieu considered slavery less irrational in
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hot climates than in cold ones since the insolence
caused by hot temperature might make it difficult to
find people willing to work;23 and polygamy more or
less natural in hot climates, since women mature early
and age quickly in hot climates, requiring a more
extensive state of dependency than in cold climates. 2 4
Whether defensible or not from the standpoint of
modern science, the generalizations concerning the
climatic influences on mankind were very current in the
scientific literature of the eighteenth century,
Besides Montesquieu, Diderot and Kant, among others,
contributed to the climatic interpretations. The clima-
tic interpretations were also the basis of the doctrine
of monogenesis, which rejected the claim of polygenesists
that human divergences were caused by heredity. While
unmistakably "environmentalist" in its basic form, the
climatic theories fall short of being geographical
theories. As we noted, their limited conception of
locality renders them unable to treat region or terri-
tory as a geographical fact.
A type of environmentalism concerned specifically
with regional aspects arose in the beginning of the
nineteenth century, its emergence coinciding with the
establishment of geography as a separate science. For
Carl Ritter as well as for Alexander von Humboldt, both
of whom are commonly seen as the founding fathers of
geography as a modern science, territory was an essential
support of society and an understanding of its various
features was requisite if history were to be intelligible.
For both Taine and Buckle, the possibility of making a
science of history lay in recognizing the causal role
of the environment, not only in the physical sense of
climate, soil and food, but also in its appearances.25
Though more exaggerated than the view of most environ-
mentalists, the following words from Victor Cousin
express the conviction people had in the fact of
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geographical influence.
Give me the physical map of a country, and I pledge
myself to tell you, a priori, what part the country
will play in history, not by accident, but of
necessity, not at one epoch but in all epochs. (26)
Geographical environmentalism found its most rigorous
formulation in the hands of Friedrich Ratzel (Anthropo-
geographie), and his American disciple Ellen Church
Semple (Influences of Geographical Environment). Parti-
cularly among English speaking geographers, according
to White, "the leading idea developed in Influences
aroused more discussion and controversy than has any
other one leading idea in our field." 2 7 In her work,
Semple claims that geographical factors are more impor-
tant than hereditary ones, because the former are "immu-
table" and more "stable" compared to "plastic" man. For
Semple, territory is the fundamental basis of society.
Similar territories produce similar societies and his-
tories, she argues, drawing parallels between England
and Japan, and between New Zealand and pre-historic
Crete.28 For this reason, geography constitutes the
proper foundation of a theory of history. 2 9
Not a determinist as has often been charged, Semple
concedes that the relation of society and the physical
environment may vary depending on the level of the
society's technology and culture. According to Semple,
there are many ways in which the territorial environment
affects society and man, molding them. It acts directly
on the physiology of people: the combined effects of
climate, air, and food causes the diversity of races
and peoples; it determines the types of dominant activity,
which in turn affect the physiology as well as psychology
of people; it influences the inhabitants' "psyche," as
the nature of habitat affects the development of mythology
and folklore; and, finally, it conditions the movement
of peoples and goods by virtue of natural barriers and
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channels of communication, affecting profoundly the
patterns of cultural diffusion.
With geographical environmentalism becoming a
highly influential theoretical orientation, the concept
of environment and its correlate, the idea of human
malleability, finally rise to the surface of scientific
discourse. They are no longer generalized and unspecific
notions implied in speculations about the world; they
are now explicit concepts framing "scientific" theories.
Haeckel's coinage of the term "ecology" in 186830
confirms and officializes the newly gained status of
these concepts. While the epistemological processes
that produced the concept of environment began nearly
a century before, the introduction of this new term
signals the beginning of a second phase in the develop-
ment of environmental thought: self-conscious, meta-
theoretical reflection on the concepts of environment
and environmentalism themselves, and the formation of
specifically environmental theories. Thus "ecology"
emerges as a new scientific orientation not only in the
field of biology proper, but also in such diverse
fields as sociology, anthropology, psychology, and
urbanism.
The environmentalist conception of man arose as a
rival position to two dichotomous orientations rooted
in Enlightenment conceptions of man: one holding the
natural determination of man, and the other positing
human dominance over nature. As such, it stands in
opposition to the ethno-centrism and anthropo-centrism
implied in these two dichotomous orientations. Instead,
it allows, at least in theory, a reconciliation of the
phenomenal diversity of people and individuals with the
ideal of human unity and equality. An environmentalist
interpretation requires no fixed "lower" or "higher"
races, no born criminals or saints; all are, at least
as far as their potentials are concerned, equal. Even
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the most deterministic formulation of environmentalism
does not deny the changeability of human character.
In fact, the more extreme a formulation of environmen-
talism becomes, the more equalizing it will be, as
complete malleability means limitless perfectibility.
* * *
Thus far we have considered how the emergent idea of
environment led to the conception that even mankind,
not just the animal world, is profoundly circumscribed
by the conditions of its environment. As we noted at
the outset, the rise of this conception of man and
environment accounts for half, though a vital half,
of the process that gave rise to the concept of human
environment. What remains to be examined is the question
of how man's environment came to be thought of as
including not only things of nature but things specifi-
cally human -- objects and systems of human origin,
in short, artifacts. This notion of "artifactual envi-
ronment" constitutes a critical bridge between 'envi-
ronment' as a general category and 'environment' as
a physical fact. We now turn to this question.
To begin, it is important to distinguish between
artifactual environmentalism and naturalistic environ-
mentalism, because an adoption of the general orientation
of environmentalism does not in itself induce the "envi-
ronmentalization" of artifacts. As we have seen, the
geographical determinism of Ratzel and Semple or Malthus'
population theory, still consider artifacts as products
of human activity rather than environments, despite the
fact that these theories are typically environmentalist.
Artifacts are not "environmentalized" in these theories,
because they approach empirical reality in the dichoto-
mous terms of nature and culture, wherein the category
of environment, is applied solely to that of nature.
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Within the realm of culture, man and his world are seen
in terms of creator and creation; in these theories,
man is -viewed principally as homo faber,31
Viewed under the general conception of homo faber,
artifacts are related to man as contrivance to contriver.
Artifacts are the end-products of deliberate design;
they are introduced to the world intentionally, and their
mode of functioning is purposefully prearranged. As
contrivances, they presuppose "contrivers" who understand
their mechanisms and uses, and know how to make them.
Men are such contrivers. Like the Creator-God in Paley's
natural theology,32 man through his intelligence and by
his deliberate choices arranges parts to create artifacts
serving his purposes and desires.
As "author," man has an absolute command over the
world of artifacts which are his creation; consequently,
the world of artifacts is completely devoid of autonomy.
Artifacts are mere instrumentsperforming designated
functions or symbols conveying intended meanings. They
have no effect, no process, and no power of their own
other than what their creator has willed them to have;
their whole existence and their mode of operation
derive from sources outside themselves. They are
completely one with human intention and design which
caused their existence.
When artifacts are considered exclusively in terms
of human design, the principal subject of knowledge
concerning the man-made world is naturally one of
"authorship." The questions of how artifacts affect us
once they are brought into being, or of what large
patterns or structures they form in their interconnected-
ness, do not arise under this "design" conception of the
man-made world. Instead, the legitimate question takes
the form of "whence this contrivance and design"; arti-
facts are thought to become intelligible only when their
authors, their original design, and their purpose are
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identified. Thus, the epistemological value of arti-
facts under this "design" conception lies not in what
they are or how they materially relate to us, but in
their capacity to be signs -- signs leading us to the
knowledge of their source and of their hidden artifi-
cers. Approached from this point of view, then,
history is a chronicle of great men's actions and
decisions; the method of cultural study is the inves-
tigation of the sources of utensils and tools, and the
main approach to study the city is to historify and
appreciate individual architectural objects that make
up the city.
The idea that the man-made world, whether physical
or otherwise, is also a part of man's external environ-
ment, affecting his life, emerges in opposition to the
traditional conception of man as homo faber. The envi-
ronmental view of human artifacts does not of course
deny the fact that all artifacts originate with human
activities; neither does it overlook the fact that some
have come to existence through deliberate design.
However, the environmental view brings into focus certain
aspects about artifacts laid aside in the traditional
conception of man as homo faber.
Above all, to consider human artifacts as a part of
man's external environment is to view them, to use
Popper's expression, as "unintended consequences of
human action."3 3 The environmental view stresses that
origin and intention are not the same things as the
present condition and actual effect; artifacts exist
and function in ways that are not completely attribu-
table to their specific origin and intended purposes.
Social institutions, market mechanisms, cultural conven-
tions, art forms, and the man-made habitat -- all these
are parts of our world affecting our lives, yet none
of them exists or functions completely as a designed
product; no single person or group is capable of wholly
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determining what they are or how they are to behave,
although all intentionally or unintentionally partake
in the making of them.
The environmental consideration of artifacts also
attends to the thing-like qualities they possess, even
those which are not corporeal. As 'things' rather than
mere signs attesting to their origins and originators,
artifacts constitute an empirical reality separate from
and independent of men who produce and use them. As
such, they can be acted on, changed, or even abolished,
and discovered, examined, and interpreted in the same
way as things of nature can be. Furthermore, as
objective reality, they have power to circumscribe
human life. Even when created as instruments, they
create problems as well as solving them; they demand
to be reckoned with and delimit as well as catalyze
our thoughts, feelings, and actions.
In addition, to consider artifacts as constituting
the human environment is to posit that they exist as
parts of organized, patterned wholes; it is as such
holistic formations that they are considered as the
environment. Viewed in this way, the character and
efficacy of individual artifacts derive not solely from
the histories and properties internal to them but
largely from their places in those large formations. A
building, when considered in isolation, may be a
"machine to live in," but it is also a part of the urban
environment and thus has a part in the latter's impinge-
ment on the inhabitants. The environmental consideration
grants, in a word, a quality of system to the world of
artifacts: an autonomy of existence and processes irre-
ducible to human interests and design. The artifactual
environment cannot be, it is therefore implied, comple-
tely controlled by man, although its processes can be
intervened in.
The new picture of the world brought on by the
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environmentalization of human artifacts brought with it
a corresponding form of knowledge, a form that is new
to the one assumed under the conception of homo faber.
Endowed now with the status of not only objective but
also influential reality, both artifacts themselves
and the macro-formations they make up came to be viewed
as the legitimate object of knowledge deserving our
serious attention. The traditional interest in the
search for origins and authorship remains, but loses
its former intellectual hold and prestige as the
favored form of knowledge. Instead a new set of
questions is formed and given legitimacy. These new
questions deal with the effects, functions, and human
consequences of artifacts once they are brought into
being, the processes and structures artifacts engender,
and the mechanisms through which they affect us. Thus,
by bringing on new objects to view and new questions to
grapple with, environmentalism invites the formation of
new disciplines vis-A-vis the world of man-made objects
and systems.
When did artifacts come to be "environmentalized,"
and what factors catalyzed and contributed to this
process of environmentalization?
As was the case with naturalistic environmentalism,
the process that led to the concept of artifactual
environment was both gradual and broad-based. An early
sign of the beginning of this process could be detected
in the eighteenth century psychological environmentalism
discussed earlier, as in it man-made institutions and
organizations were seen to be parts of the factors
affecting character formation. Similar ideas were ope-
rative in the utilitarian reform programs regarding
societal institutions and practices; they underscored,
in particular, as I shall attempt to detail in Part Two,
the emergent penal thinking which no longer saw the
criminal as born but formed environmentally and thus
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reformable environmentally -- by means of subjecting
him to a certain specially contrived facility, the
prison -- and the new consciousness of the sanitary
reformers who saw the physical city as a breeder of
disease requiring corrective interventions. Art
objects also came to acquire environmental qualities
in the latter half of the nineteenth century, when
they began to be viewed, by people like John Ruskin
and William Morris, not exclusively as end-products
reflective of their spiritual, moral, and intellectual
origins but rather as active effectors themselves, as
resources capable of directing the process of people's
enculturation.
In short, the environmental consideration of the
man-made world underlies many new concepts and ideas
which were formed in the last century and have since
come to play a large part in modern scientific as well
as common discourse. The very possibility of conceiving
society and culture, as first systematically done by
Comte, Durkheim, and Tylor, as macro-scale facts
irreducible to, yet impinging on, the individual's
acts, feelings, thoughts, manners, and values, rests
on assuming an environmental attitude towards the
man-made world.
As we have noted, the environmental mode of thinking
predicates the binary division of a given semantic
universe; the conceptual separation is a basic requisite
of environmental thinking. Just as natural environmen-
talism presupposed the conception of disunity between
the domain of nature and that of man, artifactual envi-
ronment implies the perception of a disjunction within
the domain of man, a disjunction between man-made
objects and the domain of prerogatives, or differently
put, the externalization of human artifacts.
An obvious factor in the externalization of human
artifacts is their durability relative to man. The
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tendency to last is the common characteristic of man-
made objects and systems. Whether physical or not,
they remain once they are produced, and outlive their
initial purpose and intention. This is particularly
true in large-scale artifacts such as societal,
cultural, or geographical institutions. They have, by
definition, life spans greater than that of individual
men for whom they exist. This durability renders arti-
facts capable of withstanding and enduring human uses
and exploitation, winning for them an objectivity and
externality against the subjectivity of the ever
changing nature of man.
What intensifies this sense of the durability of
artifacts' and turns it into a feeling of their separate-
ness from man is a certain state of mind (and of
society) described in Marxian literature under the
general notion of "alienation." Cast in this state,
men see a break between themselves and their products.
They feel they no longer have the power to control what
they make or what becomes of it afterwards. They no
longer see themselves as the active agents in full
command of the world; instead, they view themselves
as passive and receptive beings, separate from the
objective world and held under the sway of its inhuman
power.
While constituting a necessary condition, this
perception of separation between the objective and
subjective worlds is not sufficient to treat of arti-
facts in environmental terms. When perceived separation
is irrevocably absolute, as we discussed in the earlier
chapter, an environmental relationship cannot be invoked.
Consequently, there must be another cognitive requisite,
one which makes the separation less than absolute,
allowing the two worlds to be re-engaged in the rela-
tionship of functional interdependence.
This second cognitive requisite -- a historical
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requisite as well -- consists in viewing the human world
from a holistic perspective. Viewed from this perspec-
tive, the human world is an organized, functionally inte-
grated complex rather than an ephemeral aggregate of
self-contained, atomistic individuals or a monolithic,
indivisible unityas an individualist or unitary
approach would have it. As an organized complex, the
human world is seen to be composed of structural levels;
each level is considered semi-autonomous in its existence
and mode of operation, while all levels are seen to
interact with one another to form an integrated whole.
Seen from the standpoint of parts, therefore, the wholes
are "more than the sum of their parts"; they form levels
of reality irreducible to the constituent parts (sepa-
ration); they are so extended in space as to contain
parts within them (topological inclusion); and they
are functionally effective in that, although they
themselves are made up by parts, they have the power to
shape and condition the state and development of parts
(functional dependence). In short, the holistic per-
spective posits the existence of macro-formations which
constitute the environments of individual artifacts
and men.
Holism is, needless to say, a philosophical position
characteristic of organicism, the broad theoretical
orientation which approaches any given subject under the
general concept of organism and life.37 Holism impli-
cates organismic analogies, and organicism brings in a
holistic perspective. The two share the same epistemo-
logical content. With this point made, we are led to
reaffirm the point discussed earlier in this study:
the fundamental epistemological interdependence between
the concept of environment and that of organism, and
the corresponding coincidence in their respective emer-
gence in early modern thought. Just as the general
idea of environment presupposed and arose with the idea
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with the idea of life and organism, the possibility of
environmentalizing artifacts was correlated with the
emergence of an organismic approach towards the human
world; without one the other could not have been
possible. Thus, while a distinct step in the process
of the emergence and development of environmentalism,
the rise of artifactual environmentalism is in its
deeper level prompted by the same logic that operates
throughout the entire process.
The pervasiveness of organicism in nineteenth
century thought is a well researched and documented
topic requiring no particular evidence at this point; 3 8
we shall deal with it in Part Two when we consider
historical cases. Instead, let us see some of the
implications of artifactual environmentalism by way
of concluding this chapter.
Artifactual environmentalism brings with it an
intellectual motivation and moral urgency for systema-
tically studying and rationally managing the processes
of the man-made world. It does so, because the concept
of artifactual environment has within it a latent
potential for mediating categories that are initially
posited as polar opposites. As simultaneously man-
made nature and nature modified by man, the artifactual
environment can provide a bridge between the domain of
human freedom and choice and the realm that lies beyond
human control. As a world originated from but impinging
on individuals, it can reconcile the individual as actor
and as passive subject. And, as an embodiment of socio-
cultural heritage, it can connect formations that are
collectively shared and lasting with the realms that are
individual, varied, and in flux.
This potential for mediation points to the way for
de-alienating things that are alienated, The way lies
in actualizing this potential through an active inves-
tigation and management of the man-made world. By
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doing so we regain the control over our own fate, This
is so, because the act of knowing and modifying the
environment becomes, by the very notion of environment,
the very same thing as the act of modifying ourselves.
* * .*
With the "environmentalization"of human artifacts,
the city finally arises as an empirical and effective
reality. Attaining this new status, the city is no
longer cognized as a designed product embodying the
author's intentions or as an ephemeral aggregate
knowable only in terms of individual buildings as well
as individual inhabitants' actions, attitudes, and
intentions. It becomes an "environing world" endowed
with the power to influence; it is seen as a system
of ecological variables materially affecting the
inhabitants' lives in their manifold aspects -- psycho-
logical and physiological, individual and collective.
With the environmentalization of the city, it becomes
thus possible to conceive the city as a cause of moral
evil (or good, depending on one's position); as an agent
engendering and propagating pathology rather than as
a passive space where disease travels; and as a civi-
lizing force rather than as an expression of civili-
zation.
This environmental consideration of the city contrasts
sharply with the Renaissance and Baroque attitudes
wherein the singular emphasis on design rendered the
categorical distinction between the city and architec-
ture superfluous. The unitary, geometric emphasis is
particularly pronounced in the "ideal cities" of Alberti,
Filarete, and Martini, but it is no less basic in more
practical works such as the rebuilding of Rome under
Sixtus V or the "planning" of Versailles and Karlsruhe.
In all these cases, the city was seen essentially in
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terms of absolute, abstract, geometric parameters,
and "city planning" in terms of a grand architectural
project or a series of such projects. Very -much alive
in these cases was the spirit of Alberti, who had said
that "the whole Force and Rule of the Design consists
in a right and exact adapting and joining together
Lines and Angles which comprise and form the Face of
Building." When the primary viewpoint vis-A-vis
the city is geometric ordering in terms of number,
proportion, perspective, and order, there is little
room to appreciate its properties as a material,
concrete, localized place, let alone to cognize it as
an impinging environment.
There came a "break" in this unitary conception of
the city and architecture with Abbe Laugier. Writing
in the mid-eighteenth century, Laugier separated the
city from architecture by likening it to the forest,
and city design to that of park design. He contended:
Whoever knows how to design a park well will have
no difficulty in tracing the plan for the building
of a city according to its given area and situation.
There must be regularity and fantasy, relationships
and oppositions, and causal, unexpected elements
that vary the scene: great order in the details,
confusion, uproar, and tumult in the whole. (401
While this separation constituted a step toward the
eventual recognition of the city as an environmental
fact, such recognition was alien to Laugier's theory
of urban design. For Laugier, the city was still an
amorphous, indeterminate background lacking epistemo-
logical identity; all one could do was to "embellish"
it by means of imposing on it straight and wide avenues
and gates, Pierre Patte's plan for the improvement
of Paris also remained within the bounds of such
"embellishment, "4 1 and so was Gwynn's recommendation
for the improvement of London and Westminster.42 In
all these, the city remained as an unknowable aggregate,
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comprehensible and manageable only by reducing it to
architectural idioms, Likewise, urban design still
belonged to the category of "polite art," whose other
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members included painting and engraving.
From a historical standpoint, then, the environ-
mentalization of the city represented more than changes
in attitudes towards the city and urban design; it
marks in essence the birth of the conception of the
city as an empirical fact and hence of the new field
of urbanism. With a new epistemological and ontolo-
gical status, the city can now be studied empirically
and acted on on the basis of the "scientific" knowledge
of how it works. It is instructive to be reminded in
this connection that the Renaissance and Baroque
treatise on the city was in the main on how to design
it willfully rather than on how it works as a given
fact.
In Part Two which follows, we shall examine histo-
rical cases exemplifying the ascendence of the environ-
mentalist consciousness vis-a-vis human habitat and
the concomitant emergence of the city as a focus of
empirical thinking and planning. Four cases are chosen
for this purpose: Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon scheme,
Robert Owen's "science of circumstances," Edwin Chadwick's
sanitary reform movement, and Patrick Geddes' program
for the science of "civics." Instances commonly reco-
gnized by historians -- including Leonardo Benovolo
and Frangoise Choay -- as important sources of modern
urbanism, these four cases show the diversity of the
problem-situations under which environmentalism was
embraced and thus its broad appeal as a general way of
thinking, They also represent the logical (as well as
chronological) sequence in which urbanistic environ-
mentalism developed from what were initially implicit,
tentative, and somewhat auxiliary ideas to explicitly
argued, generalized, and positivistic theories.
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The first two examples, the schemes for social
betterment by Bentham and Owen, illustrate the emergent
belief in the power of the environment in forming the
individual's moral and psychological character, While
they were not directly concerned with problems of the
city, they anticipated the development of urbanism
proper by calling for the -management of the environment
as a means to bring about social betterment, In addition,
their contrasting methods demonstrate the fundamental
correlation between environmentalism and holism. Edwin
Chadwick's sanitary reform movement in turn exemplifies
the rising consciousness that the city is a life-
environment of people, that the state of public health
is critically dependent on the physical conditions of
the city. Correlated with the emergence of new envi-
ronmentalist medical theories, Chadwick's movement marks
the rise of the city as an empirical reality in self-
conscious thought. The city gains its full ecological
and evolutionary meaning in Geddes' "civics." Proposed
as a synoptic science, "civics" brings various strands
of earlier environmentalism into a working unity, with
the city as the organizing core; with "civics," urbanism
finally arrives as a separate field of knowledge and
action.
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PART TWO
ENVIRONMENTALISM IN URBAN THOUGHT: CASES
qrq

IV. ENVIRONMENT AND CRIMINAL REHABILITATION:
JEREMY BENTHAM'S PANOPTICON
Morals reformed -- health preserved -- industry
invigorated -- instruction diffused -- public
burdens lightened -- economy seated, as it were,
upon a rock -- the gordian knot of the Poor-Laws
not cut, but untied -- all by a simple idea in
architecture. (1)
This "simple idea in architecture"is Panopticon,
Jeremy Bentham's prized project. Convinced that he
set Columbus' egg on its end, the celebrated philoso-
phical radical and founder of utilitarianism spent the
best years of his life working out the minutest details
of Panopticon's design and operation, and even devoted
a large part of his inheritance in vain attempts to
secure its implementation. While Bentham presented -
Panopticon mainly as a model prison, he was also con-
vinced of its potential versatility matching the abun-
dance of its presumed merits. "To say all in one
word," Bentham maintained, "it will be found applicable
. . . without exception, to all establishments whatso-
ever, in which . . . a number of persons is meant to
be kept under inspection, whether [the purpose of
inspection] be that of punishing the incorrigible,
guarding the insane, reforming the vicious, confining
the suspected, employing the idle, maintaining the
helpless, curing the sick, instructing the willing
in any branch of industry, or training the rising
race in the path of education."2
While the above somewhat extravagant claims regarding
Panopticon's uses and effects may have come about in
part by the inventor's understandable desire to adver-
I7e
tise and aggrandize his invention, they nonetheless
present a notion that is significant in the context of
the present enquiry: the notion that the physical
environment -- at least that of Panopticon -- is con-
nected with moral condition as a means to an end; as
Bentham saw it, Panopticon is, among other things, an
"effector" for moral reform, an instrument for "reform-
ing the vicious." How, we are obliged to ask, is this
possible? What ideas assured Bentham of the causal
connection between the physical contrivance and moral
reform?
Although relatively neglected by historians in
comparison to Bentham's grander schemes of social
reconstruction such as constitutions or codes, Panop-
ticon has been subject to some insightful analyses by
several authors. Himmelfarbe considered Panopticon
in relation to Bentham's philosophical position and
suggested that his ascendance to philosophical radi-
calism was accentuated by the inability of the govern-
ment to implement the Panopticon ideas.3 Approaching
his subject from an architectural standpoint, Evans
searched Panopticon's sources and its connection with
Bentham's moral philosophy, correctly noting that
Panopticon was a "catalytic agent" to induce human
goodness. Foucault, in tracing the epistemological
sources of the modern prison in his book Discipline and
Punish, identified Panopticon as an embodiment of a
new "political technology" brought on by the capitalist
economy, an instrument of general surveillance designed
to keep men disciplined and productive.5
My aim in this chapter is to consider Panopticon as
a case in the emergent environmentalist mode of thinking.
By examining how the Panopticon penitentiary was to work,
I shall attempt to show (1) that the two environmentalist
premises -- the malleability of the human mind on the one
hand, and the causal power of environment vis-a-vis the
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human mind on the other -- formed the basis of the
Panopticon scheme, and (2) that the rationalist strand
in Bentham's utilitarian social philosophy prevented
his environmentalism from becoming a more generalized
position, applicable not only to the criminal but to
humanity in general.
To begin, let us first summarize some of the per-
tinent points in Bentham's description of Panopticon. 6
Physically, the Panopticon plan calls for a cylin-
drical building of anywhere between four and six
stories consisting of two parts: at the periphery is
an annular building (which Bentham changed later to one
of polygonal shape to make construction easier), and,
at the center, an inspection tower or kiosk. The peri-
pheral building is divided into a series of cells by
internal walls cutting across the whole width of the
building. Each cell has two windows, one facing onto
the central inspection tower and the other on the
external wall. The windows are positioned so as to
allow light to enter through the cell to the central
tower. The remaining two sides of the cell are solid
walls without aperture, thus discouraging communication
between inmates in adjoining cells. The central tower
is pierced with wide windows that open toward the cells
at the periphery. To facilitate surveillance, one story
of the central tower is made to correspond to two
stories of the cells. Between the peripheral building
and the central tower, an intermediate space is used
as a corridor for the inspector to pass from his lodge
to any of the cells.7
As to size, Panopticon is large enough to accommodate
a sufficient number of inmates for economic operation
but not too large to render the construction overly
expensive. In the Postscript, Bentham suggests a dia-
meter of 120 feet for the overall structure and 24 cells
per floor, giving each cell 14 feet of depth. He also
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recommends the structure be built in brick, with iron
employed generously for cell galleries, staircases
and doors. Besides specifying the method of construc-
tion, Bentham also provides detailed designs for sup-
plying the building with water and the necessities of
food, clothing and bedding.
All these physical arrangements are geared to
achieve two principles Bentham considers to be most
central in a penitentiary house: constant surveillance
and secluded confinement.
The facility of constant surveillance is Panopticon's
most essential and prized point. By virtue of its
circular arrangement, an inspector at the central tower
can observe every movement of every inmate like "a
spider in the web," as Edmund Burke is said to have
characterized it,8 without so much as a change of
posture; the inmate, on the other hand, has no way of
verifying whether he is being watched over at any given
moment because of the effect of back lighting, although
he can clearly see the outline of the inspection tower
from which he is spied on. This asymmetry of visibility
is further enhanced by the height and the intersecting
arrangement of the internal partition in the inspection
tower, which prevents the inmate from checking whether
the inspector is present. Bentham even proposed
installing venetian blinds on the tower's windows to
prevent the passage of light and thus increase the
effect of the asymmetry of visibility. This asymmetry
is meant to create in the minds of the inmates the
feeling of the inspector's "apparent omni-presence." 9
This feeling, supported by the "extreme facility of
the actual presence of the inspector," which the
building is arranged to ensure, is supposed to create
the effect of constant surveillance even when actual
surveillance is not constant.
Another principle central to Panopticon's design
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is the arrangement of solitary confinement. Whether
employed for penitentiaries, manufactories, hospitals,
or schools, Panopticon's internal partitions are to
be arranged so as to confine its inhabitants in isolated
cells, while the degree of seclusion is allowed to
vary in accordance with the nature of the institution
in question.10 The secluded confinement is considered
essential particularly for the purpose of the peniten-
tiary, since, according to Bentham, when in consort
the inmates are liable to plot for their collective
escape, to be idle or distracted and thereby hinder
work and the diffusion of instructions, and to cribbing
and other mischievous conduct which render them less
amenable to proper surveillance and discipline.
Thus, the architecture of Panopticon penitentiary
is to function as an apparatus in the technology of
surveillance and isolated confinement. By virtue of
its many intricate contrivances, it ensures to a degree
never previously attempted the relentless central in-
spection of inmates in their individualized confinement.
The unprecedented merits it is claimed to have as a
place of punishment and rehabilitation derive from the
supposed perfection of this technology. In what ways,
then, do surveillance and isolated confinement perform
the dual functions of the penitentiary -- punishment
and rehabilitation? What made Bentham believe that
the perfection of this technology would produce a
superior penal institution?
In order to deal with these questions properly,
it is important to understand that the penitentiary
both as an idea and as an institution was just emerging
in Bentham's days. In advocating Panopticon, therefore,
Bentham was proposing not just a new type of penal
practice: imprisonment as the standard measure of
punishment and rehabilitation as an end of punishment.
Panopticon cannot be understood in separation from the
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shifts in penal thinking and practice of which it was
both a product and a leading instigator. Let us
review these shifts briefly. 1
In the history of punishment, the system of impri-
sonment was the latest to be widely adopted. Before
this, the problem of crime was "solved" by liberal and
often inconsistent recourse to gallows, whipping posts,
mutilation, exile, fine, and transportation to penal
colonies. In general, corporal and financial punish-
ments were preferred over others, and the death penalty
was in wide use.12
The absence of the penitentiary does not, of course,
mean that some form of confinment did not exist prior
to its introduction; people were jailed and kept under
detention. Nonetheless, confinement served a different
function than imprisonment. Rather than being chiefly
an instrument of punishment, it was adopted as a
secondary measure, as a means of keeping those awaiting
trial under detention, of exerting pressure for payment
of fines, or of confining temporarily those who were
marked to serve at the galley. Similarly, the jail,
though it may be seen as a precursor of the modern
penitentiary, was very different in form as in function
from its modern counterpart; there was no specific type
of structure designed to safekeep, confine and "correct"
criminal offenders. Before the "invention" of the
penitentiary's architecture, a wide variety of struc-
tures -- townhall cellars, gatehouses, towers, and
even hulks anchored in harbors -- were made to serve as
detention facilities. In addition, the jail was main-
tained by private keepers working for profit and was
usually infamous as a place of corruption. Furthermore,
there was no practice of segregating inmates in the jail
by class of crime or required treatment, as is the case
in the modern penitentiary as well as in Panopticon;
instead, felons, misdemenants, debtors, the sick, and
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the insane were all thrust together indiscriminately.
The general adoption of imprisonment and of its
attendant building type constitutes, then, in the
words of Radzinowicz,13 a "Magna Carta" in the manage-
ment of criminal justice. Though there had been iso-
lated experiments with and advocacy for the institution
of imprisonment, only as late as 1778 was an act finally
passed which formally initiated the construction of a
series of penitentiary houses. In America, the Method-
ists began the movement to replace antiquated systems
of punishment with that of imprisonment in the late
eighteenth century. They built the first penitentiary
in Philadelphia in 1790, the Walnut Street Prison, and
it became a celebrated model for many later establish-
ments. 4 However, a full-scale adoption of imprisonment
began only after the second decade of the nineteenth
century.
The foregoing cursory review summarizes the histo-
rical context in which the Panopticon scheme was intro-
duced. Despite Bentham's long, untiring and unabashed
advocacy for the realization of Panopticon, the project
was not realized in his lifetime. In 1794, Bentham
managed to influence Parliament to pass two acts which
prescribed the construction of penitentiaries according
to the principles he put forward; soon, however, the
government abandoned the project, though not before it
had acquired a site and a large quantity of ironworks
for its construction. Bentham also offered his plan
to the governments of France and Ireland, but nothing
came of this. Eventually Bentham abandoned the scheme
for the Panopticon penitentiary and, instead, devised
a plan for the Panopticon schoolhouse.1 5
Though the project did not get beyond the drawing-
boards in Bentham's lifetime, the ideas expressed in
the Panopticon scheme were to be highly influential
in many ways. Almost every point Bentham put forward
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in Panopticon was eventually adopted and emerged as
common practice in the building and running of peniten-
tiaries. The designs of the English National Peniten-
tiary at Millbank in 1812, and more pointedly, that of
the Model Prison at Pentonville of 1838-40, reflected
many of Bentham's original ideas.
Bentham's unequivocal faith in the Panopticon peni-
tentiary thus derives in part from his firm belief in
imprisonment as a new, rational, and effective form of
punishment and in part from his confidence in the
superiority of the Panoptic design to fulfill the
requirements of this new penal system. In advocating
penal reform, Bentham was in league with such pioneers
of classic penal thinking as Beccaria, Voltaire, Thomas
Paine, and John Howard. With these people, Bentham
denounced earlier forms of punishment as being unjustly
harsh, arbitrary, ineffective, and most of all irrational.
Bentham argued that the previous emphasis on retributive
vengeance was completely misplaced and that the attempt
to eliminate the criminal offender through ostricization
and permanent stigmatization was not only inhuman but
also ineffective. For Bentham, the goal of a rational
system of punishment lay not in taking vengeance for
the crimes already committed in the past but in pre-
venting their occurrence in the future. For a system
of punishment to fulfill this goal, Bentham maintained,
it must satisfy certain specific requirements, which he
delineated in five points: preventing crime by bringing
the punishment of incarceration into open and public
view; incapacitating the criminal offender from further
transgressions; compensating the injured party, if such
existed, and the general public on whose expense the
care of the criminal ultimately depended; making the
labor of criminals profitable; and, finally rehabili-
tating the criminal. 1 6
It was Bentham's firm conviction that the Panopticon
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penitentiary excelled in all of these points.17
First of all, Bentham argued, the Panopticon peni-
tentiary made the punishment for criminal behavior
highly visible. Unlike the penal colony, it would be
placed in the neighborhood of the city and thus directly
visible to its residents, serving as a grim reminder of
the consequences of crime. The building's menacing
appearance, the singularity of its shape, the high
walls and surrounding ditches, all these would excite
ideas of restraint and punishment. To enhance this
effect, Bentham proposed to open the facility to the
public and encourage prople to come and see with their
own eyes the misery of criminals deprived of liberty
and comfort, and be thereby encouraged to shun crime
and criminals.
The Panopticon penitentiary was claimed to be an
excellent facility for incapacitating the criminal.
By removing the transgressor from society at large,
it simply eliminates, at least during the time of
his confinement, his power to commit crimes. Indeed,
Bentham even recommends the creation of supplementary
Panopticons to confine those discharged from the
penitentiaries who are not deemed sufficiently reformed
to return to society.
As to the objective of compensation, Bentham was
of the opinion that Panopticon would be advantageous
because of its susceptibility to a rational management
of forced labor. He expected that proper management
would allow profit sufficiently great to cover not
only the cost of imprisonment, but also compensation,
or at least some part of it, to the injured parties.
It was in its potential for profit that Panopticon
was to be unprecedented among rational means of punish-
ment. Convinced that trust management would result
in a lax, inefficient, and negligent operation of the
institution, Bentham recommended that it be run by a
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private contractor, who would agree to undertake the
management at a certain sum fixed for each inmate,
reserving himself the right to dispose of all the
profits that might arise from this labor. The idea of
combining public service with profit-making was inten-
ded to benefit the inmates as well as the managers;
by bringing the interest of the manager as close as
possible to his duty, it was hoped that more respon-
sible and efficient management would ensue.18
To protect the inmates against the abuse and the
"poor-farming" of over-greedy managers, Bentham proposed
that Panopticon's managers be required to make public
its condition and management; Panopticon was to be open
at all times to magistrates and, at properly regulated
hours, to the general public for its inspection. In
addition, the management was required to pay a monetary
penalty for every inmate lost by death or escape.
To come to the last of Bentham's five points -- and
the most important point in the context of the present
study -- Bentham maintained that the Panopticon peni-
tentiary would be influential not only in its capacity
to exemplify, incapacitate, compensate and make profit,
but also in its enhancement of the criminal's rehabili-
tation. Considering the criminal mind to be disorderly
and as impressionable as that of a child's, Bentham
claimed that the relentless surveillance and isolated
confinement rendered by the unique physical orientation
of Panopticon would completely prevent the inmate from
gratifying his criminal impulses and thereby force him
to repent and change. The rehabilitative effect of
surveillance and isolated confinement would be further
enhanced, he insisted, by the auxiliary measures --
such as forced labor, complete temperance, and instruc-
tions designed to eliminate indigence and ignorance --
he proposed to institute in the Panopticon penitentiary.
As we shall see, there is a certain ambiguity in
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Bentham's conception of the criminal -- in fact an
ambiguity common to classical penal thinking in general
-- which prevents him from taking rehabilitation as
the overriding goal of penal practice. In this Bentham
differs from the modern penal convention wherein
rehabilitation is the "sacred principle" superceding
all other concerns of punishment, a principle according
to which all other aspects of penal measure are to
be designed and evaluated.1 9 The difference is, however,
only in degree; rehabilitation is still one of the
expressed primary objectives in the Panopticon scheme,
and it is in this connection that the Panopticon peni-
tentiary, and the penal thinking it represents, depart
most from the traditional penal systems and conventions.
The ascendence of rehabilitation as an important
penal objective is predicated on shifts of thinking
going beyond the domain of penology. On a superficial
level it represents a shift in both the purpose and
method of punishment: inflicting pain and hardship on
the criminal offender is no longer an end in itself
but becomes a means to an end. On a deeper level, it
expresses changes in the conception of the criminal
and criminality and, with this, changes in the concep-
tion of man in general. Rehabilitation presupposes the
capacity to be rehabilitated, which in turn implies
the malleability of man -- at least a certain kind of
man. This brings us back to the main questions raised
in the beginning: what makes it possible to think of
punishment in terms of rehabilitation? What makes
surveillance and isolated confinement instruments for
rehabilitation? On what grounds do we propose that
the Panopticon scheme was founded on an environmentalist
mode of thinking?
The possibility of thinking of punishment in terms
of rehabilitation rests on two requisite shifts in the
target of penal operation: the shift from a public
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spectacle to one of reforming the individual offender,
and the shift from body to mind.
Punishment prior to the advent of the idea of reha-
bilitation was a public affair: it was directed towards
impressing the futility of crime on the public conscious-
ness, and worked by publicly stigmatizing the offender.
To this end, punishment was made into a public display,
with all the elaborate details of the attendant cere-
monies and rituals. In this connection, Foucault goes
so far as to suggest that the hidden function of the
traditional penal measure was to impress on the public
the absolute power of the punishing authority. In this
kind of communal event, the individuality of the offen-
der was devoid of any meaning; the offender himself was
only an incidental tool,performing as an inadvertent
vehicle through which the prescribed message was passed
to all the members of the community. In sharp contrast
to this, rehabilitation represents an intensely indi-
vidualized affair. The individual offender, not the
community, is both the locus and the aim of the reha-
bilitative operation. While undergoing the process of
rehabilitation, the delinquents are autonomous indivi-
duals and are treated accordingly. Any deviation from
the required individualized reform would diminish its
effect. Not only does the ascendence of the idea of
rehabilitation involve a shift of emphasis from the
public to the individual delinquent; it also represents
a transition from a corporal to a psychological emphasis.
Under this new idea, not the body of the offender but
his mind becomes the primary target of penal operation.
Under the system of rehabilitation the main method of
punishment consists not in inflicting bodily pain and
discomfort but in operating on the criminal's mind;
rehabilitation works not by physically incapacitating
the offender or just removing him from society but by
reforming his mind. In its professed ambition and in
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its related conceptual emphasis, rehabilitation and
the associated institution of the penitentiary, moves
penal practice away from the doman of public "theater"
and into the domain of experimental psychology.21
In adopting rehabilitation as the objective of
punishment, Bentham embraces the idea of human (crimi-
nal) malleability. Rehabilitation presupposes the
possibility of improvement. Implicitly, however,
rehabilitation also diminishes the criminal's stature
as a rational being since it denies him the capacity
to order his own life. Deviating from his egalita-
rianism based on the assumed universality of human
reason, Bentham does maintain that the criminal is
constitutionally "feeble-minded," that he is less
rational than ordinary men. Parenthetically, this
deviation causes certain conceptual problems in Bentham's
penal thinking, and we shall return to discuss this
point. The criminal commits crimes, not because he
accidentally miscalculates the balance of his actions,
but because he is somehow prone to miscalculation: his
innate capacity to measure rationally the consequences
of his actions is somehow blocked and rendered inope-
rative. In a way he is a sort of grown child, whose
mental weakness continues "beyond the ordinary length
of time." Though born with the normal capacity to
be rational, something hinders its full use.
Though a "person of unsound mind," the criminal is
not to be equated with those who are permanently
deranged; in the criminal, Bentham writes, "the complaint
has not swelled to so high a pitch as to rank him [with]
idiots or lunatics."22 His debility may be as real as
that of idiots and lunatics, but as a temporary condi-
tion it is removable by means of a program of rehabi-
litation. He is stopped from being fully rational only
by his "vicious propensities"; when this program of
rehabilitation removes these propensities, he becomes
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"normal," regaining his natural rationality.
In what, then, does rehabilitation consist? And
how does it work?
For Bentham the utilitarian, rehabilitation consists
in the restoration not of some moral faculty but of
calculating reason. According to him, there are no
immutable laws; instead, what universally guides human
action is the hedonistic mind weighing up constantly
the balance of actions in terms of pleasure and pain.
He contends that ethical behavior is not intrinsic but
depends entirely on the consequences of a given action.
Accordingly, a rational man avoids committing crimes
not for moral reasons but because he is capable of
seeing, through "hedonistic calculus," unprofitable
consequences promptly, exactly, and inevitably following
every criminal offense; he has learned to hate crime.
This is what Beccaria meant when he said: "Let the idea
of torture and execution be ever present in the heart
of the weak man and dominate the feeling that drives
him to crime."23 The criminal, however, not being fully
rational according to Bentham, is unable to see this
unfailing association between crime and the misery of
punishment. In order to make him see this association,
which is the task of rehabilitation, it is necessary
to induce him to penitent self-reflection.
Punishments vary in degree and efficacy in this
regard; consequently, careful attention must be paid,
Bentham emphasizes, regarding both the form and severity
of punishment. According to him, too harsh a punishment
might work against the above strategem and instead
stiffen the criminal's resolve to keep his way of
living. This is deemed so, since it would not leave a
moment for self-reflection. In this kind of punishment,
such as whipping, only the immediate sensation of pain
would engross the criminal's whole attention while
undergoing punishment; even when the administration of
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the actual punishment was over, which would be soon,
the tendency would be for the criminal to be occupied
in things and acts that could obliterate the recollec-
tion of the pain he endured.24 He would even develop
hatred towards the law and those who represent it.
The form of punishment most conducive to penitent
self-reflection and hence the rehabilitation of the
criminal is, according to Bentham, one that causes
gradual and protracted suffering and one that provides
"that sort of sharp looking after, that sort of parti-
cularly close inspection, which all human beings,
without exception, stand in need of up to a certain
age. "125
Such an inducement to self-reflection is what the
controlled austere environment of the Panopticon
penitentiary promised to deliver. As we have seen,
this self-reflection was to be enforced by two prin-
ciples of the Panoptic arrangement: the centralized
Panoptic plan placing the inmates under a perpetual
disciplinary inspection, under "that sort of sharp
looking after" required to correct the inmates' unfor-
tunate propensities; and the facility for individualized
confinement, always making the prisoners susceptible
to the reform measures.
Central inspection is expected to produce penitent
self-reflection by connecting the inspector and the
inmate in the relationship of circumscription and
impingement. Central inspection defines a hierarchical
order between the inmates and the inspector and what
they respectively represent: the pathological and the
normal; the sociopaths and society proper; the "feeble-
minded," grown children and the fully rational,
discerning adults; the malformed who require forced
correction and those who do not. This relation is one
of mutual exclusiveness and asymmetry, both conceptually
and physically. Mutual exclusiveness prevents the
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4. adult school in the chapel at the Surrey House
of Correction, Wandsworth: an application of
the "separate system"
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contamination feared to result when the two groups
are in contact. Asymmetry, rendered concrete by the
arrangement of the inspector's "seeing without being
seen," gives the inspector the power to impinge. Thus,
the actual operation of rehabilitation reverses the
spatial order in Panopticon. While it is the inmates
who spatially surround the inspector, it is the inspec-
tor who functions as a surrounding reality: for every
inmate he is an impinging external force, whose presence
and power are constantly felt reminders of the unhappy
consequences of past crime.
The power of central inspection required the support
of individualized confinement for its effectiveness.
We have already noted two of the supposed effects of
solitary confinement: the prevention of moral contami-
nation, and the focusing of the inmate's mind on central
inspection. There is a third function of solitary con-
finement which was seen by Bentham as most important:
the supposed capacity of confinement to induce self-
reflection in the inmates. In this capacity, solitary
confinement complements central inspection whose function
is, as we have seen, to force reflection from without.
What endows solitary confinement with this capacity is
the presumed psychological effect of environmental
deprivation. Consistent with the thesis of association-
ist psychology which he espoused, Bentham believed that
environment was the source of man's thought and feeling;
when it is deprived, that is, when it is made completely
blank in content, the mind becomes blank as well.
By confinement, the criminal is removed from the
familiar things and sensations that connected him with
his criminal past; he is abstracted from all the exter-
nal causes that can distract him from the harsh envi-
ronment to which he is confined and the misery of the
punishment to which he is subjected. In this bare,
artificial setting, the criminal is quite alone facing
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his crime and its painful consequences. Emptied of
the usual sensations making up the feeling of life, his
mind is forced to become a "gloomy void" and thus
malleable. Thus divested of his former criminal pro-
pensities, he is rendered repentant and receptive of
reformative treatment. Bentham said of this in a
pictorial language:
The most natural of all will be to retrace the
events of his past life: the bad advice he received,
his first deviations from rectitude, which have led
to the commission of the offense for which he is
at the time undergoing punishment; a crime, all the
pleasures derived from which have been already
reaped, and of which all that remains is the
melancholy suffering that he endures. He will
recall to his recollection those days of innocence
and security which were formerly his lot, and
which contrasted with his present wretchedness,
will present themselves to his imagination with
an increased and factitious degree of splendour.
His penitent reflections will naturally be directed
to the errors of which he has been guilty; if he
had a wife, children,or near relations, the affection
that he once entertained for them, may be renewed
by the recollection of the misery that he has
occasioned them. (26)
Now it has become clear why the "simple idea in
architecture" or the Panopticon penitentiary system
was so important to Bentham, the social reformer.
Given his conceptions human nature, crime and the penal
system, the architecture of Panopticon or, more
precisely, the environmental controls it facilitated,
are both a logical and inevitable means of achieving
the social quarantine and moral reform of delinquents,
the dual functions of penal practice directed to main-
tain order in society. Without the use of such environ-
mental means, according to Bentham's way of thinking,
there was no possibility of reaching, not to mention
correcting, the dangerous mind of the delinquent and,
hence, no guarantee for social order. To say it in a
word, the Panopticon penitentiary embodied the general
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idea that environmental control and psychological mani-
pulation are causally connected -- essentially an
environmentalist idea, though the word itself was not
present in Bentham's own writings. It may not be far-
fetched to suggest that not just the particular case
of Panopticon but the general evolution of the peniten-
tiary system itself was rendered possible by the
increasing concurrence of public consciousness to
environmentalist premises.
With this remark, we turn to our last subject: the
relation between environmentalism as expressed in the
Panopticon penitentiary and Bentham's larger view of
society and man.
It is not difficult to sense certain paradoxical
qualities in the ways Bentham conceives the Panopticon
scheme. While the professed aim of the scheme is
general, touching on every aspect of social welfare,
its application is programmatically restricted to a
certain particular situation -- the.situation where
constant surveillance is required. While the main
function of the Panopticon penitentiary is to rehabi-
litate the inmate, rehabilitation at Panopticon is
really a restoration of what is considered to be
temporarily lost rather than the formation of desirable
character, as in the case of Robert Owen's proposals,
the topic to be discussed in the next chapter. Further-
more, whereas the austere environment of the Panopticon
penitentiary is an instrument of rehabilitation, it
works by virtue of what it lacks, as in the case of
Malthus' environmentalism, rather than of what it has:
it is essentially a "mind-emptying" agent, not a forma-
tive one. There is a certain tentativeness in Bentham's
environmentalism.
Why this tentativeness? The answer can be found,
I submit, in Bentham's individualist social thinking.
It accommodates environmentalism, but only as an
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"epicycle," as an auxiliary hypothesis designed to
retain an individualist core in the face of observed
anomalies.
For Bentham, man is by nature a self-centered,
free, and self-contained being; he seeks freely what
brings him pleasure and avoids pain. And, being a
creature endowed with the capacity to reason, he pursues
self-interest rationally, that is, through anticipating
the consequences of his actions and behaving accordingly.
In this capacity, every individual is equal. It is
only this individual, and not the state, which has
meaning for Bentham. Thus, he maintains that "the
community is a fictitious body, composed of the indi-
vidual persons who are considered as constituting as
it were its members. The interest of the community
then is, what? The sum of the several members who
compose it." 2 7 As such, Bentham's ideal society is
one where the greatest happiness is granted to the
greatest number of people. It is a society where
everyone is left alone to pursue his own self-interest
without the government's interference; the government
is essentially evil for Bentham.
How is this ideal order to be emulated in a real
society prone to the "jungle anarchy" of competition?
Given his individualist perspective, it is entirely
consistent that Bentham views punishment as the sole
means to achieve this ideal order; stick rather than
carrot is what he considers effective. By penalizing
actions inimical to social harmony, it is believed,
individuals learn to avoid committing such actions.
Administering punishment therefore becomes for Bentham
the government's principal function.
But punishment raises a problem: how is it that
a rational person capable of acting according to the
calculus of pleasure and pain, can still commit crimes
when the pain of punishment is sure to follow the
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pleasure of crime? Are some persons, after all, inca-
pable of making reasoned choices? Bentham's answer to
this question is, as we have seen, affirmative. For
him, the criminal is not like everbody else; he is a
feeble-minded, pathological creature requiring
constant inspection and rehabilitation. Hence the
program of rehabilitation gains an important social
meaning. However, rehabilitation is not enough. Just
as the criminal is conceptually separated from the
rest of men by dint of his pathology, he must be
physically excluded from society; only by instituting
"social quarantine," to adopt Foucault's apt expression,
can society be left with those who are genuinely
rationaly and'free and thus become guaranteed of the
greatest happiness for the greatest number,
Such social quarantine is precisely what Panopticon
is programmed to achieve. Made for and housed by those
who are excluded from society, Panopticon constitutes
a negative utopia in relation to the society from which
the inmates are excluded. As such, it presents an
inverse image of ideal society. In Panopticon, every-
thing is geared to maximize interference with the
inmates rather than minimize it, Here, the individual
is neither free nor equal. Freedom and equality, the
twin precepts of Bentham's social philosophy, are
precisely what the Panoptic system is designed to
eliminate. Furthermore, in Panopticon, the individual
is subject to the measures of environmental conditioning.
The idea of human malleability by environment is
inconsistent with Bentham's conception of rational,
self-contained man, yet it enters the Panopticon scheme
as an organizing idea. This is so because the idea is
required in order for Bentham to retain, in the face of
many anomalies, his individualistic, egalitarian, and
hedonistically oriented social thought.
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VI. ENVIRONMENT AND CHARACTER REFORM:
ROBERT OWEN'S "SCIENCE OF CIRCUMSTANCES"
Robert Owen's communitarian experiments are well-
recognized sources of modern urbanism. Together with
the works of such "utopian" reformers as Charles Fourier
and Etienne Cabet, they are generally taken to be early
signs of the growing awareness of the organizational
problems produced by mechanical progress in the nine-
teenth century, and are appreciated as having provided
a model of planning from which modern town planning
theory and practice have gradually emerged.1
Owen envisioned his ideal community, or the "Village
of Co-operation" as he called it, as a universal model
for a "New Moral Society." It was not put forward as a
technical or philanthropic solution to some local or
partial problems; it was meant to be a generalized means
to reconstitute society and completely rid it of its
ills and miseries. It was to achieve this formidable
goal by being an instrument in the reform of people's
moral and intellectual character. Owen was confident
that people would become full of happiness, freedom,
and above all, mutual love once they were subject to
the environment of his ideal community. Owen's confi-
dence stems from his conviction that he discovered
"scientific laws" governing human character formation
and that his community scheme was therefore scienti-
fically based. This conviction is exemplified by the
following words of the Owenite architect Stedman
Whitwell. After giving a detailed description of the
design of New Harmony, the American monument to Owenite
communitarianism, he gives assurances that:
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the disposition of every other part (of the pro-
posed design of New Harmony) is so regulated by a
careful attention to the most important discoveries
and facts in science, as to form a new combination
of circumstances, capable of producing permanently
greater physical, moral and intellectual advantages
to every individual, than have yet been realized in
any age or country. (2)
In what follows I shall attempt to analyze some of
the central features of this "science of circumstances"
as it relates to the communitarian experiments. My
purpose is to show that Owen's science was a version of
environmentalism, and to illustrate that the Owenite
ideal community was at once an embodiment of the idea of
environmental influence over the process of character
formation, and an experiment testing the validity of
this thesis. In addition, I will argue that this envi-
ronmentalism compelled the essentially social and moral
movement of Owenism to resort to physical means in an
effort to reorganize society.
This chapter on Owen is designed to complement the
preceding one on Bentham. These two prominent figures
of early modern England diverged sharply in their
respective views of man and society -- a socialist,
holistic position as opposed to a liberal, individual-
istic one -- and their ideas on the environment differed
correspondingly. In order to see the relationship
between environmentalism and larger social views, there-
fore, I shall attempt to compare their respective
projects at the end of the present chapter.
Owen's "science of circumstances" or the "science
of society," as he came to call it in his later writings,
is essentially a socio-psychological doctrine purporting
to explain how one's character, or in modern terms,
personality, is formed. He first presented this science
to the general public in his New View of Society (1820),
which contained a lengthy essay on the formation of
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human character. Beginning with this publication, he
never tired of reiterating his social and psychological
theses. In his Book of the New Moral World (1836-44),
he presented these ideas in their final and most
dogmatic form. They are formulated as "Five Fundamental
Facts" and "Twenty Fundamental Laws" of human nature,
and Owen claims that they exist "without man's knowledge
or consent," to be unchangeable by any effort man makes.
The theory of human nature which had been generally
accepted up to Owen's time was innatist.3 Innatism had
been particularly influential on moral and social thought
in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Innatism holds as its central thesis that human nature
is constant. This, of course, does not mean that all
men at all times have held similar ideas and have acted
in similar ways; rather, innatism maintains that man
has as "essence" or "inner nature" which remains
unaffected by the vicissitudes of existential experience.
Accordingly, innatism assumes that the divergent features
of men derive from divergent intrinsic properties, and
that therefore human character is immutable. Also taken
for granted by the holders of innatism is the assumption
that, underlying varying beliefs and forms of action of
different individuals, there are some common characteris-
tics shared by all men, and that these shared common
characteristics are just as unchangeable as the diver-
gencies among them.
Owen's "science of circumstances" amounts to a
virtual rejection of this assumption of the constancy
of human nature. While still maintaining the mentalist,
individualist emphasis of the traditional view of human
character (as evidenced by his emphasis on character
as the basis of behavior), he diverges sharply from
innatist doctrine by maintaining that human character
is entirely "malleable" by education and environmental
influence. He wrote:
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The character of man is, without a single exception,
always formed for him, -- it may be, and is chiefly,
created by his predecessors; -- they give him, or
may give him, his ideas and habits, which are the
powers that govern and direct his conduct. Man,
therefore, never did, nor is it possible he ever
can, form his own character. (4)
In Owen's thinking, man is fundamentally a "com-
pound being," his character formed in part genetically
by the "constitution or organization"given at birth,
and in part externally by the "effects of life circum-
stances" acting on the genetic part from birth to
death. The genetic part alone is "the immediate work
of the creator," thus admitting no human control. It
lays down only the most basic dispositions in man:
the "natural" desire to obtain happiness and avoid
pain, or "self-interest" according to the utilitarian
nomenclature of Owen's time, and the mental faculty
to receive, convey and compare ideas.5 All men are
born with these propensities, although the precise
content and intensity of each of them varies from one
person to another. This individual variation, according
to Owen, accounts for the diversity found among people's
native talents and mental capacities.
Owen is emphatic, however, in claiming that diver-
gencies caused by genetic variation are minimal com-
pared to what infinitely varying life experiences can
do for differences in people's character. It is actual
ideas, feelings and passions one experiences through
life that really make up the substance of human charac-
ter, not native organization. The latter only lays
down certain general directions; the former moulds and
fixes an individual's qualities. Consequently, Owen
was fond of saying, "man is nothing in his cradle,
neither good nor bad"; virtue and vice, as with other
features of man's character, are externally acquired,
and there are no intrinsic principles that induce man
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to be either virtuous or vicious.
In rejecting the innatist idea of mind, and in pro-
posing a theory of environmental influence on human
character, Owen was neither first nor alone, his own
claims notwithstanding. Similar environmentalist ideas
had been emerging since the eighteenth century and were
gaining supporters among contemporary social theorists,
educators, and philosophers. In particular, there is
an unmistakable conceptual affinity between Owen's
"science of circumstance" and the environmentalism
inherent in the associationist psychology of John Locke
and Claude Helvetius, among others. 6
In his celebrated Essay Concerning Human Under-
standing, Locke first expounded the theory of associa-
tionism. The main thesis is that the mind has no innate
ideas, and that all knowledge is dependent on experience.
The chief function of the mind is, according to Locke,
to register sense impressions arising from the external
world. However intricate knowledge may become, all of
its original elements are derived from the sensory
impressions registered in the mind. Simple ideas are
given directly through the senses, while more complex
ones are formed through inspection by the association
of simple elements. To quote Locke:
Had you or I been born at the Bay of Soldania,
possibly your thoughts and notions had not exceeded
those brutish ones of the Hottentots that inhabit
there. And had the Virginia king of Apochancana
been educated in England, he had been perhaps so
knowing a divine, and as good a mathematician as
any in it . . . . And if he had not any idea of
a God, it was only because he pursued not those
thoughts that would have led to it. (7)
Another important precursor to Owen's "science" is
the environmental behaviorism of Claude-Adrien Helvetius,
the French Enlightenment philosopher and patron of the
encyclopedists. Helvetius' ideas became widely
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accessible to the English public through similar works
by William Godwin, especially the latter's Enquiry
Concerning Public Justice (1793), which exerted an
enormous influence on the social and political conse-
quences of England immediately after the French revo-
lution. In his book De l'esprit (On the Mind)
published in 1759 and one of the ideological cause-
celebres of the eighteenth century, and later in On
Man (1772), Helvetius expounded his view of the mind
and on its basis made a systematic attack on the
church and state.8 Like Locke, from whom he derived
his thought, Helvetius denied that human nature was
innate; he held that the human mind was completely
malleable by external conditioning, and that its
primary function consists in registering sense
impressions arising from the external world. Helvetius
maintained:
Man, born without ideas or character, and indif-
ferent to good and evil, has no gift from nature
but corporeal sensibility; that in his cradle
he is nothing; that his virtues and vices, his
factitious passions, his talents, his prejudices,
and even his self-love, are acquired. (9)
Given the malleability of human character, Helvetius
reasoned, the intellectual and moral capacities, no
less than the entire complex of values and motivations
of any individual, are to be explained solely as the
product of education, or the total cumulative environ-
ment defining an individual's life situations from the
moment of birth. As in Owen, Helvetius used both the
concepts and the words, 'education' and 'environment,'
interchangeably. For him, as for Owen, everything that
exists external to the mind and impinges on sensation
contributes to the content of education: education flows
entirely from the operation of circumstances and events
acting upon a faculty of receiving sensible impressions.
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In taking a behavioral "tabular rasa" view of the
human mind, Helvetius was more interested in deriving
the ethical and social implications of this view than
in developing an epistemological theory. He sought
justifications for a global social reform based on
general education. In this respect he stands closer
to Owen (.and Bentham) than to Locke.
Thus far we have examined some of the central
features of Owen's "science of circumstances" and
its intellectual precursors. In essence, Owen's
"science" was a theory of the process of socialization.
As a theory, it was rough, incomplete, often incon-
sistent, and inferior to the works of Locke and Hel-
vetius in terms of its philosophical or scientific
achievement. Still, by virtue of the nature of its
aims, concerns, and conceptualizations, it deserved
to be called what it was claimed to be by Owen: a
vanguard of modern social science.
However, Owen's more profound contibution lay in
what he did with the "science" rather than in the
"science" itself. Logically speaking, the notion of
creating a new environment to change man and society
is a concomitant to the conception that human beings
are malleable by external control into whatever form
is deemed desirable. However, it remains to Owen's
credit that he, more than anyone of his generation,
realized the full implications of the doctrine of
human malleability on questions of social reform, and
that, moreover, he sought through action to test this
doctrine.
What enabled Owen to go beyond his predecessors
was his willingness to consider society in environ-
mental terms. In insisting that the ultimate cause
of social ills lay in the conditions of the social
environment itself rather than in the innate qualities
of its members, Owen effectively rejected the precept
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of the individualist liberalism which was influential
in his time. For Owen, society was a "whole" capable
of conditioning the state of its constituents, not a
"mere aggregate" of self-contained and selfish indi-
viduals; it was not a necessary but regrettable product
of contract, restricting man's unlimited right to do
as he pleased, but the setting of his life, happiness,
and individuality. Though he believed with the utili-
tarians that happiness was the primary and necessary
objective of all men, he diverged from them sharply in
his conviction that "happiness cannot be obtained
individually"; that "it is useless to expect isolated
happiness," and that "all must partake of it or the
few will never enjoy it."10 For Owen man was naturally
a communal being.
In rejecting the innatist view of human nature and
in believing in its malleability by environmental con-
ditions, Owen also denounced the idea of personal
accountability and the penal tradition based on that
notion. Classical jurisprudence, as we have seen with
Bentham, assumed that all men possessed free-will and
were autonomous and capable of rational decisions, and
that, therefore, criminals were personally and comple-
tely accountable for the offences they committed. From
the viewpoint of Owen's "science," this was an entirely
erroneous proposition, since it ignored the "fact"
that human conduct was a product of external condition-
ing. For Owen, it is the environment impinging on man,
not the individual himself, which should be held res-
ponsible for what the individual does or fails to do.
Consequently, it is "the essence of irrationality to
suppose that any human being from the creation to this
day, could deserve praise or blame, reward or punish-
ment. . . . In the characters which now exhibit crime,
the fault is obviously not in the individual, but the
defects proceed from the system in which the individual
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was trained."" By utilizing a system of punishment,
Owen maintained, society fails to deal with the real
cause of crime. Crime, as with any other social ill,
is merely a symptom of the defective environmental
conditions under which people are brought up and made
to live -- society achieves nothing by means of punish-
ment. The genuine solution lies in removing this
faulty environment and creating a new one that would
reform the minds of individuals and, through this reform,
usher in a new moral society.
By putting forward a new view of society and criti-
cizing the notion of individual accountability, Owenism
confronted head on the fundamental premises of the
received social order. In the Owenite view, the
principle source of society's various ills and miseries
was the prevalent attitude which accepted the pursuit
of individual interest as the natural as well as the
most beneficial foundation of society. This attitude,
which the influential theorists of political economy
sanctified and propagated, was, Owen declared, "one of
those magnificent errors that, when enforced in practice,
brings ten thousand evils in its train."12 All kinds
of undesirable effects, "all the divisions of mankind,
the endless errors and mischiefs of class, sect, party
and of antiparties, creating angry and malevolent
passions, and all the crimes and miseries with which
the human race [was] hitherto afflicted," were attributed
to this source.
To Owen's mind, there is nothing natural or immutable
about men acting selfishly. They act so because they are
not taught to do otherwise, and they are not taught to
do otherwise because the prevailing conception of human
nature is fundamentally in error: it incorrectly assumes
that human character is innate and therefore unchangeable.
Consequently, Owen believes, once the erroneous ideas are
dispelled and the correct view is accepted through a
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"science of character formation," men can easily be
trained to be cooperative, and to live in harmony and
unity with others. As they have been trained to unite
for the purpose of war, Owen predicted, so too can
they be taught to unite for the purpose of living
together peacefully. Thus the key to the "New Moral
World" is this "science of character formation." Owen
was confident that he had discovered this new science.
He wrote:
The science of the influence of circumstances over
human nature will dispel this ignorance, and prove
how much more easily men may be trained by other
means to become, without exception, active, kind,
and intelligent, -- devoid of those unpleasant
and irrational feelings, which for ages have tor-
mented the whole human race. This science may
truly be called one whereby ignorance, poverty,
crime, and misery may be prevented, and will indeed
open a new era to the human race; one, in which
real happiness will commence, and perpetually go 14
on increasing, through every succeeding generation.
There is an apparent circularity in Owen's "science":
it claimed that man is wholly a product of his environ-
ment but at the same time credited him with the capacity
to modify the same environment drastically. How is it
possible that man is at once a product and modifying
agent of his environment? Does a good environment
made men virtuous, or do virtuous men make a good envi-
ronment? To many of Owen's critics, this circularity
was more substantive than just a case of the chicken
and egg question. It was taken as an indication that
Owen's entire doctrine was hopelessly flawed and his
practical proposals unwarranted; it confirmed, the
critics charged, that Owen's evident indifference to
the traditional Christian concepts of duty and moral
responsibility as the basis of philanthropy was not
only ethically unjustified but also logically faulty. 1 5
For Owen and his followers, however, this circularity
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was only apparent and not real. For them, it was not
a conceptual contradiction that could undermine the
validity of their doctrine but, on the contrary, the
very source of their conviction. Owen gave two argu-
ments in support of this point. The first argument
was based on the Enlightenment belief in the power of
rationality. According to Owen, man is at the mercy of
his environment; once he gains the knowledge that he
is under the control of the environment, he can then
practice an inversion and, at least to a large extent,
control the environment impinging on him. The second
argument pointed to the differences of power between
men as individuals and men in a group: as individuals
men lack power to alter and improve their environment
on any meaningful scale and thus are subservient to
the influences of the environment; however, when
working together collectively, they can create most
of their environment in such a way as to favor their
own improvement and happiness.
This "resolution" of the circularity forms the very
core of Owen's "science of circumstances," enabling the
Owenites to consider their communitarian experiments
not only as practical solutions to solve some limited,
local problems, but as a universally valid means to
bring about social reform at the most profound level.
By joining together what had hitherto been seen as
contradictory ideas, Owen was able to envision the
making of the environment and the making of man's
future as but two sides of one and the same process.
An acceptance of the power of the environment over
individual men meant to Owen that the ultimate cause
of social ills as well as the effective means of
removing them lay beyond the power of individual men,
although the aggregate of their moral values and dis-
positions, themselves formed by the condition of the
environment in which they lived, was the immediate
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5. the "Institute for Characer Reform" at New Lanark
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cause of such social ills. However, an acceptance of
the second thesis -- that man can control his own envi-
ronment -- convinced him that reform was possible,
because problems were man-made, and were to be removed
once the pathogenic environment was eliminated. The
logical means to effect reform, then, was to create a
new environment for people, one that would free them
from the grips of the received problematic environment
and, at the same time, nurture them in the values of
harmonious, communitarian living. Hence, the basis
was laid for the "Village of Co-operation," particu-
larly for its dual emphasis: education and community.
While not a movement whose principal aim was to
create schools and literary institutions for their own
sake, Owenism's schools and its emphasis on education
in its communitarian experiments, proved to be the
most enduring part of the local Owenite institution.1 6
New Lanark, for example, is remembered chiefly for its
innovations in the infants' school, considered by many
historians of education as "one of the most outstanding
educational phenomena of the -nineteenth century."1 7
Physically, also, the schools and other educational
facilities occupied a large portion of the communities'
land. For a community of 2,000 people, the Whitwell
plan called for: two gymnasiums, a library, several
music rooms, a theater for lectures and exhibitions,
a reference museum, and two schools, one for infants
and the other for older children.
Education at the "Village of Co-operation" was
inseparably linked with Owen's idea of environmental
influence on human character formation. The role of
education lay in inculcating in the children communi-
tarian values suitable for a new moral world. In
order to minimize the negative influences the children
might get from their parents, Owen was eager to begin
their schooling as early as the age of one.18 Unlike
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many contemporary schools, where the children were
forced to Iook-learning with harsh disciplinary measures,
the Owenite school relied on creating an exemplary
environment for its moral teaching. It had no monitory
system such as was prevalent at the time. Fundamental
rules of kindness and mutual help were observed, and
all forms of harshness and violence were eschewed.
Punishments were strictly forbidden not so much for
reasons of cruelty, but out of the fear of setting bad
examples for the children.
Not only was environmental conditioning a means of
training at the Owenite school, it was also the main
object of learning. A great emphasis was given on
teaching the children that human values and attitudes
were not innate but produced by environmental conditions.
Once made aware of this fact, it was reasoned, the
children would soon come to realize that there could
be no single standard of truth or virtue which would
be universally valid regardless of environmental varia-
tions, which in turn would induce them to be more open
and understanding towards those who were not like them.
Consequently, geography became an important subject in
the curriculum of the Owenite schools.19 In this way,
education in the Owenite communities was both about,
and dependent on, evironmental conditioning. Conjoined,
environment and education served as the means of nur-
turing qualities conducive to social unity and harmony.
This concomitance of education and environment
explains why the Owenite movement considered the ideal
community its central institution and devoted a large
part of its energy, capital, and time for its creation
and propagation. The actual community was called for
in order to make education and the formation of human
character truly effective. To repeat, the objectives
of Owenite education consisted in training the children
in the virtue of conmunitarian values and attitudes and,
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at the same time, teaching them the fallacy of innatism
and the truthfulness of human malleability by the envi-
ronment. But, given Owen's environmentalist view of
education, these objectives could not be fully achieved
without employing an actual environment which would
nurture the inhabitants in the desired values and atti-
tudes. Seen in this light, the entire Owenite community
was to function as the "Institute for Formation of
Character," not just the schools so designated by Owen.
As an example of an already reformed society, it would
provide an influential and educative environment in
concrete form.
As Owen put it, his community was an attempt to
extend the organic quality and environmental power of
the traditional home beyond the man-and-wife union,
while eliminating its negative restricting effects from
society. For the holist Owen, the traditional family
was the very source of individualism and self-centredness
to which he was so vehemently opposed, perpetuating the
institution of private property, separating men from
each other, and thereby discouraging social unity and
cohesion. In the "Village of Co-operation," such would
not be the case: land and other properties would be
collectively owned, production and distribution performed
jointly, child rearing and food production shared, and
village affairs collectively managed. The ideals were
thus "many families with one interest," not "simple
families with separate interests," and a more enriched,
rational, inclusive place for people emancipated from
the confining influence of the received system.2 0
Owen laid down prescriptions for the Village of
Co-operation in his famous address to the County of
New Lanark in 1821.21 Actual Owenite communities --
there were altogether twenty-six -- differed markedly
from one another in size, architectural arrangement,
and in the method of management.22 Moreover, many of
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of them were adaptations of the pre-existing settlements
on which they were founded. Nonetheless, Owen's pre-
scribed model remained powerful, whose spirit, if not
its actual form, was devoutly followed.
The model community was a self-sufficient agricul-
tural village, having a restricted size of landholding
and population in order to ensure "the largest amount
of the intrinsically valuable produce in a way most
advantageous to the producers and to society." The
optimum size of the land was between 800 and 1,500
acres, with a population of 800 to 1,200 inhabitants,
though a size anywhere between the maximum of 3,000
acres and 2,000 inhabitants and the minimum of 150
acres and 300 people was considered possible. The
land was to be held in communal ownership, and labor,
expenditure, and privilege were to be shared equally
among the inhabitants.
In arranging the settlement, the dwelling site was
to be located at the center of the community land in
order to minimize the walking distance to the surround-
ing agricultural fields. The community would be without
such usual features as streets, alleys, lanes and courts,
because they were thought to "create unnecessary incon-
veniences, injuries to health," and to be "destructive
of almost all the natural comforts of human life." 2 3
Instead of these arrangements, the community was to
take the form of a large square or, more precisely, a
parallelogram. The form of the parallelogram was
claimed to be most natural and advantageous for accommo-
dating community life. Owen writes:
This form, indeed, affords so many advantages for
the comfort of human life, that if great ignorance,
respecting the means necessary to serve good con-
duct and happiness among the working classes, had
not prevailed in all ranks, it must long ago have
become universal. It admits of a most simple, easy,
convenient and economical arrangement for all
purposes required. (24)
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DESIGN
for a Comnunity of 2000 Persons founded upon a principle
Commended by Plato, Lord Bacon and Sir Thomas More
EXPLANATION OF THE PARTS NUMBERED ON THE PLATE
1 Gymnasiums or Covered Places for Exercise, attached to the Schools and Infirmary.
2 Conservatory, in the midst of Gardens botanically arranged.
3 Baths, warm and cold, of which there are four for the Males, and four for the Females.
4 Dining Halls, with Kitchens, &c. beneath them.
5 Angle Buildings, occupied by the Schools for Infants, Children, and Youths, and the
Infirmary; on the ground floors are Conversation-rooms for Adults.
6 Library, Detached Reading Rooms, Bookbindery, Printing Office, &c.
7 Ballroom and Music rooms.
8 Theatre for Lectures, Exhibitions, Discussions, &c. with Laboratory, Small Library, &c.
9 Museum, with Library of Description and Reference, Rooms for preparing Specimens,
&c.
10 The Brew-houses, Bakehouses, Wash-houses, Laundries, &c. arranged round the Bases
of the Towers.
11 The Refectories for the infants and children are on each side of the Vestibules of the
Dining halls.
12 The Illuminators of the Establishment, Clock-towers, and Observatories, and from the
elevated summits of which all the smoke and vitiated air of the buildings is discharged
into the atmosphere.
13 Suites of adult sitting rooms and chambers.
14 Suites of Chambers, which may be easily and quickly made of any dimensions required;
Dormitories for the Unmarried and Children.
15 Esplanade one hundred feet wide, about twelve feet above the natural surface.
16 Paved Footpath.
17 The Arcade and its Terrace, giving both a covered and an open communication with
every part of the building.
18 Sub-way leading to the Kitchens, &c. and along which meat, vegetables, coals, &c. are
conveyed to the Stores, and dust and refuse brought out.
6. Steadman Whitwell's design for an Owenite community
1~' 0
0 :c rt (D 0 Or rt
Private apartments occupied three sides of the
parallelogram, the remaining side being reserved for
communal facilities. These apartments provided
sleeping and sitting rooms for the adult population.
Also provided here were rooms to store various pro-
ducts, an infirmary, and an inn to accommodate visitors.
A church or other place of worship was to be located
in a structure across the center of the parallelogram,
thus leaving sufficient free space for air and light,
affording easy access for the whole population, and
facilitating the best public superintendence. Vegetable
gardens adjoined the apartments on the outside of the
parallelogram, bounded by principal roads. Plantations,
workshops and manufactories occupied the rest of the
communal land. There were no individual kitchens for
the private apartments, since cooking as well as eating
were to be done communally. Separate fireplaces were
also eliminated from the apartments; heating, cooling,
and ventilation were to be maintained collectively.
The training and education of the children received
the highest emphasis in the design and operation of the
community.- Each community was to have two schools, one
for the toddlers from two to six years of age, and the
other for children from six to twelve years old. Both
of these schools adjoined the church, housed in the
building to be erected across the center of the
parallelogram.
* * *
As a way of concluding this chapter, let us compare
the environmental ideas expressed in the Owenite com-
munitarian experiments with those in Bentham's Panopticon
project. Panopticon and the Village of Co-operation
epitomize the reform thought of two of the most promi-
nent figures of early modern England and the ideologies
they respectively represented. Conceived and advocated
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as prototypical solutions to ameliorate the conditions
of society at large, their respective projects shared
the ambition of bringing the greatest happiness to
the greatest number of people. Nonetheless, when the
proposed features of these projects have been followed
through, Panopticon and the Village of Co-operation
reveal attitudes that are markedly distinct, even anta-
gonistic. On the surface, they contrast sharply in
the immediate effects they are expected to bring. At
a deeper level, they point to differing conceptions
of environment and environmental control in relation
to social reform, and contrasting ideas of man and
society, with which their environmental notions are
connected.
In the first place, the two projects differed in
the area and scope of intended application. As a "house
of inspection," Panopticon had generalized, yet confined,
usage: it was recommended explicitly for penitentiaries,
schools, poor-houses, manufactories, etc. Though these
facilities vary considerably within themselves in
detailed purposes, requirements and technologies involved,
they were considered by Bentham as being of a class in
that they all required inspection, a "constant, sharp
looking after." In Bentham's mind, they were to be
grouped together because they all dealt with social
misfits of one kind or another, people who do not quite
measure up to society's standard of normality, being
immature, sick, vicious, intemperate, or simply ignorant.
In a way, the invention of Panopticon as a "generalized"
solution predicates the conceptual division of society
into two mutually exclusive worlds: one, normal, free,
and rational, requiring no surveillance; the other,
pathological, irrational, contaminating, and therefore
requiring confinement and reform. Panopticon served
the former through the reform of the latter. In a
diagrammatic contrast, the Owenite Village of Harmony
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sought to overcome such a distinction; the central
purpose of the Village was to create a society based
on the principles of unity and harmony, not on separation
and division. The premise of the Village was that the
entire existing system, not just a few unfortunate
deviants, was in error. Though Owen had the working
poor in mind when he first formulated the idea of the
ideal community, he eventually came to regard the
project equally valid for every class of society, indeed
for humanity as a whole.
Panopticon and the Village contrasted also in their
functions. Bentham considered Panopticon mainly as a
model prison; it was to function as a "place of punish-
ment," and its architecture, management and organization
of routines were to facilitate punishment in its most
rational forms. To this end, the deviants were to be
removed from society and to be confined in Panopticon
under continuous surveillance. The end of punishment
at Panopticon was reformation -- the operation of
removing undesirable propensities from the mind of the
delinquents and thus restoring their native rationality.
Owen, on the other hand, was strongly opposed to punish-
ment both as a concept and in practice. He considered
punishment ineffectual and even harmful in preventing
social malaise; not individual offenders but their life
environments were responsible for social ills, according
to Owen. Punishment in any form was, therefore, to be
banned from the Owenite villages and schools. Instead
of using punishment, Owen relied on education to counter
social ills. Owen's conception of education was dis-
similar to Bentham's idea of reform at Panopticon. For
Owen, it meant inculcating an entirely new, positive
character rather than removing negative mental traits
already developed, as was the case with Bentham.
As the functions intended for Panopticon and the
Owenite Village differed greatly, so did the means they
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adopted to exercise their respective functions. The
operation of reform at Panopticon relied on maintaining
an individualized (between the inmates) and hierarchical
(between the inmates and the inspector) human rela-
tionship for its success. Every means was employed in
the building and operation of Panopticon to ensure the
separation of the inmates from one another and to dis-
courage congregation; the measures of discipline and
surveillance were enforced in this state of forced
individualization. In sharp contrast, the Owenite
Village sought to reach the mind of the people by
fostering association between them. The environment
of community, not of isolation, was proposed as a
necessary condition for moulding the minds of the
people.
In sum, conceptual inversion characterizes the
relationship between Panopticon and the Owenite Village.
While sharing the utilitarian goal in common, one
sought to attain it by means of "social quarantine"
and rehabilitation, and the other by means of total
transformation. The operation of Panopticon was to
remove and cure the pathological; the ambition of the
Owenite Village was to offer a new reformed world. In
pursuing its objective, Panopticon would function as
an "anti-environment"; an environment which was to
derive its power over the mind by depriving it of its
usual environmental associations; the assumption being
that the mind, deprived of environmental data, becomes
"void" and thus malleable to any shape desired. The
premise of the Owenite Village was the opposite: to
create a full, complete and rich environment to effect
"formation of character." Here, environment was con-
ceived positively as an agent to fill, rather than to
empty, the minds of men who are to be educated.
It is easy to dismiss these contrasts in the two
projects as a consequence of the fact that Bentham and
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Owen pursued differing interests -- penal reform as
compared with moral reform, By doing so, however, we
will be missing an important point; why did Bentham
choose to pursue one kind of problem while Owen pursued
another? What motivated them in their choice of
problems? Furthermore, there is no logical reason why
reform should take the form Bentham recommended for his
Panopticon, as there is no necessary connection between
the task of moral reform and the content of Owen's
proposals.
The key to an understanding of this "inverted"
relationship may be found in the fact that Bentham
and Owen were opposed in their conception of society
and its relation to the individual.
Bentham considered man and society in individualist
and hedonist terms. Given this orientation, Bentham's
choice of punishment-confinement-reform as the principal
means to secure harmony in society was a logical one.
Man (that is, "normal" man),in Bentham's view, is by
nature a self-centered and self-contained being; he is
also rational in the sense that he is capable of anti-
cipating the consequences of his actions and of behaving
accordingly. Because of this capacity, people can be
induced to act in such a way as to bring "the greatest
happiness to the greatest number of people." This can
be done by excluding from society those who are for
some reason inacapable of guiding their actions ration-
ally and thus are disruptive of social harmony; by
teaching the "normal" and the "pathological" alike,
through punishment of the offenders, the pain associated
with societally undesirable acts; and by "curing" the
deviants and misfits through reformative measures which
will return them to the society of rational individuals.
Equally expected is Owen's choice of problems and
proposed solutions. Given his holistic interpretation
of society, the Village of Co-operation was the most
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logical means to achieve his goals. For him, man is
naturally a communal being, whose interest is "irre-
vocably, intimately, and inseparably" linked with that
of others; this "truth" is blocked from people by the
defective environment of existing society. And since
individuals are affected by their total surroundings
rather than vice versa, the entire societal system
should be overhauled in order for the truth to be
realized.
Despite many differences derived from their con-
trasting views of society, Panopticon and the Owenite
Village remain united in being predicated on the mallea-
bility of the human mind under environmental influences.
Both of these projects were environmental in their
final forms as in their alleged modes of functioning.
They were "inventions" of contrived environments, whose
common function was to exercise certain kinds of
influences on the minds of people placed there. A style
of thinking that correlates environmental conditions
and man's inner properties as cause and effect enabled
these "inventions" and supported their claims to
efficacy.
In addition, Bentham and Owen shared in common what
we may call a mentalist operation toward reform: they
both considered mind (moral disposition, intellectual
capacity, emotional propensity, or simply "character")
as a main determinant, though not necessarily the final
one in the case of Owen, of a person's social conduct.
Also, it was the mind that was considered environmentally
malleable, and therefore susceptible of reform. Connected
with this preoccupation with the mind is their unbounded
conviction in both the fact and power of human rationa-
lity, the notion that every man is, at least in prin-
ciple, completely rational -- capable of acting in
accordance with the utilitarian principles. In Bentham's
case, this notion formed the basis for his theory of
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personal accountability and of punishment-as-prevention;
in the case of Owen, it supported his program of
education. An assumption implicit to both is that
knowledge necessarily leads to action, that correct
knowledge is not only morally good but is also bound
to be acted out. The unashamed self-advertisement
of both Bentham and Owen for their contrivances exem-
plifies this assumption.
To sum up, two broad conceptual complexes are common
to the theories that produced Panopticon and the
Village of Co-operation: the environmental malleability
of the human mind and the belief in the complete
rationality of man. These complexes have their sources
in the two contending traditions of Enlightenment
thinking -- empiricism (sensualism) and rationalism.
They remain not fully integrated in the thinking of
Bentham and Owen, although their shared mentalism
intersects the two complexes, tying them loosely. The
results are certain conceptual ambiguities and diffi-
culties in the two projects. In Panopticon, these
involve the ambiguous status of delinquents relative
to the "normal" man; the delinquents are simultaneously
rational (therefore punishablel and "feeble-minded"
(therefore reformable). In Owen, the xuain difficulty
was with the circularity; that man is simultaneoulsy
a product and a master of the environment.
This uneasy co-presence of the two modes of
thinking in Bentham as well as in Owen presented, as
did the conceptual incompatibility between the indivi-
dualist Bentham and the holist Owen, a major source
of theoretical concern -- a concern which was to
occupy much of the ensuing development of environmental
thinking, well into the present century.
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VII. ENVIRONMENT AND PATHOLOGY:
EDWIN CHADWICK'S SANITARY REFORM MOVEMENT
The contribution of the nineteenth century sanitary
reform movement to modern town planning is both more
tangible and basic than that of the cases discussed in
the preceding sections. We find it almost a contradic-
tion in terms for a modern city to be without a constant
supply of drinking water, a reliable way of disposing
of human and- other wastes, or even a system of street
cleaning. "Nobler" sides of city life assume the satis-
faction of these bare requirements which nonetheless
entails complex tasks requiring the concerted coopera-
tion of engineering, sanitary science, municipal machi-
nery and an administrative framework.
Sanitation has long been practiced by society. The
history of organized efforts to provide the city with
adequate water supply and waste removal is as old as
urban civilization itself. Nonetheless, only in the
nineteenth century does sanitation become a subject
of conscious, concerted and public movements supported
by hygienic sciences as well as legislative and
administrative measures. The modern theory and practice
of sanitation derives from the innovations achieved in
this "century of reform," particularly from the work of
Edwin Chadwick (1800-1894) and his colleagues on the
Royal Commission.
Franqoise Choay states that these men achieved works
which are "monuments of urban sociology," and credits
them as the first to analyze urban phenomena with a
"clinical eye," diagnosing the city as a "monstrous
deformity" requiring radical "surgery" through "clinical"
"planning."l In the opinion of Leonardo Benevolo,
M9.
furthermore, the Public Health Law of 1848, one of the
direct outcomes of the efforts of Chadwick's group,
constituted a direct forerunner of modern town planning
legislation; it replaced the antiquated and irresponsible
framework based on the concept of public control.2
Edwin Chadwick's enquiry into sanitation had its
immediate beginning in 1838, when as secretary to the
Poor Law Commission, he initiated a small-scale survey
into the relationship between the housing conditions and
the health of London's working poor. Performed by three
well-known physicians of the day -- Drs. Neil Arnott,
James Phillip Kay, and Southwood Smith -- the survey
was published in the same year as an appendix to the
Poor Law Commission's Fourth Annual Report. From a
medical point of view, this brief report, totalling
ten pages, was not a major event, the medical opinions
voiced in the report having been fairly commonplace
among the leading men of the field around the time.
Yet, the report was one of the first instances where
the government formally employed medical men to gather
factual examples as a prelude to possible parliamentary
action.
In the year following the report's publication, the
government formally charged the Poor Law Commission to
undertake a sanitary enquiry on a national scale. The
purpose of this new enquiry was to determine, through
empirical investigation, the nature of the relationship
between sanitary conditions and public health. Edwin
Chadwick was given primary responsibility to oversee
its operation. Subsequently, Chadwick extended the
original metropolitan survey of 1838 to the wider
context of England, Wales, and Scotland. His survey
included not only the industrial towns, in the context
of which the traditional debates on sanitation and
public health were waged, but also agricultural towns
and villages; indeed, towns of all types and sizes
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were finally covered in his comprehensive survey. In
the course of gathering local data, Chadwick made an
extensive and systematic use of the nationwide network
of medical and social intelligence controlled by the
Poor Law Commission -- a body which he himself was
instrumental in creating. In interpreting the collected
data he consulted widely with the leading medical autho-
rities of his time including the three who produced
the 1838 report.
The results were published in 1842 as the Report on
the Sanitary Conditions of the Labouring Classes of
Great Britain under Chadwick's name.3 Though the main
purpose of the Report was to make a case for governmental
action, no concrete results followed its publication
until 1848, when the Public Health Act became a law.
In the meantime, A Royal Commission was formed to verify
its conclusions and to evaluate Chadwick's recommenda-
tions. This commission, known as the Health of Towns
Commission, and whose key members included Drs. Neil
Arnott and Southwood Smith, published two reports in
1844 and 1845, which largely supported Chadwick. While
the work of the commission was going on, Dr. Southwood
Smith, Lord Normandy and Lord Ashley created the Health
of Towns Association to agitate for sanitary reform.
An organization with branches in many cities and towns,
the Association was very active in propagating Chadwick's
ideas, and he himself took an active part in the effort.
Besides helping the commission and the Association,
Chadwick also worked on another hazard to public health,
namely the danger arising from the proximity of burial
grounds to urban dwellings.4
In 1848, after a period of inaction due to an
unfavorable political climate in Parliament, the Public
Health Act became a law, thus bringing the ten-year
struggle of Chadwick and his colleagues to fruition.
Though a far cry from the ambitious plan Chadwick
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outlined in his Report (no comprehensive national
system of supervising sanitary, sewage, or public
health works), the enactment of the Public Health Law
represented a major turning point in the administration
of sanitation and public health measures. For the first
time in British legislative history, the government
recognized the need for central control and a standard
of efficiency in urban cleaning, water supply, sewage
and waste disposal. The act stipulated the creation
of a General Board of Health, and gave it the power to
create local health districts and local boards, either
through public petition or in any place with an annual
mortality rate higher than a specified norm. The local
board of health, in turn, was empowered to exercise
large functions in overseeing the management of sewage,
drainage, water supply, street and burial grounds as
well as in regulating certain noxious trades. Chadwick
was named a member of the General Board of Health, along
with two others, Lord Morpeth and Lord Ashley.
The public reaction to the Public Health Act was
not very favorable. Many, especially the landed class
and established corporations, considered the Act to
be dictatorial, aggressive, and peremptory. Particularly
vocal was the hostile movement organized by Toulmin Smith
and supported by Herbert Spencer -- a movement which
attacked the Act as unconstitutional, contrary to the
rights of people, and advocated, instead of centrali-
zation, the parish as the sole organ of government.5
In criticizing the Public Health Act, Spencer wrote
that "suffering and evil are nature's admonition; they
cannot be got rid of; and the impatient attempts of
benevolence to banish them from the world of legislation
before benevolence has learned their object and end,
have always been productive of more evil than good." 6
The government yielded to the criticisms and dissolved
the General Board of Health in 1853.
132
As the foregoing historical summary indicates,
Chadwick's sanitary movement became a battleground for
many conflicting interests, views, and ideologies,
where far more than technical issues were at stake,
In the final analysis, however, it was the "sanitary
idea" that propelled the movement and defined its
battleground -- the idea that the sanitary condition
was causally connected with the state of public health,
and that, if a sanitary program were carried out com-
pletely, disease, particularly epidemic, endemic, and
contagious kinds which were the main cause of all pre-
mature death, would itself die out. Chadwick's Report
was in essence an attempt to corroborate this sanitary
idea with statistical data, to argue for its general
adoption, and to propose a legal and administrative
machinery necessary to carry out the idea.
The largest portion of Chadwick's Report was devoted
to the task of demonstrating the "sanitary idea."
Chadwick defined his purpose at the outset of the Report
as showing "in what proportion these causes of death
fall upon the poorer classes as compared with other
classes of society inhabiting the same towns or districts,
and in what proportions the deaths fall amongst persons
of the same class inhabiting districts differently
situated."
In the first three chapters, where he deals with
residential, public, and work environments in relation
to disease, Chadwick presents the sanitary idea as a
matter of proven fact, interweaving his presentation
with a number of first-hand observations furnished to
him by the Poor Law Medical Officers. To give an indi-
cation of the axiomatic tone of these observations, I
quote two examples from the Report. One, from a Mr.
Bland, the medical officer of the Macclesfield Union,
informs Chadwick that:
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In a part of Town called the Orchard, Watercoates,
there are 34 houses without back doors, or other
complete means of ventilation; the houses are chiefly
small, damp, and dark; they are rendered worse with
respect to dampness perhaps than they would be from
the habit of the people closing their windows to
keep them warm. To these houses are three privies
uncovered; here little pools of water, with all
kinds of offal, dead animals and vegetable matter
are heaped together, a most foul and putrid mass,
disgusting to the sight, and offensive to the smell;
the fumes of contagion spreads periodically itself
into the neighborhood, and produces different types
of fever and disorder of the stomachs and bowels.
The people inhabiting these abodes are pale and
and unhealthy, and in one house in particular are
pale, bloated, and rickety. (8)
Another medical officer, this time a Mr. Pearson of
the Wigan Union, describes the condition of large
classes of tenements in the manufacturing town of
Lancashire in the following words:
From the few observations which I have been able to
make respecting the causes of fever during the two
months which I have held the situation of house
surgeon to the Dispensary, I am inclined to consider
the filthy condition of the town as being the most
prominent source. Many of the streets are unpaved
and covered with stagnant water, which lodges in
numerous large holes which exist upon their surface,
and into which the inhabitants throw all kinds of
rejected animal and vegetable matters, which then
undergo decay and emit the most poisonous exhalations.
These matters are often allowed, from the filthy
habits of the inhabitants of these districts, many
of whom, especially the poor Irish, are utterly
regardless of both personal and domestic cleanliness,
to accumulate to an immense extent, and thus become
prolific sources of Malaria, rendering the atmosphere
an active poison. (9)
The above quotations are quite typical of the local
doctors' observations which Chadwick employed in his
Report to underline his thesis; they indicate that the
correlation between health conditions and sanitary
conditions was commonly taken for granted by physicians.
As we shall see later, medical theories attributing the
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cause of disease to the unclean physical environment
was gaining broad acceptance when Chadwick was making
his Report.
The notion of sanitation receives its most systema-
tic treatment in the fourth chapter of the Report,
entitled "Comparative Chances of Life in Different
Classes." Here Chadwick makes a statistical interpre-
tation of the data brought to him by the Poor Law
doctors. Chadwick warned of the danger of error in
making generalizations from gross statistics which
do not distinguish between the differing circumstances
among people of dissimilar social backgrounds; he
drew up tables correlating three factors: the condition
of health, the social background, and the locality.
The condition of health is measured by the average age
of death, which Chadwick considers reflects the inten-
sity and frequency of the disease. The social background
is classified into three categories: "gentry, and
professional people and their children; tradesmen, and
persons similarly circumstanced, and their children;
and lastly, other labourers, artisans, and servants and
their children." The locality is indexed by Metropolitan
districts. 10
The tables convinced Chadwick that the condition of
health was indisputably correlated with both social
background and the locality of one's residence. "The
laboring classes become old the soonest," Chadwick
concludes, "and the effects of the unfavorable influences
in the adult and adolescent stage is shown in the
smallest proportions who attain extreme old age, and
also in the periods of the deaths of heads of families
of this class, by which widowhood is produced."" As
to the effect of the locality, Chadwick maintains that
"on comparing the proportion of deaths amongst all
classes between one district and another, as well as
between class and class, the general influence of the
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Total Proportion of Deaths which Proportion
No. of occurred at the under-mentioned of Deaths
CLASSES Deaths periods of Age under
under 20 Years
20 Years Between Between to Total I
of Age 0 - 5 5-10 10 - 20 Deaths
Gentry and Professional
Persons, Children of
Manchester
Leeds
Liverpool
Bath .
Bethnal Green
Strand Union
Kendal Union
County of Wilts
(Unions of)
County of Rutland
(Unions of)
Total .
Farmers, Tradesmen, and
Persons similarly circum-
stanced, Children of
Manchester
Leeds
Liverpool
Bath .
Bethnal Green
Strand Union
Kendal Union
County of Wilts
(Unions of)
County of Rutland
(Unions of)
Total .
Agricultural and other
Labourers, Artisans, and
Servants, Children of
Manchester
Leeds .
Liverpool .
Bath . .
Bethnal Green
Strand Union
Kendal Union
County of Wilts
(Unions of)
County of Rutland
(Unions of)
Total .
21
20
61
32
33
21
15
25
4
in
in
in
in
in
in
in
in
in
3
5
3
11
5
6
7
9
4
1 in 24
1 in 26
1 in 11
1 in 12
1 in 20
1 in 29
1 in 26
1 in 40
1 in 54
1 in 40
1 in 23
1 in 31
1 in 13
1 in 29
1 in 9
1 in 13
in 3
in 4
in 21
in 4j
in 3
in 4
in 3
in 5
in 7
__232 1 in 5 1 in 19 1 in 19 1 in 31
444 1 in 2 1 in 18 1 in 27 1 in 2
425 1 in 2 1 in 18 1 in 18 1 in 2
1,033 1 in 2 1 in 19 1 in 33 1 in it
78 1 in 4 1 in 24 1 in 30 1 in 3
142 1 in 2 1 in 20 1 in 28 1 in 2
99 1 in 3 1 in 20 1 in 25 1 in 2
47 1 in 4 1 in 35 1 in 14 1 in 3
54 1 in 7 1 in 27 1 in 15 1 in 4
174 1 in 3 1 in 30 1 in 17 1 in 3
2,496 1 in 2j 1 in 20 1 in 23 1 in 2
3,106 1 in 2 1 in 22 1 in 19 1 in 1j
2,245 1 in 2 1 in 14 1 in 14 1 in 1
4,004 1 in l l I in 15 1 in 33 1 in If
508 1 in 2 1 in 19 1 in 18 1 in it
908 1 in 2 1 in 15 1 in 30 1 in l
367 1 in 2 1 in 14 1 in 23 1 in 2
186 1 in 3 1 in 19 1 in 11 1 in 2
954 1 in 3 1 in 21 1 in 14 1 in 2
293 1 in 3 1 in 18 1 in 18 1 in 21
12,571 I in 2 1 in 17 I in 20 I in 1
* These Tables are compiled from deaths which took place in Manchester during the
year 1840; in Leeds during the year 1840; in Liverpool during the year 1840; in Bath
during the year 1839; in Bethnal Green during the year 1839; in the Strand Union during
the year 1840; in the Kendal Union during the year ended 30th September, 1841; in the
county of Wilts during the year 1840; and in Rutland during the three years 1838, 1839,
and 1840.
8. Edwin Chadwick's comparison of the
chances of life in different classes
136
locality becomes strikingly apparent."1 2 It should be
noted, however, that the observed correlation between
locality and condition of health was less clear-cut
than that between social background and health. Chad-
wick attributes this to the fact that districts were
large, containing mixtures of differing physical situa-
tions; he was confident that, once the data were more
finely drawn, he would get the "correct" result.
Chadwick speculates:
Since the character of the residences of many of
the labouring classes, and the condition of their
places of work and their habits are known, it is
to be considered that where the occupations are
duly registered, returns, on the principle of those
we have first given of the average age of death
among particular classes, will afford the most
close approximation to accuracy, or the best indi-
cations of the extent to which each of those classes
is placed. (13)
Chadwick summarizes his findings in the following
words:
. . . that the various forms of epidemic, endemic
and other disease caused, or aggravated, or
propagated chiefly amongst the labouring classes
by atmospheric impurities produced by decomposing
animal and vegetable substances, by damp and filth,
and close and overcrowded dwellings, prevail amongst
the population in every part of the kingdom, whether
dwelling in separate houses, in rural villages, in
small towns, in the larger towns -- as they have
been found to prevail in the lowest districts of
the metropolis . . . .
. . . that such disease wherever its attacks are
frequent, is always found in connection with the
physical circumstances above specified, and that
where those circumstances are removed by drainage,
proper cleansing, better ventilation, and other
means of diminishing atmospheric impurity, the
frequency and intensity of such disease is abated;
and where the removal of the noxious agencies
appears to be complete, such disease almost
entirely disappears. (14)
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Clearly, the correlation between longevity and
social status is not sufficient by itself to conclude
that an unsanitary condition is the cause of poor public
health. This correlation was well known, but tradition
supplied many explanations for it without involving the
issue of sanitation. A common tendency was to relate
mortality with morality, and morality in turn with
income level. The logic of these correlations was that
a lower income brings fewer medical benefits, smaller
and inferior (though not necessarily inferior in sani-
tation) housing, less abundant and healthy food, and
less discipline and morality in the regulation of
"public and private life" -- all factors considered
as contributing to a low life expectancy. Many propo-
nents of this economic view of disease causation,
particularly those of the Malthusian persuasion,
accepted as inevitable the differential morality among
social classes; for them, it was a manifestation of
"natural check" against overpopulation, a blessing in
disguise, as it was Nature's mechanism for weeding out
the sick and the weak from society. For Malthus,
disease was a Providential instrument of admonishment,
a sign telling us that "we have offended against some of
the laws of Nature."1 5
Chadwick rejects such views completely and advocates
the idea that attributes of place, and not of people,
are responsible for untimely death. He resorts to two
arguments to press his idea.
Chadwick seeks to demolish the traditional view by
maintaining that the evidence shows disease to attack
people in the prime of their working life, and not when
weak and destitute. Citing the statistics of fever
hospitals as support for his view, he calls attention
to the fact that the greatest number of patients
admitted for epidemic, endemic and contagious diseases
are all young. He continues:
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How erroneous the inferences are in their unres-
trained generality, which assume that the poverty
or the privation which is sometimes the consequence
-- is always the cause, of the disease, will have
been seen from the evidence as that adduced from
Glascow and Spitalfields, proving that the greater
proportion of those attacked by disease are in full
work at the time; and the evidence from the fever
hospitals, that the greatest proportions of the
patients received are in high bodily condition. (16)
Chadwick further points out that the average worker
earned an income sufficient to maintain minimum suste-
nance, though much lower than that of other classes.
Thus, low wages could not be held as the main cause of
disease. He cites several instances of a higher death
rate among those people of a comparatively higher
income average.
By making inferences on the basis of these state-
ments, Chadwick concludes that poverty is not the cause
of disease, and that the latter is not the mechanism
of a "natural check," as Malthus' followers wanted
to believe; he holds that disease, especially contagious
disease, is caused primarily by unsanitary conditions,
and that indeed disease is the cause of pauperism, and
not vice versa. "Noxious physical agencies" sap the
nation's economic health, he contends, since they weaken
her vital labor strength: they produce the younger popu-
lation "inferior in physical organization and general
health," and the adult population "short-lived, impro-
vident, reckless, and intemperate, and [even] with
habitual avidity for sensual gratification. ,17 For
Chadwick, then, filth and overcrowding are not symptoms
but causes of economic, social, and moral malaise. This
diagnosis made Chadwick optimistic about the possibility
of genuine social improvement. Because unsanitary
conditions are brought about by men, they can be removed
by men; what governs the condition of society is inhe-
rently governable. While the traditional sanction of
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moral agencies has but a remote chance of success in
the task of social improvement, sanitary improvement
is sure to bring about broad benefits. Stressing that
the amelioration of the unhappy sanitary condition is
the responsibility of public authority, Chadwick calls
for a radical reconstruction of the existing administra-
tive and legal machinery, which he considers inherently
inefficient because it lacks a centralized, concerted
system of control.
* * *
Having considered some of the central features of
Chadwick's Report, let us now turn to an examination of
the medical theory on which his sanitary idea was based.
This theory of disease causation provided Chadwick's
argument with a certain scientific credence, giving it
a cutting edge and thereby helping its general acceptance
by the public. The theory claims, as we have seen, that
disease is caused by unknown agents in the atmosphere
acting upon the gases from animal and vegetable decom-
position given off, for example, by a hidden, stagnate
water sewer, an overcrowded chuchyard, a slaughter house,
or a tanner's yard. By a kind of spontaneous generation,
according to this theory, this admixture might produce
an outbreak of typhus, or perhaps -- since this promis-
cuity of filth brought forth an uncertain progeny --
of typhoid or cholera.
We have already noted that this theory was not
uniquely Chadwick's but was shared by many people;
Chadwick accepted it and worked out its practical
implications in unprecedented ways. But, his claims
notwithstanding, the theory was not fully corroborated
by his voluminous statistics. Finding a correlation
between locality and health is one thing, but singling
out lack of sanitation, let alone "atmospheric impurity,"
140
as the cause of disease is quite another. Looking back
from the vantage point of twentieth century etiology,
we know that this theory was only half true, given that
bacteria, and not filth or impure air, engender disease.
But, of course, bacteria were not to be discovered for
another twenty years after the Report, and Chadwick
could not but rely on the medical theory available to
his time. Thus he held steadfastly to the "impure air"
or "filth" theory even when the data showed this to be
less than clear-cut. To be precise, then, Chadwick's
Report was a documentation of allegations; his sanitary
idea was an extension of the medical theory he espoused
a priori.
This "filth" or "impure air" theory of etiology is
known in medical science as "pythogenic" or "miasmatic"
theory. While the two are not identical, they were used
interchangeably in the nineteenth century, as filth was
believed to be the cause of impure air. In the following
I shall use the term "pythogenic theory" generically,
unless the distinction is required.
The localization of "zymotic" or infectious diseases
in the narrow courts and alleys of the poor had frequently
been noticed by the eighteenth century physicians whose
sympathies brought them to practice in the towns' lower
quarters. The observation that outbreaks of fever were
somehow correlated to unsanitary conditions gave rise
to the pythogenic theory. Pythogenic theory had become,
in Chadwick's time, an influential, though still con-
troversial, theory among leading medical professionals.
One of the theory's leading proponents was Dr.
Southwood Smith, one of the three doctors who contributed
to the Poor Law Commission's first report. 1 8 Already
in 1825, he had published an article, "Contagion and
Sanitary Laws," showing that epidemic disease was due
to unsanitary conditions, and that it was not communi-
cated from one person to another, as the traditional
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"contagion theory" supposed, but had its origin in the
bad influences peculiar to certain places, In the
Westminster Review of the same year, he wrote:
The room of a fever patient, in a small and heated
apartment of London, with no perflation of fresh
air, is perfectly analogous to a stagnant pool in
Ethiopia full of the bodies of dead locusts. The
poison generated in both cases is the same; the
difference is merely in the degree of its potency.
Nature, with her burning sun, her stilled and
pent-up wind, her stagnant and turning marsh,
manufactures plague on a large and fearful scale,
Poverty in her hut, covered with her rags, surroun-
ded by her filth, striving with all her might to
increase the heat, imitates Nature but too success-
fully; the process and the product are the same,
the only difference is the magnitude of result.
Poverty and ignorance can thus, at any time and
in any place, create a mortal plague. (19)
Dr. Southwood Smith played a leading role in pro-
pagating the pythogenic theory; he helped to create
and operate the Health of Towns Association, which
published numerous articles and held many public
lectures in an effort to enlighten the general public
of the "true" cause of disease and its attendant
miseries.
As a theory of causation of disease, particularly
the "zymotic" kind of disease, the pythogenic theory
was relatively new, though it did have, as we shall
see shortly, certain similarities to the Hippocratean
theory of the influences of lands and waters. At the
time of the pythogenic theory's emergence, most medical
theorists held to the "contagion theory." The pytho-
genic theory was raised as a conscious alternative to
the contagion theory, and the two remained the subject
of heated controversy among medical men until the dis-
covery of bacteria in 1860 finally disproved both.
The contagion theory literally posited that disease
is not created by anything, but exists as a kind of
entity traveling from the body of an afflicted person
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to that of a potential victim through bodily contact.
The contagion theory too was a relative newcomer in
medical history.20 Under the classical system of
Hippocratic medicine, the notion of contagion had been
largely suppressed, though for many centuries it
remained a powerful influence among practitioners of
folk medicine. The medieval experience with leprosy,
and particularly the "Black Death," once again brought
the theory to the surface, and it began to gather
influence. Popular belief in the contagion theory
further strengthened in the seventeenth century by the
renewed occurrences of the plague and the knowledge of
Near Eastern practice of smallpox innoculation. The
success of vaccination by Jenner at the end of the
century strengthened even further its already widespread
influence.
As the pythogenic theory supported and invited
sanitary reform as the means of preventing epidemic
disease, the contagion theory was intimately connected
with quarantine as the favored method of protecting
public health. Because under the contagion theory
disease was thought to spread through contacts between
the healthy and the sick as well as as through contact
with objects exposed to the sick, it was surmised that
the logical method to prevent the spread of disease
was to impose isolation of persons who actually "carried"
or were suspected of "carrying" disease. 2 1
Thus the two theories contrasted sharply in their
respective views of epidemic disease and of the practical
schemes for disease control. Later in this chapter, I
shall argue that the source of their divergence is philo-
sophical rather than scientific; that their contrasting
views derive from their differing conception of man,
his environment, and their relationship. I shall also
argue that the ascendance of the pythogenic theory, and
of the concomitant sanitary ideas, was a symptom of the
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rising evironmental way of thinking in the nineteenth
century. But this is to anticipate. At present let
us focus on medical history and trace the transition
in etiological ideas. The transition is an unmistakable
fact of history; it is borne out by an examination of
the leading opinions of the medical establishment from
the eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century.
In the following I shall concentrate on the recommen-
dations of the successive Boards of Health, created
by the government at times of epidemic threats. 2 2
In 1720, an outbreak of plague in Marseilles threat-
ened England with a renewed invasion. In devising a
plan to prevent the invasion, Parliament sought advice
from the leading medical authority of the time, Dr.
Richard Mead of St. Thomas Hospital in London. His
recommendation was based on the contagion theory,
calling for an adoption of strict quarantine and
isolation in "pest houses." Parliament quickly accepted
Dr. Mead's recommendation and passed an act to institute
quarantine measures.
The same belief in the contagion theory and quaran-
tine prevailed in the Board of Health of 1805, which
was formed by the Privy Council on the threat of a
yellow fever epidemic known as the "Gibraltar scare."
A yellow fever epidemic had broken out in North Africa,
and soon crossed the Mediterranean to ravage the
southern parts of Spain. The following note sent by
the 1805 Board of Health to the Privy Council well
expresses how unchallenged an authority the contagion
theory enjoyed at this time, and conversely, how absent
pythogenic ideas were.
We the president and Fellows in His Majesty's Royal
College of Physicians in London, having maturely
weighed the information contained in the various
documents transmitted to us by His Majesty's Most
Honorable Privy Council . . . are . . . of opinion
that the disease is contagious, and that the
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propagation of it has arisen from its contagion-
nature . . . . In further confirmation of the
infectious nature of the disease, we observe that
the towns that have suffered from it are not such
as are considered as unhealthy from situation,
but, on the contrary, some of them are remarkably
healthy, such as Medina, Cadiz, Sidonia, and
Gibraltar, in all of which, nevertheless, the
disease has made great havoc, at the same time
that other towns, much less healthy in point of
situation, have remained free from sickness . . . .
Being, therefore, of the opinion that the disease
is both highly malignant and contagious . . . we
would recommend that the Laws of Quarantine be
put in the most strict execution upon all ships
coming from Cadiz, Gibraltar, Marga, Cathagena,
Alican, or Leghorn, all of which places are known
to be infected . . . . We beg leave to observe
that we have the most perfect confidence, that the
careful and diligent enforcement of the quarantine
laws will secure the country. The disease being
supposed . . . to have got into the country, the
town or neighborhood, in which it shall appear,
should be immediately placed under a set of regu-
lations approaching nearly to Martial Law, by which
the Magistrate and the Military should assist in
carrying out the execution of the measures adopted
for cutting all communciations, between the sick
and the well. (23)
As many as 100,000 died of yellow fever in Cadiz,
and despite quarantine measures, the disease crossed
and reached Gibraltar, leaving numerous victims. It
also entered Malta, killing one third of the island's
15,000 people. In its attempt to control the adminis-
tration of quarantine, the Board of Health became
entangled with the Office of Customs and Excise, which
had controlled such operations since Elizabethan times.
The Board was abolished in 1806, despite its hope of
becoming a permanent institution.
The next major threat to public health came from
Asiatic cholera. While it had been endemic in India
for centuries, beginning in 1830, it became pandemic,
invaded Russia, and once started, followed an itinerary
laid down by the trade routes, entering England in 1831.
The mystery of its origin, its frequent termination in
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sudden death, and its irresistible advance across
continents and seas, made cholera the most feared of
all diseases -- not without reason, known as "the
scourge of nations." (In Paris 7,000 deaths occurred
in eighteen days.) The world universally turned to
the physicians for some means of fighting the disease
and once again, in England the government formed the
Central Board of Health, drawing people from the
Royal College.
This time, neither the Privy Council nor the Board
of Health was so certain of the effectiveness of qua-
rantine against cholera. In its instructions (June 21,
1831) the council directed the Board to give its
attention to the "two points which are the most impor-
tant in this enquiry: First, whether the disease is
communicable from person to person. Secondly, whether
it is communicable by inanimate matter of any descrip-
tion."24 The Board's answer to the Council was ambi-
valent. The doctors on the Board still felt that cholera
was communicated, like plague, through personal contact,
and therefore, the old method of quarantine would be
effective in checking its spread. At the same time,
however, there was also some feeling that the disease
was somehow associated with unsanitary conditions. Dr.
Thomas Walker, the medical observer sent by the Board
to cholera-ravaged St. Petersburg, reported to the
Board that the question of the etiology and communication
of cholera was a very difficult one, as "the disease
has manifested the same caprices in its progress in
Russia that it showed in India, missing occasionally
places that lie directly in its apparent route. ,25
Having voiced his uncertainties about the traditional
contagion ideas, however, the doctor felt obliged to
defend them nonetheless. He added in the letter that
"it [is] more probable that Icholera] is carried by men,
somehow or other, although it has not been ascertained
147
in what way."26 The postscript to the same letter
expressed the same ambiguity. It reads: "I find the
expressions I made use of here (concerning the validity
of the contagion ideas) have appeared to others not
to convey quite the meaning I myself attached to them.
I intended to say that I am convinced of the contagious
nature of the disease, but that the proofs of its
transmission from one individual to another are not
quite perfect as yet."2 7
Not certain of the cause of the genesis and propa-
gation of the disease, the 1831 Board adopted a more
careful approach this time; it recommended both qua-
rantine and sanitary measures. On the one hand, the
Board insisted that "the best means of preventing the
spreading of infection are the immediate separation of
the uninfected from the sick, by their prompt removal."28
At the same time, however, the Board also called for
the sanitary measures of white-washing, fumigating,
and cleansing the place of infection, conceding to the
apparent association between the outbreak of the
disease and the absence of cleanliness. These recom-
mendations were promptly put into effect. Despite this,
however, the epidemic went on, killing 5,000 persons
in one year. The Board of Health was subsequently dis-
mantled, and a new Board was formed. This time, the
new Board was composed of custom and quarantine offi-
cials, who, compared to the academic physicians that
made up the 1831 Board, had more direct experiences of
the disease and disease control. 2 9
By the time Chadwick's Report was published, the
contagion school had been reduced to a minority view,
and the pythogenic theory had gained greater influence.
The General Board of Health -- the organization whose
creation was indebted to Chadwick's Report and the
concomitant Public Health Act of 1848 -- made its
belief in pythogenic ideas unequivocally clear in its
148
1849 Report of Quarantine. In it, the Board assessed
various arguments advanced for and against quarantine
and finally came to a complete rejection of the system.
The reason given for the rejection was clear: the Board
stated that "epidemic diseases were not contagious but
have their primary and essential condition in an
'epidemic atmosphere' which may exist over a thousand
square miles and yet affect only particular unwhole-
somely kept localities."30 On this basis, the Board
proposed to abolish altogether the quarantine system
and to trust the protection of public health to local
sanitary reform.
Thus the pythogenic theory finally arrived as the
dominant theory of disease causation in the mid-
nineteenth century, and with this, the sanitary idea
came to enjoy a widespread and enthusiastic acceptance.
Despite all the fervor for sanitary reform, however,
the victory of the pythogenic theory was not to last
long. Pasteur's discovery of bacteria in 1860, and
the subsequent development of bacteriology and etiology,
established that the pythogenic theory was neither
accurate nor incompatible with its rival, the contagion
theory. As far as such diseases as cholera, yellow
fever, and typhus were concerned, the new development
showed, the villain was not miasma or filth but rather
tiny organisms that inhabit certain kinds of environ-
ment. To the extent that it confirmed the localization
of disease, the new knowledge upheld the pythogenic
hypothesis. Yet, by showing that disease was caused
and propagated by the transfer of microbes, it
reaffirmed the contagion theory, though not in its old,
mechanical form. In a way, what it showed was that,
while both pythogenic theory and contagion were
incorrect as scientific theories, they could each be
considered reasonable approximations.
The new etiology also showed the error of classi-
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fication that was common to both theories. In the
light of bacteriological discoveries, no such categories
as "pestilential disease," Tevers," or "contagious
disease," which generations of physicians used freely,
were justifiable. For some cases, like water-borne
cholera, dysentery, and yellow fever, the sanitary
control of water supplies is by far a more effective
means of prevention than quarantine; for others, such
as diphtheria, sanitation is useless while isolation is
all important. On the whole, pythogenic theory was
found too exaggerated, as few dangerous microbes were
discovered in the air. 3 1 At the same time, sufficient
evidence was accumulated to show some validity to the
contagion theory, which, together with its quarantine
measures, was consequently reinstated, though in a form
modified by the bacteriological discoveries. The
"Contagious Diseases Act" was passed in 1878.
The foregoing brief excursion into developments
after Pasteur was to highlight the point that the
pythogenic theory's ascendance over the contagion
theory occurred in spite of the absence of empirical
evidence to justify it. In the light of modern medical
knowledge, the two theories were equally erroneous,
and they were so to a comparable degree. What prompted,
then, we are led to ask, this scientifically unwarranted
transition in medical ideas? How are we to interpret
the ascendance of the pythogenic theory and the conco-
mitant sanitary idea?
As one would expect, the criticisms historically
advanced against the contagion theory were lacking in
scientific specificity, tending to be general, indirect,
and speculative. Often the target of these criticisms
was quarantine rather than the medical theory on which
it was founded. One recurrent argument -- one that
drew a particularly strong support from ship-owners
and foreign traders -- was that quarantine was injurious
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to the nation's economic health: that quarantine was
not only expensive to operate but disruptive of the
nation's trade. There was also a moral argument;
quarantine was censured for restricting an individual's
freedom and for blunting "the ordinary feeling of
humanity, destroying all sense of propriety and
decorum." Some critics charged that quarantine was
counter-productive and that it increased, rather than
decreased, mortality. Since quarantine restricts
access to the means of subsistence and discourages
attendance of the sick, these critics insisted, it
forces many people to die unnecessarily and, even
worse, to go unattended. Furthermore, it was argued,
quarantine obliges the sick to remain in the infected
place and thereby exposes them to the hazardous
"influence of the atmosphere," which is the real cause
of disease. Also ridiculed was the idea that disease
could be retained and communicated by inanimate articles.
A doctor MacLean, one of the tireless pamphleteers in
favor of the pythogenic theory, wrote:
. . .is it not the height of human absurdity to
suppose that infection, as such, and by virtue of
its inherent powers, can pass from the living body
to inanimate matter; upon which the air cannot be
presumed to have a similar influence, and that,
after residing for some time in this inanimate
matter, it can repass, still retaining its infec-
tious qualities, into the living human body? (32)
It is easy to recognize that much of what has been
said against quarantine (its cumbersomeness, high cost,
and even its immorality) could be, and actually was,
said about its alternative, sanitation. And, while it
was true that quarantine measures did not work well for
a cholera epidemic, that alone was not a reason to
expect a new theory to ascend; as the history of science
witnesses, persistence in the face of theoretical or
empirical anomaly is a manifest tenet of the theoretical
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turn of mind. Furthermore, there was no reason to
expect, without the discovery that cholera is indeed
water-borne, sanitation would do better than quarantine.
In the final analysis, then, it was on the strength
of the unqualified belief that the pythogenic theory
gained its influence.33 In their effort to affirm
pythogenic theory and lend it credence, some proponents
of this doctrine even drew authority from the classic
environmental theory of Hippocrates, which takes the
causal role of noxious air or filth for granted. Just
as Dr. Walker was "convinced of the contagious nature
of disease" despite the lack of "proofs of its trans-
mission," many proponents of the pythogenic doctrine
were equally undaunted by the absence of firm empirical
corroborations. The same doctor who called the con-
tagion theory "the height of human absurdity" was
perfectly willing to separate on the effect of noxious
air:
. general qualities of atmospheric air, whether
these qualities be determined by the course of
velocity of the winds; the nature of soil; the
vicinity of marshes, woods, minerals, metals, salts,
volcanoes; the breath of animals; vegetable exha-
lation; animals putrefaction; the influence of
earthquakes, comets, and planets; or other circum-
stances, which, although to us unknown, are
perfectly in the ordinary course of nature. (34)
To return to our question: if the transition from
the contagion theory to the pythogenic theory did not
in any real sense represent an "inevitable" scientific
progression brought on by some objective discovery of
new facts, what is the meaning of this transition?
What factors contributed to it? My contention in this
connection is that the transition is not an isolated
affair but an integral part of broad transformations
in the way of conceiving man, his world and the rela-
tionship between them. More specifically, I believe
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that this transition was a symptom reflecting the
growing influence of the environmental mode of
thinking.
The essential difference between the two theories
lies, I submit, in the fact that one associates disease
with locality, the other with people. In the pythogenic
system, disease is conceptualized primarily in asso-
ciation with the unfavorable characteristics attributed
to certain places: gases arising from open sewers,
smells emanating from ill-ventilated alleys, and the
like. In this theory, the connection between an
individual and the disease is incidental compared to one
between certain kinds of places and disease. Man
contracts disease by exposing himself to the dangerous
influence of the environment; he remains a passive
receptor while the noxious environment remains a potent
causal factor. By contrast, in the contagion theory,
the relationship between a disease and its victim is
intimate and inseparable. Disease, as a kind of entity,
resides within the body of the sick, and is communi-
cated among people. In the pythogenic theory, disease
is not a "thing" which can be given and received, so
to speak; it is a collection of symptoms or processes
(chemical combustion) of the body reacting to forces
emanating from the contaminated environment, and thus
is separate in origin from one who reveals the given
symptoms. In pythogenic theory, the importance of the
material environment is paramount as far as public
health is concerned; in the contagion theory, on the
other hand, the material environment plays hardly any
role; it is like the empty space of the Cartesian
world of kinematics, where the only reality is a set
of self-contained bodies moving only through mutual
contact,
There is another dimension in these contrasts
between the two contending theories. The spread of
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disease in the contagion theory takes place between self-
contained individuals; in this view, separation and
individualization are normal states, whereas association
is a potentially pathological one. The entire system
of quarantine is based on this premise of separating
and individualizing the sick and the suspected. By
contrast, disease in the pythogenic theory is collective
in its origin. As Chadwick repeatedly emphasized, the
unsanitary environment is supra-individual; it origi-
nates in the decisions of many people, and is as beyond
the control of individuals as weather. As the cause of
disease is social or collective, therefore, the
effective means of controlling it -- sanitation -- also
needs to be a collective effort.
Yet another aspect of the separation of disease and
the patient in the pythogenic theory is the tendency to
take a materialist, positivist attitude towards it;
because the theory connects disease with de-personalized,
objective, and collective environmental conditions, it
is possible to dissociate disease from its traditional
associations with morality, personal habits, income,
and the like -- characteristics of a person with which
traditional Christian philanthropy was concerned.
Seen in the light of the above, the historical
transition from the contagion theory to the pythogenic
theory is an isolated and technical incident in medical
history only at one, and perhaps a superficial, level.
At other levels, the transition involves a major modi-
fication in the collective conceptual tradition,
signalling the emergence of the environmentalist way of
conceiving, describing and explaining material phenomena
in the world. The medical ideas of pythogenic theory
were founded on non-medical premises which emphasized
the importance of the physical environment as a causal
factor in man's well-being and, therefore, the respon-
sibility to ameliorate the inadequate environmental
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conditions. The ascendance of pythogenic theory and
sanitation indicates the rising consciousness that man
depends on a certain range of the physical environment
for the sustenance of his life, and that, when the
former deteriorates, the latter suffers. It also
represents the growing willingness to move away from a
tradition of laissez-faire, and to accept the fact that
the individual alone cannot enhance an environment,
which by definition is collective both in its origin
and in its mode of operation.
Edwin Chadwick's sanitary reform is, then, both the
product of and a contributor to this large transforma-
tion of the collective conceptual tradition: his works
helped to institutionalize ideas of sanitation and
public health and their underlying environmentalist
beliefs; at the same time, without the availability of
the environmentalist ideas and associated conceptual
framework, his practical contribution could not have
been sustained. The historical significance of Chad-
wick's work lies in its connection with the rising
environmentalism. Through Chadwick's sanitary efforts,
modern planning received not only a functioning legal
and administrative framework, but also an evironment-
alist orientation, which, by offering problems, hypo-
theses, solutions, was to provide a strong conceptual
guidance for the subsequent development of planning.
By claiming that the medical ideas underlying
Chadwick's practical works were integral parts of a
larger collective conceptual framework that was coming
to dominate the field of discourse, we have not as yet
answered the question of why or how this framework
emerged at that time, whether it arose autochthonously,
or whether its ascendance was itself a consequence of
other developments. To begin with, the evidence pre-
sented so far suggests that the outbreak of cholera
epidemics helped to heighten certain difficulties
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inherent in the traditional contagion/quarantine theory
and, thus, indirectly open a way for the acceptance of
the alternative pythogenic theory. Also, it is
undeniably true that the unprecedented growth of urban
concentration and its attendant overcrowding and squalor
inevitably attracted people's attention to the problems
of sanitation and public health. In light of this, it
would seem that the actual conditions cried out for a
form of environmentalism, and that the rise of the
pythogenic theory was an automatic response to condi-
tions in a period of time which clearly had pressing
environmental problems. Though true to a certain
extent, we should be careful not to accept this inter-
pretation too prematurely. There is no logical reason
why this particular theory had to be devised; after all,
unsanitary conditions, overcrowding, and repeated visi-
tations of epidemics were not confined to the time in
question.
What seems to be a more plausible description of
the genesis of environmentalist ideas at this time is
that the material conditions were only catalysts, that
they do not dictate the form and content of specific
theory. Just as much as the external world conditions
the choice of a conceptual orientation, so too does the
choice of a particular conceptual outlook mould exter-
nal reality or, at least, its conceptualization. Thus,
it is through the concepts, categories, and hypotheses
provided by the environmentalist medical theories that
the external world is examined, analyzed, and acted
upon, as much as the latter encourages acceptance of
the former.
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VIII. ENVIRONMENT AND HUMAN EVOLUTION:
PATRICK GEDDES' THEORY OF "CIVICS"
To conclude the case studies, we now turn to an
examination of Patrick Geddes' theory of "civics" or
his philosophy of town planning. Unlike the works of
Bentham, Owen, and Chadwick which represented environ-
mental ideas in their general and universalist forms
and whose influence on the nascent discipline of urban
planning was indirect, Geddes' "civics" shows an expli-
cit theory of city and civic improvement, and therefore
signals the beginning of the history of modern urbanism.
A contemporary of such leaders of modern town planning
as Ebenezer Howard and Cerda, Geddes approached the
problem of cities from "the most original and compre-
hensive approach." Unlike many of his contemporaries
who were preoccupied with either a wholesale utopian
reconstuction of cities or a piecemeal paliative
"surgery," Geddes sought to provide a theoretical frame-
work to town planning. By common consensus, his Civic
Development (1904) and Cities in Evolution (1915) as
well as his numerous civic exhibitions constitute major
landmarks in the history of urbanism. His ideas were
incorporated in the subsequent development of planning,
particularly in urban renewal and residential rehabi-
litation.
But in the present context the main interest in
considering Geddes lies elsewhere; Geddes' "civics" is
essentially a theory of environment applied to the
problem of cities. Without using the term "ecology,"
Geddes succeeded in formulating an ecological theory of
the city and city planning. As I shall attempt to show,
it is indeed his concern for the ecological relationship
between man and his habitat that motivated him to
formulate one of the first comprehensive theories of
urbanism. In short, environmentalism was the source
of Geddes' theory of civics.
Perhaps because of the uncomfortably general and
synthetic character of his thought,2 Geddes has not
been the subject of a wide and critical scholarship
which he richly deserves. There are a number of
biographies, but they are mostly descriptive and tend
to be somewhat adulatory. Among these, two works are
particularly helpful: one by Geddes' friend and
disciple, Amelia Dreifus, The Interpreter Geddes: the
Man and His Gospel (.1927); and the other by Philip
Boardman, The World of Patrick Geddes (1978). Recently,
John Reilly traced the sources of Geddes' early socio-
logical thought, including his urban philosophy.3
Helen Meller's article "Geddes' Theory of Civics" in
Victorian Studies largely covers the same ground as
Reilly's work.4 Mumford still provides a most readable
and penetrating interpretation of Geddes' ideas, though
his intellectual affinity for Geddes somewhat detracts
from his objectivity.5
Despite the relative sparsity of his published work
and the often-noted chattiness of his expository style,
Geddes himself of course remains the most reliable
source of his ideas. Many of his published works,
especially those earliest and latest in his career, are
in the natural sciences. But even in writing on botany
or biology in general, Geddes' synoptic approach
revealed itself superior to his technical discussions.
Indeed one of the most succinct statements on his gene-
ral theoretical orientation, and of his ideas on civics,
is contained in Life, Outline of Biology (1930), a
textbook he wrote in collaboration with his pupil and
colleague Arthur Thomson. Among Geddes' works on
strictly urban matters, City Development (1904) is the
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most comprehensive. A report documenting his scheme
for a park development at Dunfermline, it presents
Geddes' philosophy of urbanism and society vividly
interwoven with the most detailed and picturesque
descriptions of his practical proposals. The paper
produced in the same year, "Civics: an Applied Socio-
logy" and its sequel "Civics: a Concrete and Applied
Sociology"6 contain discussions of a more methodological
and programmatic nature; here Geddes describes the
scope, purpose, method, and organization of the proposed
science of civics. His later works, including the
best known City in Evolution (1911), were largely
extensions and amplifications of the ideas expressed in
the earlier works, with few substantive changes or
additions.
* * *
Though he was renowned and reproached for his
penchant to invent new words, the word 'civics' was
not of his own making. The word, along with its cognates
'civic,' 'civil,' and 'civism,' had been in currency in
both England and America before Geddes used the word
to denominate his theory of town planning. In its
common usage, 'civics' was understood as a branch of
political science, studying in particular the rights
and duties of citizenship, and such public affairs as
taxation, public education, citizen participation, and
organization of government. In America, courses in
civics had been incorporated in the curriculum of public
education, and taught especially to immigrants and
their children to familiarize them with the system of
American politics.
Geddes' used the term 'civics' in a far broader
sense. While he retained the traditional educative
and political aspects of its original meaning, he
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conceived "civic" as a new, applied and concrete science
dealing specifically with aspects of the city. His 1904
paper contains the following description of the proposed
science of civics:
Viewed as Science, Civics is that branch of Socio-
logy which deals with Cities, their origin and
distribution; their development and structure;
their functioning, internal and external, material
and psychological; their evolution, individual and
associated. Viewed again from the practical side,
that of applied science, Civics must develop through
experimental endeavour into the more and more
effective Art of enhancing the life of the city and
of advancing its evolution. With the first of these
lines of study, the concretely scientific, our
philosophical outlook will not fail to widen; with
the second, the practical, our ethical insight will
not fail to deepen also. (7)
As a "concrete science," Geddes recommended that
"civics" begin with a careful observation of the city
as an empirical reality; "civic survey" is thus a
fundamental component of the science of "civics." In
emphasizing the indispensable value of civic surveys,
however, Geddes was neither alone nor first; in fact,
detailed surveys of cities began to appear on both
sides of the Atlantic during Geddes' time. Adna Weber
gave a statistical treatment of population concentration
in cities in his pioneering work The Growth of Cities
in the Nineteenth Century (1899), published just five
years before Geddes' lecture on civics. In addition,
a detailed statistical study of London's social problems
was conducted by Charles Booth, who was like Geddes
one of the founding members of the Sociological Society.
Geddes' program for the civic survey -- or civics
in general, since he used the two synonymously -- diver-
ged sharply from the above works in scope, purpose, and
method. While these works were concerned mostly with
certain isolated aspects of contemporary cities such as
demographic characteristics, Geddes' conception of the
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civic survey was a synoptic one covering all aspects
of the city, not only its present condition but also
its past history and its future prospects. Additionally,
the intention of the survey lay not so much in docu-
menting empirical facts as in offering broad ecological
and evolutionary interpretations of the city's role in
the context of the development of human civilization.
Geddes' civic survey was thus fundamentally prognostic
in orientation; Comte's aphorism, "voir pour prevoir,
prevoir pour pouvoir," profoundly guided Geddes'
approach to the science of civics. To quote Geddes:
IThe civic survey] must take in all aspects, con-
temporary as well as historic. It must be geogra-
phic and economic, anthropological and historical,
demographic and eugenic, and so on: above all, it
aims towards the reunion of all these studies, in
terms of social science, [an] as yet but little-
noticed bud upon the ever-spreading tree of know-
ledge . . . [which] may before long be recognized
as one of the most fruitful of all. Its legitimacy
and interest are still often unrecognized by the
sociologist, himself too abstract, or merely
anthropological or racial, for lack of civics. (8)
Civics, then, is no simple science for Geddes. It
is simultaneously a program for public education, an
ideology of civic regeneration, an ecological theory of
the relationship between urban life and the surrounding
region, and a theory of the evolution of cities. Geddes
firmly believed that through the teaching of the new
science of civics "there will be a renewal of social
feeling" in the mechanized modern world and "the eco-
nomic, political and other divergencies and conflicts
of the present day may be progressively harmonized." 9
According to Geddes, there are two fundamental
dimensions in the city which require careful survey
and interpretation; the city's placement in and inter-
action with the surrounding region, and the city's
history. Accordingly, Geddes suggests two complementary
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surveys for the purpose of studying the city scienti-
fically: the regional or geographical survey on the one
hand and the historical survey on the other. For Geddes,
civics is in essence a scientific doctrine founded on
the union of the separate concerns, ideas, and theories
represented by these two orientations. As a way of
exploring the conceptual core of Geddes' civics,
therefore, let us examine Geddes' programs for these
two surveys, first separately and then together, asking
how they are brought into a "working union." Geddes
advised that, in making an actual survey, one should
start with a regional survey firstbecause to do so
is "simpler" than the other way around. We shall do
likewise.
Geddes considered the region a primary and influen-
tial fact. A bounded area demarcated by common condi-
tions of geological structure, soil, topography,
drainage, climate, and vegetable and animal life, a
region for Geddes constitutes a natural and relatively
permanent unit, more fundamental and stable than poli-
tical or administrative support. As a primary geogra-
phical fact, region provides home to a society of
people; it is the locus, Geddes stressed, where community
life is lived out, an ecological base without which no
truly human society is possible. In short, Geddes
insisted, regional boundaries are also social boundaries.
For Geddes, region had an even deeper meaning: he
saw it not only as a geographical fact and the locus of
community life, but more importantly, as a causal factor
of the community's life and history. As regions vary
in resources and limitations of both quantity and quality,
Geddes observed, they consequently have differing impli-
cations in terms of the most viable forms of production
and distribution. Upland regions with coniferous trees
promote hunting and woodmanship, hilly upland regions
invite pasturage and "croft" farming, and plain land
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regions with richer soil encourage large-scale farming.
In short, Geddes maintained that "place" influenced
"work."
Ocdupational types or "work" in turn shape the
group's socio-cultural organizations and mores, or
"folk" in Geddes' terminology. According to Geddes,
each occupation type entails a specific form of orga-
nizing labor and managing production, and the latter
in turn determines the type of attendant socio-cultural
institutions, value-orientations, and individuals'
personality traits. According to Geddes, a grain pro-
ducing region would be generally inhabited by people
who are relatively individualistic and independent-
minded. Grain production requires no extensive coope-
ration between farmers; each farmer can drive his own
plow' without another's help, and at harvest time the
women and children are merely accessory helpers. Under
these circumstances, Geddes contended, neither complex
and extensive communal organizations nor communalistic
mores have reason to develop.10 Regions suitable for
rice cultivation, on the other hand, tend to produce
people of the opposite character. The success of rice
cultivation depends heavily on securing and properly
managing large water supplies during extended periods
of time. Out of necessity, therefore, the kinds of
socio-cultural organizations and mores conducive to
these requirements would rise and be maintained.11
Geddes summarized the schema underlying the proposed
regional survey in the following words:
Given the region, its character determines the
nature of the fundamental occupation, and this in
turn essentially determines the type of family.
The nature and method of occupation must normally
determine the mode of its organization, e.g., the
rise and character of a specialized directive class,
and the nature of these occupational chiefs as con-
trasted with the people and with each other. Simi-
larly, the types of family tend to develop their
165
their appropriate types of institutions, e.g., for
justice, guidance and of course notably in response
to social environment as regards defense or
attack. (12)
In insisting on a schema based on geographical
environmentalism, Geddes, as he himself acknowledged,
stood on the shoulders of many predecessors. By the
time Geddes began working on "civics," the notion of
a necessary correlation between habitat and the cha-
racter of life lived within it had become an increa-
singly influential axiom in the nascent disciplines of
historiography, human geography, and anthropology. We
have discussed in Part One evidence of the emerging
geographical environmentalism with the works of Mon-
tesquieu, Comte, Buckle, and Ritter. Affinities
between Geddes and these authors are unmistakable.
Influenced as he was by these precursors of geogra-
phical environmentalism, the single most important
source of Geddes' regionalism remains the French social
economist and economic geographer Pierre Guillaume
Frederic Le Play.13 From the time Geddes came in
contact with his ideas (through Le Play's disciple
Edmund Demolins and his colleagues at the "Science
Sociale," a Parisian society promoting Le Play's ideas),
he became his ardent follower. The Le Play House,
which Geddes formed with Branford as an off-shoot of
the Sociological Society of London, was the main propa-
gator of the Frenchman's philosophy in England.1 4
Trained as a mining engineer and surveyor, and having
come from a farming region, Le Play sought to construct
a discipline that could interpret economic, social and
political phenomena on the basis of the region within
which they take place. Spiritually a descendant of the
physiocrats who constructed economic theory on the basis
of agricultural production, Le Play objected to what he
considered the overly abstract and deductive method of
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the prevailing doctrines of political economy,1 5 and
instead advocated a detailed socio-regional survey as
a method of deriving general principles. His lieu-
travail-famille triad, which Geddes adopted in his
program of civics, derives from his extremely meticulous
survey of the life of Russian farmers.16 Le Play
proposed these three categories as representing the most
fundamental determinants of any social existence. The
basic hypothesis represented by this scheme of three
categories is essentially the same as Geddes' version:
'lieu' refers to geographical environment and is seen
as determining 'travail' or economic organization;
'travail' in turn is seen to shape 'famille' or the
organization of family, which Le Play considered the
fundamental unit of society.
In embracing Le Play's triadic scheme, Geddes
retained Le Play's geographical environmentalism but
substantively broadened and balanced it. For one thing,
he expanded Le Play's category of 'famille' to include
not only family proper but all units of social orga-
nization such as community, city, and even nation.
Geddes also generalized the original scheme of lieu,
travail, and famille by interpreting it in terms of
the fundamental biological categories of environment,
function, and organism. In so doing, as we shall see,
Geddes sought to balance the unidirectional determinism
of Le Play's regionalism, allowing the possibility of
active human (organism) shaping of work (function) and
of regional surroundings (environment). We shall see
later that Geddes' program of civics was rendered
possible by this attempt to reconcile the two orienta-
tions traditionally posed as antagonists: environmental
determinism and humanism.
By adopting Le Play's triadic model, Geddes departed
from the traditional forms of geographical environmen-
talism. As we saw in Part One, the traditional
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environmentalism, particularly the variety held by
Montesquieu, adopted a two-body model: the tendency
was to view the world in the dichotomous terms of
nature and culture, and to ascribe nature as the direct
cause of culture without admitting an intermediary
causal mechanism. In such two-body models, the
assumption was that the environment "acts" directly
on the individual's physiological and mental consti-
tution, and hence on society and culture, because the
latter are, under these models, but aggregates of
individuals and their characteristics. With Le Play,
Geddes overcame this dichotomy. By positing "work"
as a third category linking the environment and socio-
cultural formations, Geddes could avoid positing some
direct "action" of the environment. With the mechanism
of environmental influences introduced, it now became
possible to relate the region and socio-cultural forma-
tions at the level of organization and structure.
In positing "work" as a mediator, Geddes also
placed himself in opposition to the economic determi-
nism of the Marxian school of sociology. For Geddes,
as for Le Play, economic organization was not a category
sui generis. In relation to socio-cultural systems, it
was still accepted as a major determining factor, and
to this extent, Geddes was prepared to view human history
as a drama played out by competing "occupation types."
However, Geddes' geographical environmentalism led him
to consider economic organization as itself a product
of the possibilities and limitations imposed by the
physical environment. For him, the drama of history was
in essence a regional drama; it was "the unfolding of
that abiding interplay between society and limiting
geographical environment in which each undergoes conti-
nuous and correlative change for better or worse."1 7
As an environmental theory of socio-cultural
causation, Geddes' regionalism represented also an
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alternative approach to both biological determinism
and mentalism, two influential positions in early
twentieth century thought. From the standpoint of
regionalism, the differences among human groups are
explainable only when the conditions of their physical
environment are taken into consideration; neither their
shared genetic factors nox their intellectual and moral
propensities are seen as determining factors; rather,
physiology and mental traits themselves are seen as
things that require explanation. In positing material
environment as the source of explanation, Geddes thus
anticipated the subsequent development of cultural
ecology, particularly the theories of Karl Wittfogel
and Julian Steward. 1 8
Geddes' regionalism also has far reaching practical
ramifications. When employed politically, regionalism
constitutes a kind of ideology of decentralization and
regional autonomy; it strives for the restoration of
regional social order at the expense of the "tentacles"
of the centralized state and its bureaucracy. It calls
for the revival of regional cultures, languages,
literatures, arts, and for the establishment of museums,
theatres, libraries and other cultural facilities for
this purpose.19 The economic, administrative and cul-
tural independence of a region is the goal, and the
restoration of an organic harmony between the towns
and the country a major objective; it is opposed to
the metropolis as form of habitation and as a form of
economic as well as socio-political organization.2 0
To return to the subject of the civic survey Geddes
proposed: under his form of regionalism, the city is
by definition a regional city. While it is the economic,
social, and cultural focus of regional life, it is
dependent on the region for its existence and character;
like a plant rooted to soil, it cannot exist without
the support of the surrounding region from which it
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derives energy, labor, food, and other vital resources
necessary to sustain its life. The city is, as Geddes
using the neo-vitalist expression of Henri Bergson
called it, a fruit of the regional 'lan vital.21 The
geographical part of Geddes' civic survey is, then,
an attempt to understand the city by examining how
it is shaped by the influences of the surrounding
region; it approaches the city as a dependent variable.
To Geddes' synthesizing mind, however, the city is
more than a dependent variable; while it is the fruit
of a region's life forces, it is at the same time
itself an effector of that life. Set in the context
of a surrounding region, it actively shapes the content
of its ecological relationship with the region and,
in doing so, greatly conditions the form and quality
of its citizens' lives. In short, Geddes allowed that
the city is also itself a surrounding environment, an
independent variable. With the introduction of this
view, the question of how the city affects the people
and its region becomes both legitimate and urgent;
Geddes' "historical survey," the second part of his
proposed science of civics, addresses itself precisely
to this question.
Geddes compared the task of the "historical survey"
to that of an archaeologist who, in contrast to the
geographer investigating ecological processes through
the "valley section," excavates the vertical layers of
the city's land and "reads" its history "upwards"
layer after layer.22 By this Geddes means that the
historic process of the city is one of constant readap-
tation between the three determinants of society --
work, folk, place. The ecological relationship between
the three, as Geddes posed it in his "valley section,"
is essentially a structural relationship, admitting of
no sequential change. The precept of the "historic
survey" is that, given the principle of the tendency
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for the three aspects of society to maintain a correla-
tion, change in any of the three categories would
trigger movements toward readaptation in the remaining
categories. The history of the city for Geddes, then,
consists in the trajectory of such adaptive movements
over time.
The catalyst for this adaptive process may belong
to any of the three categories. It could be innova-
tions in technology. Technological changes, especially
changes in the technologies of energy, production or
transportationrestructure the use of resources and
bring about changes in the preferred mode of production
and distribution, as well as in the resultant social
forms and cultural contents. Geddes' well-known
distinction between the "paleotechnic" and the "neo-
technic" phases of modern industry refers not only to
the differing modes of technology, but also to the
attendant variations in urban forms and regional orga-
nizations.23 Or the catalyst may be changes in the
dominant social mores and intellectual attitudes. One
of the causes for the deterioration of the modern city,
according to Geddes, is cultural decay, the increasing
lust for power and the weakening of the will-to-culture
-- the loss of purpose in science and technology and
the decline in civic spirit. Finally, the catalyst may
be changes in the physical environment. Changes in the
physical environment, which in themselves may have
resulted from changes in technology or culture, also
propel readjustments of the received order and, thus,
sets the city's history in motion.
Thus, for Geddes, the city's history is that of
constant and continuous adaptations between various
aspects within the city itself and between the city
and its surrounding region. But why does Geddes think
that knowledge of the city's history is essential for
the purpose of understanding its present condition and
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of planning for its future? What makes an ecological
enquiry through his "regional survey" insufficient?
Evidently, there is an evolutionist strand in
Geddes' philosophical orientation, in addition to an
ecological one. Given this evolutionist approach, it
is expected that Geddes would regard as a matter of
epistemological principle that to know something is to
understand its origin and past. There is, however,
more to Geddes' emphasis on the "historical" survey
than what can be seen simply as a consequence of his
general evolutionist approach. This additional aspect
has to do with Geddes' conception of the role of the
city vis-a-vis human evolution.
According to Geddes, the city is simultaneously
an embodiment of and a condition for human civilization.
Through its buildings, institutions, arts, customs, and
cultures, the city embodies and transmits the accumu-
lated accomplishments of past generations, and as such,
acts as an instrument in aculturating and socializing
the present generation. In short, for Geddes the city
is a transmitter of acquired characteristics unique to
mankind; like art, language, or science, it distinguishes
as well as makes man distinct from lesser animals. The
city's history is, then, the history of human civiliza-
tion; to know it is to know the trajectory of no less
than the history of mankind itself.
Geddes wrote of the city's role as an instrument of
"regional memory":
It accumulates and embodies the cultural heritage
of a region, and combines in some measure and kind
with the cultural heritage of large units, national,
racial, religious, human. It stamps the resultant
product upon each passing generation of its citizens.
The stamp has an obverse and reverse. One side is
the individuality of the city -- the sign manual of
its regional life on record. On the other are the
marks of civilization, in which each particular city
is a constituent element. Like a photographic
plate, the city receives the experiences of each
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passing generation and hands the record on to the
next, It is the instrument primarily of the
regional memory, but serves also as the memory of
larger groups, with a faithfulness proportional to
the vividness of the corresponding experience. (24)
Through accumulating and embodying the "cultural
heritage" of a region and wider units, the city per-
forms essentially as a vital link, connecting genera-
tion to generation, and individual and community. To
quote Geddes on this:
Whatever else the city may be and do, there can be
no question that it serves one specialized function,
which no other instrument of man or nature performs
with the same directness, fullness and perfection
of adaptation. May not the city be the long sought
missing link between animal and human evolution?
Biologists puzzle over the relationship of the indi-
vidual to the species in relation to the inheritance
of the acquired characters. But suppose the civic
life and city development represent the supreme
striving of nature to balance the freedom of the
individual and the continuity of the species! The
central and the significant fact is that the city
does function as the specialized organ of social
transmission. It is the vehicle of acquired
inheritance. (25)
As the "specialized organ of social transmission"
and as "the vehicle of acquired inheritance," the city
possesses its own life-trajectory. The knowledge of
this trajectory allows a foresight about the direction
of its future development, a necessary requisite for
rational planning.
But the civic role is far from passive. It is also
(and essentially) active, creative, evocatory. By
some subtle alchemy, the spirit of the city selects
and blends memories of the past with experiences
of the present and hopes for the future. The complex
product expresses, or rather constitutes and is,
that individuality of the city which it impresses
on each oncoming generation of its citizens. (26)
173
What Geddes contends, then, is that the city is an
exponent of human civilization, materializing and re-
presenting the total achievement of humanity. For
Geddes, it is a totally aberrant thought of the
"mechanized" age to dissociate civilization from the
city and civic life. The two are by origin and by
function intimately connected. "The city was foremost
in Hebrew and Greek civilization, though in different
ways; and central also in the Roman one; it fell into
ruin and neglect in barbarian times, but revived as
opposition and complement to the feudal order in the
medieval cities . . . ."27 As a civilizing force as
well as the product of civilization, the city rises
and falls with civilization itself.
In support of this contention, Geddes calls atten-
tion to the fact that the word 'civilization' is
derived from the Latin word for the city. He also
argues that,in the original sense, Aristotle's Politics
was not a theory of state administration as it is
usually taken, but a theory of the city-state so that
its original content was close to what Geddes proposes
under the theory of "civics." To Geddes, the false
translation of the original meaning is merely another
expression of the same force that tends to dissociate
civilization from the city, the growing subjugation,
both conceptual and actual, of cities under the State. 2 9
But, if the city is indeed the exponent of man's
socio-cultural heritage or civilization, what is the
nature of the heritage that it embodies? To put it
differently, how does Geddes use the terms 'civilization,'
'culture,' and 'social heritage'?
Geddes expository style is not characterized by the
explicit definition of terms; and in this particular
case, he used the three terms interchangeably without
making terminological distinctions which had come to
concern many students of the nascent social sciences. 3 0
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However, it is not difficult to recognize two inter-
locking yet separable ideas that are co-present in
Geddes' view of the city as a transmitter of socio-
cultural heritage.
On the one hand, Geddes considered the socio--
cultural heritage embodied in the city as an object for
an individual to absorb, emulate, and learn. Geddes
often spoke of the city as if it had a soul, spirit,
and essence. In idealizing the city, Geddes under-
scored his belief that things that are represented by
the city constitute the very substance of man's noblest
achievements, that they are "those matters," to adopt
the expression of Matthew Arnold whose ideas Geddes
embraced, "which most concern us, the best which has
been thought and said in the world."3 1 Geddes thus
contends that the city is an expression of those values
and ideals that individuals must learn to reach human
perfection, and that it offers standards by which other
aspects of human life must be judged. It is on the
basis of this belief that Geddes likened the city to
the medieval cloister and to the university.
On the other hand, Geddes also viewed the city as
itself a socio-cultural environment, an empirical
reality that actively fosters, regardless of the indi-
vidual's intention or consciousness, certain values,
ideas and ways of life. In this sense, the city
functions not as a sign whose meaning can be known
only to those who actively seek to know, but as a
collective, material condition that impinges on every
citizen, whether he likes it or not, and whether he is
aware of it or not. In this second sense, then, the
city is like a climate; it forms an objective, supra-
individual factor of human existence with which one
has no choice but to contend. In short, the city in
the second sense is itself a socio-cultural heritage
with a causal power to mold people.
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What we find in Geddes' program for historical
surveys, then, is another manifestation of environmen-
talism which, as we have seen, formed the basis of his
regionalism. Underlying the program of historical
surveys are the ideas that the thought and activities
of individuals are invariably dependent on the forms
and organizations of socio-cultural tradition, and that
the city constitutes one such collective tradition. The
program accepts as fundamental premises that the
individual is malleable, and that his external man-made
world molds him. The holistic approach with which
Geddes views society and culture supports this envi-
ronmental view of man and the city; for Geddes, socio-
cultural tradition is a general property diffused
throughout the extent of a given society and, although
arising from the activities of its individual members,
transcends them in the modes of existence and function-
ing. Because it is seen as an external and autonomous
reality relative to individuals, it is granted a coercive
power; individuals can resist or violate it, but they
cannot ignore it. The city thus arises as an indepen-
dent collective fact, emancipating investigation into
its nature and functioning. The emancipation consists
in discovering that it was a mistake to suppose that
the origin of any society, or any widely prevalent
social institution, could be understood through knowing
how individual human beings, when first brought together
in a social situation, might be expected to behave. The
nature of man depends on the nature of the society in
which he exists.
Geddes was certainly not alone in accepting the
notion that individuals are moulded by the collective
socio-cultural environment. Mill had challenged the
individualist, universalist precept of Benthamite
utilitarianism, and Pugin saw, already in the mid-1830's,
the correlation between the general condition of art and
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and the "generally prevalent way of life." The "roman-
tics" Coleridge, Carlyle, and Ruskin saw society as a
necessary condition for the well-being of individuals,32
Similar assumptions have already been discussed in
connection with Owen. The growing interest in exotic
cultures, and the concomitant establishment of anthro-
pology as a discipline, also expressed a growing concern
over the relationship between the collective cultural
tradition and the development of individuals.
Concomitant with the holistic conception of the city
and society is Geddes' commitment to the idea of commu-
nity. Like the Russian biologist and ecologist Kropotkin,
with whom he had extensive communications on both biolo-
gical and social matters, Geddes considers cooperation
natural to man, and sociability as an asset for survival
and successful evolution. The city, as the culmination
of human evolution, is, Geddes contends, by origin and
nature a community. He concedes that these qualities
have been lost in modern cities, but that precisely
such an anomaly is what requires correction through
civic planning. By insisting on the value of community,
Geddes attempted to correct what he saw as the excess
of a vulgar Darwinism with its blind acceptance of the
"principle" of competition and individualism as the
only "natural" and ultimately beneficial principle of
social life. While not totally denying the value of
the latter, Geddes, in keeping with his synthetic turn
of mind embracing both holistic and anarchistic approaches
to social philosophy, eagerly accommodates the value
of its opposite.
Thus far we have examined the two parts of Geddes'
program of a civic survey separately. This separate
treatment is justified at least on one level because
the two surveys have distinct concerns and approaches.
The geographic survey is essentially an ecological
investigation into the relationship between the natural
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environment and the socio-cultural aspects of the city,
with a strong emphasis on the causative power of the
former. The historic survey, on the other hand, pursues
the relationship between the city and its citizens, on
the assumption that the city as an embodiment of a
socio-cultural heritage affects the lives and activities
of its citizens. That these two surveys and the con-
ceptual premise behind them are distinct,33 Geddes
grants; he recognizes that they represent, respectively,
the doctrines of regionalism (or naturalism) and
humanism, doctrines that were often viewed as competing
ones historically. It was Geddes' contention that he
united these two contending orientations in his science
of civics.
Before we consider the reasons for Geddes' conten-
tion above, let us leave Geddes and his civics briefly
and consider another of the new "sciences" that arose
in Victorian England and was an antagonist in the con-
troversy over environmentalism, Francis Galton's
eugenics. Galton was one of the founding members of the
then newly-established Sociological Society, the learned
society to which Geddes had presented his "civics"
papers; eugenics, along with Geddes' civics and Charles
Booth's social survey, occupied an important place in
the Society's intellectual direction until a separate
eugenics society was created in 1906.34 In one of
the Society's first meetings (Geddes was in the audience),
Galton gave a lecture entitled "Eugenics, its Definition,
Scope, and Aims," which summarized the views he had
formulated from the time of his seminal Hereditary
Genius of 1868.35 The definition of eugenics that
Galton gave on that occasion was "the science that deals
with all influences that improve the inborn qualities
of a race." The most basic premise of the science is
that differences among people are genetically rather
than environmentally determined. To quote Galton:
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I have no patience with the hypothesis occasionally
expressed and often implied, especially in tales
written to teach children to be good, that babies
are born pretty much alike, and that the sole
agencies in creating differences between boy and
boy, and man and man, are steady application and
moral effort, It is in the most unqualified
manner that I reject the pretensions of natural
equality. The experiences of the nursery, the
school, the university, and of professional careers,
are a chain of proofs to the contrary. (36)
Galton extends this innatist thesis to social and racial
contexts. According to him, the state of society or
nation depends on the quality of the "racial stock"
making up that society, that is, the proportion of
healthy, intelligent, "superior" individuals in that
population group. He even attributed socio-cultural
variations among various groups to differentiations
in group-restricted heredity drives and attitudes.37
In order to enhance national wealth, then, there has
to be a corresponding improvement of "racial stock."
And, Galton argued, it would be "quite practical to
produce a highly gifted race of men by judicious
marriages during consecutive generations" and by
encouraging the physically unfit to practice birth
control or be sterilized. To do so is, according to
Galton, not only the moral duty of every individual,
but also an obligation of the public authorities.
Unless eugenics is sufficiently propagated and enforced,
Malthus' recommendation of moral restraint by postponing
marriage will likely be followed only by that segment
of society whose superior intelligence and moral strength
makes its propagation more desirable. Consequently,
Galton suggested that eugenics be made into something
of a national religion -- a religion whose aim is to
control the course of human evolution by controlling
reproduction. Galton writes;
What nature does blindly, slowly, and ruthlessly
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man may do providently, quickly and kindly. As it
lies within his power, so it becomes his duty to
work in that direction; just as it is his duty to
succor neighbours who suffer misfortune. The
improvement of our stock seems to me one of the
highest objects that we can reasonably attempt.
We are ignorant of the ultimate destinies of
humanity, but feel perfectly sure that it is as
noble a work to raise the level in the sense
already explained, as it is disgraceful to abase it.
I see no impossibility in Eugenics becoming a
religious -dogma among mankind, but its details must
first be worked out sedulously in study. (38)
There are many parallels between the program of
civics and that of eugenics, parallels which made them
more than incidental affiliates in the Sociological
Society. They are both concerned with improving man's
social situation; they both rely on biological know-
ledge for this purpose -- indeed, both of them claim
to be applied biology; and they both seek to use the
knowledge of natural law to affect the course of
evolution to fit human purposes.
Despite these similarities, however, the contrast
is also evident. Civics embraces an environmental
moulding of man and society as an important if not
primary fact of life; eugenics rejects environmental
conditioning in favor of genetic predetermination.
Galton and the other eugenicists considered delinquents
and social misfits as naturally feeble-minded and,
therefore, immutable; one can eradicate them but not
improve them. Geddes rejected such hereditary deter-
minism. He argued:
Many of those whom eugenists are apt to think of
and to tabulate as 'degenerates' in type and stock
are really but deteriorates, and this in corres-
pondence to their depressive environment. (39)
By eliminating unhealthy living conditions, and by
improving the educational setting, Geddes contended,
these misfits could be made to rise above "average" as
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they now fall below, "Such types and stocks, which
our wholesale Paleotechnic experiment of slum-culture
has proved most sensitive or adaptive to its evils,
should correspondingly no less respond to better con-
ditions, and this rise above average as they now fall
below." 40 Geddes considered that eugenics' insistence
on heredity implied a fatalism and crude Darwinism,
which he rejected as a "reactionary sophistry" discou-
raging the "uplift of the people with the improvement
of their conditioning."
In spite of his strong reservations, however,
Geddes did not reject the proposals of eugenics in toto.
His main criticism of eugenics was not that it was
morally wrong or scientifically unfounded. With the
eugenicists, Geddes was convinced that the advancement
of biological knowledge allowed and compelled man to
think in terms of the long-term future of his species;
just as man selects and plants forests and improves
animals with "statesman-like patience," he must be in
command of his own future evolution as a species-being.
Geddes' objection to the eugenic theory was, then,
that it constituted "too much monopolizing of the
heritage. ,41 By insisting on the primacy of biological
inheritance, Geddes contended, the eugenicists failed
to deal adequately with the nurturing role the envi-
ronment plays, and with the formative role education
and enculturation have in making man "socially human."
Following his synthetic turn of mind, Geddes
attempted to resolve the contrast between heredity and
environment or between nature and nurture by embracing
both and recognizing either alone as being incomplete.
Geddes advises: "As regards the Eugenic movement, with
its invaluable insistence on the fundamental importance
of nature, it can do this with best effect when it does
not at the same time depreciate the work of those
devoted to the improvement of nurture; let it rather
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collaborate with them,"42 According to Geddes, then,
civics as a science concerned with the task of improving
"nurture" is complementary, not contradictory to,
eugenics, the science concerned with improving "nature,"
"The ideals of civics and eugenics lare] in agreement,
and Ithey must] no longer Ibel studied apart, as separate
specialisms, nor advocated as if they were rival pana-
ceas."43
The foregoing brief excursion was to highlight
Geddes' environmentalism by contrasting it with Francis
Galton's biological determinism, and also to illustrate
Geddes' synoptic approach. Let us return to the main
subject of the program for the science of civics and
its two components: geographical survey and historical
survey. As we have already noted, Geddes recognized
these two "surveys" as representing distinct conceptual
orientations, and claimed that through the science of
civics he "united" the two orientations -- regionalism
and humanism. This claim leads us to the central
questions: On what basis does Geddes make this extra-
ordinary claim? What are the methodological and
practical ramifications of this supposed "union"? What
role does the city play in relation to this conceptual
"union," or vice versa?
To state the conclusion first: what binds together
the various aspects of Geddes' theory of the city and
city planning is, I submit, his organicist philosophy.
It is his insistence on approaching given phenomena,
whether natural or human, in terms of life (and envi-
ronment as its important concomitant) that provides a
conceptual framework to the entire theory of civics,
allowing the unity of the two doctrines. Indeed, one
can say that the very possibility of conceiving a
science of the city, and of putting an ethical value
on the practice of city planning, rests on the organi-
cist "hard core" of Geddes' thinking.
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The idea of life and living was central to Geddes,
who began his professional career as a botanist and
remained so throughout his life even when he was
engaged in matters of civics and city planning. The
title of his last lecture at Dundee, where he had been
a professor in botany, was significantly "How a Botanist
Looks at a World."44 For him, learning and living were
one; his recurrent motto was vivendo discimus, learning
from living. He firmly believed that from life emanates
knowledge, society, and history, that enrichment of life
is the goal of man's practical activities, and that
understanding the nature of life is the ultimate goal
of science.
Instead of defining life, which Geddes thought
should come as a result of study rather than from its
beginning, he was interested in determining its mani-
festations. For him, one of the most fundamental
manifestations of life is simply the process of inter-
action between an organism and its environment, As such,
life cannot be analyzed in terms of the organism's
physiology and morphology alone; it fundamentally
involves interaction by an organism with its environment.
An attempt to understand life solely on the basis of
morphology and dissection is futile -- dried up plants
and dead animals do not exhibit the essence of the
living, Geddes maintained. According to Geddes, then,
organism, function and environment are the three-fold
aspects of life: "Those thinkers and doers who do not
recognize the trilogy of organism, function and envi-
ronment are wrong from the start," 4 5
In keeping with his conception of life as an inter-
action between organism and environment, Geddes
maintained that an evolutionary theory would be incom-
plete unless it placed equal weight both on the influence
of environment on organism and on the organism's active
modification of the environment. This consideration led
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Geddes to adopt a critical view of the evolutionary
theories of Buffon, Darwin and Lamarck, which he consi-
dered typified the current view of his time,46 Accord-
ing to Geddes, Buffon was in error when he explained
evolution in terms of the role of environment in limit-
ing selectively the fertility of organism and in elimi-
nating certain life forms through cataclysms; in Geddes'
view, Buffon overstressed the effect of environment
on organism while not giving due weight to the power
of an organism to change its environment to fit its
needs. Darwin's contrasting evolutionary theory provo-
ked equal disagreement on the part of Geddes; Darwin
was wrong, from Geddes' standpoint, in considering
environment merely as a passive "sieve," sifting and
winnowing variations endogenously formed but incapable
of generating variations.
Geddes' own position is close to that of Lamarck,
although he did not agree with the latter's particular
explanation of the mechanism of the inheritance of
acquired characteristics. With Lamarck, Geddes contended
that the life experience of an organism immediately and
directly modifies its hereditary nature, but at the same
time, maintained that the organism is not merely a
passive "victim upon whom environment worked its will
like a sculptor does on his clay," but an active agent
capable of shaping its future by modifying its environ-
ment. In short, for Geddes, heredity and environment
are not two contrasting and mutually exclusive factors,
but complementary pairs with equal importance which
must be held together in a "comprehensive" theory of
evolution. Thus, the schema of the three-fold categories
of life provide a way of seeing for Geddes.
The second facet of Geddes' organicism is the holis-
tic consideration of levels, Geddes approaches the
world in terms of a complex system consisting of many
levels of organization, each of which, he considers,
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has a certain degree of autonomy in its operation and
behavior and is, thus, "irreduceable" to another level;
the whole is not equal to the sum of its parts, Thus,
ecology is a separate discipline having a subject
matter that cannot be analyzed in terms of individual
physiology, and phylogeny cannot be equated with the
collection of ontogeny. The same logic is applied to
the "socio-sphere." This is why Geddes says: "There
is an old saying, 'the proper study of mankind is man',
but it would be just as true to say: 'the proper study
of man is mankind', if we mean by mankind all human
societies. As in the case of the relationship
between organism and environment, Geddes is not necessa-
rily rejecting a summative approach, but is expressing
the fact that a sumnative approach with the exclusion
of a holistic integration is unacceptable.
Geddes' insistence on respecting the holistic nature
of the socio-sphere was a reaction to what he saw as
the dominant reductionist individualism of his time.
Geddes' criticism of the individualist mechanism is
well presented in Coming Polity, where he and his co-
author, Victor Branford, considered the theoretical
orientation of Julian Huxley, once Geddes' teacher, as
an ardent follower of Darwinian evolutionism. Accepting
him as one who represents "with incomparable fidelity"
the spirit of science in the nineteenth century, the
authors contend that Huxley'-s mechanism is an outcome
of the peculiarly mechanical and militaristic mores
of his time, lacking, therefore, general scientific
and practical validity. The doctrine is wrong, above
all, because neither nature nor the human world are
completely mechanically constituted; to so insist is
to force an excessive specialization and departmenta-
lization of knowledge, resulting in a complete mis-
understanding of social phenomena. It is also unethical,
Geddes and Branford argue, because it justifies and
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promotes a "jungle anarchy" as well as "predatory
politics" and their concomitant products; war, misery,
and human conflict.
The recognition of social wholes as facts
language, community, religion, city -- invites a
heightened interest in the relationship between such
wholes and their parts, rendering new sets of relation-
ships accessible to self-conscious contemplation. This
part-whole relationship becomes the object of "scientific"
interpretation, once the holistic view is applied to
the social order. And, given the fundamental ecological
schema, the way to interpret this part-whole relation-
ship is by conjoining it with the schema of organism-
environment. The conjoining of the two sides of Geddes'
organicist orientation -- environmentalism and holism
-- forms the basis for his social thinking in general
and theory of civics in particular. Accordingly, the
city is seen at once as an organism and as an environ-
ment: when it is considered in relation to its surround-
ing world, it is taken as if it were an organism and
the surrounding world an environment; when confronted
with its citizens, the city is conceptualized as an
environment and the citizens as organisms.
What Geddes achieves with this correlation is the
creation of a third category, "human environment," to
stand between the categories of nature and culture.
As an intermediate category, the "human environment"
is given the attributes of both nature and culture.
Seen as a human environment, then, the city is simul-
taneously an integral part and external condition of
human existence. When seen as an organism, it is
considered as possessing a life of its own ("the civic
drama"), a history (."the civic evolution"), and indi-
viduality ("the civic personality"); seen as such, the
city is made up of body and mind or morphology and
physiology: its physical side materializes, influences,
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and is in turn influenced by its functional and cultural
side. When seen as an environment, on the other hand,
the city is an external, autonomous, impinging world
within which people live their lives; it is a material
setting capable of affecting the condition of people's
lives. It has a degree of coercive power. Geddes
expresses the correlation between the biological and
social triads with the following diagram.
- BIOLOGICAL
ORGAN ISM -ENVIRONMT
FOLK ..-. PLACE
OBJ. ..''. OCIAL
SUB. ...
FUNCIldNINGS
WORK
Biological and Social. The outer triangle is biological, with its organismal,
functional, and environmental aspects. In the social sphere, Folk, Work
and Place correspond to Organisms, Functionings, and Environment;
in the Biosphere. The convex surface (OBJ.) indicates objective aspects,
the inner surface (SUB.) indicates the subjective life.
One can now see more clearly why Geddes claims that
civics "unifies" the two separate doctrines of naturalism
and humanism and thereby resolves the old controversy
of nature versus nurture, By positing human environment
as a new category lying between the two dichotomous
poles of nature and man, he effectively breaks the
dichotomy and joins them in a consistent, continuous
and complementary relationship. The consistency of
this new tri-partite schema is guaranteed by the common
ecological framework he applies to either of the two
pairs: region and city, city and citizen, The continuity
within the schema, on the other hand, is established,
as the city, conceptualized at once as an organism and
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The Biological Prism.-I, The Organism (ORG) in relation to its Environment
(ENV) in its functions and functionings (FN). The prism is drawn un-
completed, to suggest that all the three sides are changing. II, The
convex outer surface indicates the objective aspect (OBJ). The concave
inner surface indicates the subjective or psychical aspect (SUB). In the
case of the environment, this is evident enough when part of the environ-
ment is animate.
s4
ORG r-ENV
O E
F
Organism and Environment. I, The Environment (ENV) may act on the
Organism, producing a dint ormodinication (1). The organism may produce
a change in its environment (2). II, The organism has an uplift, and
pulls up its environment. III, The environment improves, and raises
the organism. IV, The functionings are depressed; organisms and environ-
ment follow.
organism and environment12. Geddes' diagrams:
an environment, binds the two pairs in a series of
cause and effect relationships. And the complementa-
rity of the two partial relational pairs is respected,
as Geddes accepts that the one concerns mostly the
effect of nature and the other human creative activities.
Thus, the city becomes an essential part of a large
model of the world, identified and conceptualized for
the new "science" of civics.
We see that however determinism may limit life on
physical or even organic levels, the psychological
and social life may be thereby all the more pressed
on to higher freedom of effort beyond. But do not
even achievements again become limits? Undeniably,
yet never absolute ones.
Thus, instead of a simple acceptance of either
determinist or libertarian conclusions, we see in
their perpetual alteration on heightening levels,
a main factor of true progress, though granting
that progress may at times be arrested -- or even
too easily go the wrong way. But even here the
Dutch national dyke-vigilance comes in, as an
exemplary principle; the spirit thus controlling
the environmental life-adjustment, even when and
where it cannot at the time transcend it. (48)
collective
individual
environment
"geographical
environmentalism"
"humanism"t
organism
environment
MAN organism
nature 4 ) culture
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Given this organismic orientation and its application
to social spheres, it is expected that Geddes considered
planning a privileged means of securing human welfare,
indeed a tool for man's conscious evolution, After all,
given this organicist and ecological interpretation of
social life, modifying one's environment is the very
act of living, as being modified by it is an inescapa-
ble fact of life. Once it is granted that man is
moulded by the environment, even if it is of his own
making, his actions on the environment acquire a
profound evolutionary meaning. Thus Geddes writes:
"The world remade by effective men of action becomes
in turn the environment that shapes over men, stimulates
their mental life, which in turn leads them to change
the world even further."49 The making and modifying
of the human environment -- particularly the city which
is the human environment par excellence -- is then seen
as a part of the same process of shaping man's own
future; Geddes expresses this idea by saying that "our
life and progress involve the interaction and uplift
of population with work and place, as well as of place
and work with people. Cities in evolution and people
in evolution must thus progress together."5 0
Also intelligible in the light of Geddes' organicist-
environmental approach are the directions of practical
planning that he advocated. Geddes preferred citizen
participation over a cabal of specialists in carrying
out city planning. In his view, the city as an envi-
ronment affects the life of each and every individual
living in it; and, therefore, a citizen's interaction
with the city is both an inevitable as well as an
obligatory part of his life. The science of civics
and the education of people in the findings of this
science are also crucial for rational planning; the
city, like an organism, has a life-trajectory of its
own, and without an understanding of this life-trajectory,
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no effective, meaningful planning is feasible,. The
organism-life characteristic of the city also means
that incremental change is preferable to comprehensive
and wholesale change: "conservatory surgery" rather
than wanton destruction and construction, Man can
only guide the direction of evolution, he can neither
ignore it nor work against it, Above all, Geddes'
civics emphasizes, the proper method of planning is
one directed toward the enhancement of life in its
totality. From this point of view, economic, aesthetic,
or technological concerns are not enough; the -method
of city planning must be one of ecology, "bio-technics"
and "geo-technics."
* * *
To be accurate, Geddes did not produce a theory of
the city, if by theory one means a set of testable
hypotheses and explanations. Geddes' civics is essen-
tially a philosophy of urbanism, an interpretive schema;
it locates the city in a global model of life and the
world of things, and relates the knowledge of the city
in the matrix of human learning; its purpose is not to
define and probe the city internally and on an ad hoc
basis, but to reason why the city deserves a serious
scientific understanding. The fundamental precept of
his urban thought is that the city represents a human
environment par excellence, that it is a factor moulding
us and our civilization. As the city is a factor of
our evolution both as individuals and as a species,
learning about it is part of learning about ourselves,
and acting on it is the same as acting on our own
future. Knowing, planning, and living are the same
thing. 5 1
What we have here, then, is a simultaneously
broadened and concrete conception of environment and its
application to the phenomena of the city. Compared to
191
the universalistic, homogeneous, and undifferentiated
conception of environment that characterized Benthan,
Owen, Helvetius, and others, Geddes' environment is
highly concrete; it is rooted in place, centered around
organism, and differentiated in the nature of its
resources; most importantly, environment in Geddes'
civics includes the products of man, which in turn
are differentiated from nature as "human environment."
The ascendance of the city as a primary subject is now
rendered possible by this shift in environmental
thinking. And what in turn makes this transformation of
environmental ideas possible is essentially the rise
in the field of discourse of organicism, and its
attendant holistic, evolutionary, and ecological
emphasis. Geddes, through his unique zeal for a uni-
versal synthesis, contributed to this process of
"environmentalizing" the city to an unprecedented degree
and thereby opened the beginning of modern science and
the praxis of urbanism,
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CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION
Within a decade after Geddes presented his program
for the new science of civics to the Sociological
Society of London, urbanism finally came to attain a
formal status as a separate discipline in its own
right. In 1909 England witnessed the establishment of
the first school of civic design as well as the enact-
1
ment of the first town planning law. In 1910 the
first town planning conference was held in London, and
in the same year the Town Planning Institute was
founded.2 By 1915, the development of city planning
had become a priority concern for every municipality
in England, a phenomenon soon to be repeated in the
United States.3 The formation of town planning as a
separate profession accompanied the rise of sub-
disciplines specialized in the study of the city. In
1921 Robert Park and Ernest Burgess outlined the
program for human ecology, initiating a series of
fertile researches into the form and processes of urban
communities.4 Similar developments took place in the
fields of geography, anthropology, and economics, giving
rise to new specialized studies investigating various
aspects of the city.
Within the field of design, the emergence of urbanism
represented a culmination of revolt against the tradi-
tional ideas, attitudes, and methods associated with
architecture. Epitomizing the rising new consciousness,
LeCorbusier declared;
Architecture , , can no longer do anything to help
modern society; it is doomed to stagnation as long
as it has no program and no environment. Cities
1 5
are made by planning, and architecture can do
nothing without such plans, For the houses it
creates are in cities; they are the cities
themselves. (5)
From the perspective of this new orientation, the
city was no longer a designed product or the formless,
indeterminate "forest" Laugier spoke of, and the
purpose of action neither geometric ordering nor
embellishment. Equally unacceptable were such tradi-
tional stock notions of the trade as "evocation,"
"expression," and "representation": for the pioneers
of modern urbanism imbued with environmental ideas,
these notions were symptoms of misguided spiritualism,
boneless as ghosts.6 Under the new consciousness the
most important qualities of the city were its immediacy,
materiality, and empiricity; the city became an effector,
a set of variables affecting materially the development
of the inhabitants' lives in all their manifestations.
As the city gained its immediacy, materiality, and
empiricity, the inhabitants also ascended as the funda-
mental axis of the city and city planning. Thus the
most focal relationship shifted from one of authorship
between the city and the designer to one of ecology
between the city and its anonymous inhabitants. The
planners were no longer creators; they became interpre-
ters of and interveners in this ecological relationship.
With this, life emerged as the central parameter of
planning. The goal of planning became fulfillment of
the needs of the inhabitants' lives in all their "twenty-
four hour cycles." The meeting of modern architects at
La Sarraz in 1928, a meeting out of which the International
Congress of Modern Architecture CC,I.A.M,) was to spring,
adopted the following description of the nature of town-
planning:
Town-planning is the design of the different settings
for the development of material, emotional and
spiritual life in all its manifestations, individual
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and collective, and it includes both town and
country. Town-planning cannot be submitted
exclusively to the rules of an arbitrary aesthe-
ticism; it is essentially functional. The three
basic functions with which town-planning must
concern itself are: (1) living; (2). working;
(3) recreation . . . . (71
As the city became the target of environmental
planning in the emergent nodern urbanism, biology, as
a science studying the relationship between life and
its environment, came to be embraced as the new
discipline's intellectual foundation. "Biology!"
LeCorbusier exclaimed, "the great new word in archi-
tecture and planning."8 In a similar vein, Jose Luis
Sert called for "urban biology" to guide actions to
it I 9save modern cities. The environmental-biological
outlook was particularly dominant in neighborhood or
community planning, a newly emphasized sub-area in
modern urbanism. According to the idea of "neighborhood
unit," first formulated by Clarence Perry in 1929,10
the neighborhood was not just a mentally and/or
administratively constructed area but an ecological fact
as well as a desideratum of planning; it was taken to
be a vital environment of people's daily life, an
ecological unit nurturing community values and generally
conditioning their enculturation and socialization.
Neighborhood or community planning was, then, an exercise
in "urban biology" aimed at buttressing such ecological
units. Richard Neutra, writing in the 1950's, even called
to have an "expert in biology" chair a scientific board
that he proposed was necessary to assist the "art of
community planning."11
Environmentalism and biologism thus came to consti-
tute the two-sided conceptual core of the nascent field
of urbanism. Many pioneers of the field self-consciously
"borrowed" ideas from the biological sciences, including
ecology, in formulating their theories and methods. In
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In order to determine the philosophical sources of
modern urbanism, however, the recognition of such
"borrowings" is not enough. Borrowing presupposes a
sense of plausibility on the part of the borrower of
his acquisition. In other words, for borrowing to
take place, there has to be a widespread preconception
of analogies between biological and urban phenomena in
the nature of problems, issues and tasks. What requires
to be accounted for is, therefore, the sources of such
preconception.
It has been the contention of this study that the
fields of modern urbanism and biological sciences are
on a deeper level products of the same broad intellectual
transformations; that the epistemological strata that
gave rise to modern urbanism is one and the same with
the one that produced modern biology. It is the sharing
of this common epistemological strata or the "archeo-
logical level of knowledge" that sanctioned the life-
centered outlook that is characteristic of modern
urbanism.
As a correlate of organicism, environmentalism forms
an important part of such "archeological strata" of
modern urbanism. A general form of knowledge and model
of the world that emerged at the end of the eighteenth
century, environmentalism introduced a new set of facts
into the realm of conscious and empirical thinking and
set the familiar ones under a new light. It raised
locality as a fundamental factor of things in the world.
In doing so it reconstituted the received static and
unitary world view to a dynamic and diversified one
where the continuous interaction between things and
their environments is a fundamental precept. Environ-
mentalism thus deprived things of self-containedness
and immutability which had been formerly ascribed to
them, Instead, environmentalism reintroduced them
as malleable entities, which actively mold and are in
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turn molded by their surrounding world. The granting of
a new epistemological and ontological status to locality
invited empirical investigations to aspects of this newly
arisen fact. In these investigations, the central concepts
were those of adaptation, function, process, and develop-
ment rather than those of proportion, form, self-
containedness and permanence. Under environmentalism,
diversity, relativity, and chance became norms rather
than aberrations. Form came to be seen not just as a
finished product whose sole role was to embody or express,
but as a dynamic property with functional and developmental
implications.
We have traced the history of the rise of environ-
mentalism and of the concomitant emergence of urbanism.
The way for environmentalism was opened with the decline
of the static, unitary and geometric world views of
Cartesian mechanism and natural history. Environmentalism
emerged when the rise of the idea of life led to a recon-
stitution of the form of knowledge, bringing in a cate-
gorical separation of the organic from the inorganic and
thereby positing a functional interdependence between
things and factors endogenous and exogenous; it came to
be applied to the consideration of the human condition,
as the traditional dichotomy of determinism and humanism
gave way to the idea of the malleability of human nature.
Once the growing feeling of alienation as well as the
holistic approach "externalized" the world of man-made
artifacts from man as a separate, independent fact,
environmentalism finally arrived in humanistic discourse;
"environmentalized," artifacts came to be seen as
constituting a semi-autonomous, causally effective empi-
rical domain with which man is correlated not just as
an unconstrained producer but also as a passive
receptor. With the environmentalization of human arti-
facts, the city came to gain visibility to systematic
thinking as well as to activism; the city arose finally
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as an object of scientific knowledge and as a field of
planned intervention founded on such knowledge, The
respective proposals and theories of Bentham, Owen,
Chadwick, and Geddes were presented as illustrations
of the emergent environmentalism in its varying stages.
In many ways, environmentalism rendered the forma-
tion of new fields of enquiry and action not only
possible but also highly desirable. Besides making
new facts and relations accessible to self-conscious
thought, environmentalism also defined a new intellec-
tual problematic: if a man or society is wholly a
product of the environment, then to understand a parti-
cular man or society, one needs only to understand the
environmental forces that acted on the subject, Envi-
ronmentalism also had an ethical appeal as an equalizing
philosophy: made by the environment, all men and societies
are intrinsically equal and their phenomenal differences
are only extrinsic, and therefore reversible, and hence
to be tolerated. In addition, environmentalism induced
socio-political activism: if the environment shapes
man and society, then it is a source of human and social
problems; by improving environmental conditions, there-
fore, one improves man and society. Finally, environ-
mentalism had a metaphysical appeal as a mediator: by
knowing and acting on the environment man regains his
control over his destiny; through shaping the environment
that makes him, man effectively makes himself. Thus
environmentalism offered the potential of reconciling
the dichotomy of human freedom versus determinism.
The rise of modern urbanism was thus a product of
the broad reconstitution of the conception of man and
his world brought about by environmentalism. The
reconstitution was profoundly dialectical, On the
one hand, it "externalized" what had been seen as
integral parts of human prerogative; on the other
hand, it "internalized" the natural realm by correlating
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it with the human world as a variable in a larger
ecological system. Thus environmentalism simultaneously
diminished and enlarged the domain of man's existence
and influence. The broad appeal of environmentalism
lay in this inherent dialectic quality. The same
dialectic in turn constitutes a source of the disinte-
gration of environmentalism, Once it brings the envi-
ronment to the center of conscious thought as a
separate reality, it tends to reify the environment as
a self-contained autonomous object. When the environ-
ment is completely reified, it is no longer an environ-
ment; just as in visual perception the attention to
the background makes the figure recede as a new back-
ground, the reified "environment" no longer retains the
relationship of mutual dependence with man: -man recedes
to the background as irrelevant datum. This was one
of the problems with which modern urbanism was to
grapple once it was born.
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traveaux, la vie domestique, et la condition morale des
populations ouvrieres de l'Europe, precedes- d'un expose
de la methode d'observation, (Paris: Imprimerie imperiale,
1855).
17. Patrick Geddes and Victor Branford, The Coming Polity,
(London: Williams, 1919), p. 117,
18. Karl Wittfogel, applying an ecological approach, explained
the peculiarity of Chinese society as a consequence of the
hydraulic bureaucracies arising from the techno-environmental
exigencies of large-scale irrigation, See his Oriental
Despotism, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), Julian
Steward, another pioneer of cultural ecology, also stressed
the functional interdependence between features of social
organization and techno-environmental requirements and
resources. Julian Steward, The Theory of Cultural Change,
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1955).
19. Geddes was the editor of "The Evergreen," a semi-annual literary
review that he and his colleagues established in 1895. The
purpose of the review was to restore Scottish regional culture
and its literary tradition. While it lasted only four issues,
it promoted artistic and literary works towards the renaissance
of folk culture. See Philip Boardman, The Worlds of Patrick
Geddes, (London: Routledge, Kegan & Paul, 1978), pp. 149-152.
Geddes' Dunfermline proposal also stressed strongly the revival
of regional culture; Geddes' proposals for the creation of art
-museums, schools, and other cultural institutions in the context
of part planning represented Geddes' regional commitment. Dora
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Wiebenson suggests that Geddes was an intellectual source
for Tony Garnier's regionaliam in his Cite Industrielle,
another monument of early modern urbanism. Geddes' Dunferm-
line project and Garnier's scheme were contemporaneous.
See Dora Wiebenson, Tony Garnier: Cite Industrielle, (New
York: G. Braziller, 1970), pp. 16, 17.
20. Because of its emphasis on land as the primary determinant
of productive activities, Geddes! regionalism was strongly
biased in favor of agrarianism. Reilly, in his Early
Social Thought, pp. 94-103, shows the connection between
Geddes' conception of economy and that of Quesnay's, the
leader of the physiocrats. Geddes' disapprobal of metropolitan
commercialism was a source of conflict between the Regional
Planning Association of America (RPAA) favouring Geddes'
conception of planning, and the Regional Plan Association,
New York, favouring metropolitan planning. Mel Scot, op. cit.,
pp. 223, 261, 292, 293.
21. Geddes' life-centered approach was akin to the neo-vitalist
philosophy of Henri Bergson. Geddes was in fact involved
with Bergson's attempt to create an international institute
of intellectual cooperation. See Boardman, op, cit., p. 371.
22. Marshall Stolley, ed., Patrick Geddes, (New Brunswick:
Rutgers University Press, 1972), p. 335.
23. A paleotechnic order, characterized by a coal-based industry,
emphasis on cotton production, quest for the expansion of
markets, "predatory" commercial competition, and ill-sanitized
and crowded cities with slums, is to be replaced by an indus-
trial order of "neotechnic," which is far more efficient in
the use of energy, chiefly electricity, and resources, and
enables a more harmonious relationship between the city and
the country. Cities in Evolution, pp. 32, 57.
24, Geddes and Branford, op. cit., p. 154.
25. Ibid., p. 153.
26, Ibid., pp, 123-125.
27. Geddes, City Development, p. 211.
28. Geddes and Branford, op. cit., p. 154.
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28, On the same subject, Kroeber and Kluckhohn citing Wund.report
the~ following history- of the word civilization. The modern
word 'civilization' come& from the Latin word ciyis, citizen;
ciyis gave rise to ci-itaasor city-state and cviilitas or
citizenship, which in turn:developed into the Medieval
divitablis or urbanizable, and this to the Romance language
d1*1lizataio meaning to urbanize or to civilize, The current
word 'civilization, as referring to the state and process is
.derived from the latter, :Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 6p; dit,,
p. 159.
29. Geddes and Branford, ' pp. 149, 150.
30, Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 6p dit, , Part I, pp, 11-76, Also on
the relationship between the' concept of culture and social
philosophy in the context of nineteenth century England,
see Raymond Williams' Culture and Society,
31, Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anardhy, (New York: Macmillan, 1891), p. 6.
32. Raymond Williams-, op . cit . passim.
33. The distinction between the historic and geographic survey
roughly parallels- the division by Comte of the new science
of sociology into social statistics and social dynamics,
Social statistics is a study of the permanent, structural,
and functional conditions of social order examining the ways
in which the essential functions of society are performed by
its parts and the manner in which the various functions
require integration. Social dynamics, on the other hand,
investigates- how social systems vary in time, and what their
pattern of development is. Cf. A. Comte, The Positive
Philosophy, trans. H. Martineau, (London: G. Bell, 18961,
34. R.J. Halliday, "The Sociological Movement, the Sociological
Society and the Genesis of Academic Sociology in Britain,"
The. Sociological Review, 16, no. 3 (November 1968), pp, 377-
398,
35. Besides Francis Galton, Karl rearaon and Edward Brabrook were
the leading proponents of eugenics, Eugenics was institu-
tionalized in 1907 with the formation of the National Eugenics
Laboratory at the University of London.
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36. Galton quoted by D.W. Forrest, op, cit., p. 89.
37. According to Galton's eugenics theory, the negro race is two
grades below the white race in -mental abilities. Very few
negroes have shown abilities as high as the lest of the whites.
the whites. The white traveller -- not usually an outstanding
individual in his own culture -- fares better when he is
compared to the native chiefs, who are highly s-elected from
among their own kind and attain their place by their abilities.
Galton, Hereditary Genius, pp. 325-338.
38. Galton, op. cit., p. 227,
39. Geddes, Cities in Evolution, p. 36.
40, Ibid., p. 152.
41. Geddes and Thomson, Life, p. 992.
42. Ibid., p. 991.
43. Geddes, Cities in Evolution, p. 152.
44. Included in Geddes, Cities in Evolution, as an appendix,
pp. 214-230.
45. Thomson and Geddes, op. cit., p. 1242.
46. Geddes' belief in the influence of the environment on heredity
remained strong even in the face of Weissmann's germ plasm theory,
which foreshadowed modern genetic discoveries. Weissmann contended
that all organisms contained within their cells hereditary
substance (genes in modern terms) which could be formed anew
or influenced form outside. Geddes found this a "veritable
physiological miracle," tantamount to positing that the repro-
ductive protoplasm leads a life separate from the general life
of the body. Reilly, op. cit., p. 197.
47. Geddes and Thomson, op, cit., p. 1159.
48. Ibid., p. 1438.
49. Geddes, "The Notation of Life," in his Cities in Evolution,
edited by the Outlook Tower Association, p. 196.
50. Ibid., p. 153.
51. In her essay on Geddes' civics, Helen Meller finds that Geddes'
approach is fundamentally riddled by the "paradox" of a conflict
between his ethical, moral interest and that of his "scientific,"
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more objective approach, A closer reading of Geddes reveals
that there is no division between morality and knowledge in
his philosophy of life to generate such a "paradox"; a common
concept of and respect for life fuels both his scientific
and ethical understanding. Planning and civics warrant a
primary standing because Geddes' "scientific" approach convin-
ces him of their evolutionary meaning and the latter in turn
compels him to seek for the "principles" of the meaning.
CONCLUSION
1. The first school of Civic Design was established at Liverpool
University. Ashworth, op. cit., p. 193.
2. Loc. cit.
3. Ibid., pp. 167-192.
4. Robert Park, Ernest Burgess, and Roderick McKenzie, eds.,
The City, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968),
For general reading in the general theory of human ecology,
see Amos Hawley, Human Ecology, A Theory of Community Structure,
(New York: Ronald Press, 1950). For a sociological criticism
of the ecological theory of the city, see William Michelson
Man and His Urban Environment: A Sociological Approach,
(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1970).
5. LeCorbusier, The Radiant City, (New York: Orion Press, 1964),
p. 96.
6. LeCorbusier, When the Cathedrals Were White, (New York: McGraw
Hill Book Co., 1964), p. 147.
7. Quoted by Benevolo, The Modern Movement, vol. II of History
of Modern Architecture, (Cambridge: the MIT Press, 1960),
p. 497.
8. LeCorbusier, Radiant City, p, 155.
9. Jose Luis Sert, Can Our Cities Survive?, (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1942), p. iii,
10. Clarence Perry, Neighborhood and Community Planning, Regional
Survey Vol, VII, (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1929). An
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excellent biobliographical note on neighborhood unit planning
is James Dahir, The Neighborhood Unit Planning, (New York;
Russ-ell Sage Foundation, 1947). Suzanne Keller examines
sociological aspects of the neighborhood unit plan in her
The Urban Neighborhood, CNew York; Random House, 1968,)
11. Richard Neutra, Survival Through Design, (New York; Oxford
University Press, 1954), p, 337.
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